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 SUMMARY 
 
The following series of three essays examine the impact of peer networks of 
investment banks, including those commercial banks that recently entered security 
underwriting, on investment banking activities.  Specifically, I focus on underwriter and 
financial advisor peer networks in security underwriting and mergers and acquisitions 
advisory services, and examine how the structure of these peer networks affects the 
performance of initial public offerings, the shareholders’ wealth in mergers and 
acquisitions, and the market share of underwriters.  The results indicate that the peer 
relations of underwriters and advisors have significant implications along various 
dimensions. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Investment banking is a knowledge- and information-based industry.  Despite the 
changes in the industry and the recent switch towards the universal banking model, 
investment banking remains a relationship-intensive business.  Two major functional 
roles of investment banks are underwriters in security issuance and financial advisors in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Recently, commercial banks have joined the ranks of 
investments banks and entered security underwriting.   
 Investment banks, including those commercial banks that entered security 
underwriting, maintain relationships with each other from their cooperation in various 
investment banking activities.  These peer relationships represent important channels of 
information and resources.  Moreover, the structure of investment bank peer networks 
may vary along various dimensions, such as size and diversity, and the different 
characteristics of the networks should have implications for the quantity and quality of 
information and resources that flow through the networks.  Hence, we expect significant 
consequences from investment bank peer networks.  However, in the finance literature, 
we know very little about the effects of such networks.  Thus, this dissertation research 
studies the effects of underwriter and financial advisor peer networks.  
 Specifically, Chapter 2 examines how the structure of underwriter peer network 
affects IPO performance.  Network analysis methodology is applied to construct 
underwriter network measures in this chapter.  Our results show that underwriter 
networks have significant effects on IPO pricing and placement.  Specifically, we find 
that IPOs underwritten by book managers with larger or more centrally located networks 
  2 
are more likely to experience bigger offer price revisions, suggesting greater 
informational role of such networks.  This likelihood also increases when the book 
manager networks are more homogeneous or more cohesive.  The book managers with 
above network characteristics are also associated with higher short-run stock returns.  
Furthermore, the effects of book manager peer networks on the IPO outcomes are greater 
under certain firm characteristics and market conditions.  However, we find no significant 
difference between the informational role of networks of commercial banks and 
investment banks.  Overall, our results from this chapter show that the underwriters use 
their peer networks to generate information and place securities, and the structure of the 
networks has implications for the security issuance process. 
 Chapter 3 explores the impact of the working relationship between acquirer and 
target advisors that result from various investment banking activities on M&A 
shareholder wealth, by examining domestic M&A deals that employ advisors on both buy 
and sell sides.  In this chapter, we use measures of relative dependence between pairs of 
advisors.  Our results show that when the relative bargaining power of the target advisor 
in the relationship is greater than that of the acquirer advisor, the target premium, 
announcement return and share of the total wealth gain are higher, while the acquirer 
firm’s share is lower, and vice versa.  We also find evidence that despite the additional 
conflict of interest that can result from the advisor peer relationship, target firms are more 
likely to hire advisors that have previously worked with the acquirer advisor. 
 In Chapter 4, we study how the structure of underwriter peer network affects 
market share by using measures from social network analysis.  We find that underwriters 
with extensive ties and advantageous network positions are more likely to win book 
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manager and co-manager appointments in security underwriting and capture higher future 
market shares, especially in equity underwriting, and this effect is also more pronounced 
for commercial bank underwriters.  Moreover, underwriters that are further away from 
the given book manager in terms of social distance are less likely to be selected as co-
managers in both equity and debt underwriting, although the effect is somewhat mitigated 
for commercial banks.  We also find that investment banks are more likely to experience 
increased deal flows from homogenous networks, while commercial banks benefit from 
diverse networks.  Overall, our results in this chapter not only show that the various 
aspects of underwriter peer networks affect underwriter market share in the U.S., but also 
indicate differences in the effects of peer network between equity and debt underwriting 
and between commercial bank and investment bank underwriters.  To summarize, these 
three essays add to our knowledge of the role of social networks in the security issuance 
process and M&As. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ROLE OF UNDERWRITER PEER NETWORKS IN IPOS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Information production is one of the key functions of underwriters in equity 
underwriting.  Information that is needed to price an initial public offering (IPO) is 
neither standardized nor entirely public.  To produce price relevant information, 
underwriters utilize different sources and rely on various relationships.  One such 
relationship is the underwriter’s peer network.  This paper studies how the peer networks 
of underwriters affect the IPOs they underwrite by using measures from social network 
analysis.  We find that IPOs underwritten by book managers with larger or more centrally 
located networks are associated with a higher likelihood of offer price revision and higher 
post-issue stock returns, suggesting a potential role of peer network in price discovery in 
the primary market and distribution of securities.  The above effect is also observed if the 
networks are denser, more reciprocated, or more homogeneous. 
Despite the changes in the industry and the recent switch towards the universal 
banking model, investment banking remains a relationship-intensive business.  In the 
finance literature, from the various underwriter relationships, an underwriter’s 
relationship with client firms has received the most attention.  For example, Schenone 
(2004) studies whether the existence of a pre-IPO banking relationship with the firm 
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affects IPO underpricing, and Yasuda (2005) examines the effect of banking relationships 
on the underwriter choice in the corporate bond market.1  Certain aspects of underwriter-
investor relationship have also been examined.  For instance, using brokerage 
commission data of mutual fund families, Reuter (2006) documents that business 
relationships with lead underwriters increase investor access to underpriced IPOs.2   
Research on an underwriter’s relationship with its peers is mostly limited to 
studies addressing underwriting syndicates such as Corwin and Schultz (2005) and 
Pichler and Wilhelm (2001).  There is an interesting aspect to an underwriter’s 
relationships with its peers, however.  Through these relationships, an underwriter can tap 
other underwriters’ client and investor networks indirectly, thus reaching out to additional 
information and distribution channels.  Although such a relationship can have significant 
effects, specifically in an IPO setting, it remains rather unexplored in the literature.  The 
goal of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the role and function of 
underwriter peer relationships in the security underwriting process. 
Ties with other underwriters represent channels through which valuable 
information about the overall market condition, the issuer, and the institutional investor’s 
reaction, flows.  Networks can also serve a marketing purpose by generating greater 
investor demand for the issue.  The structure of underwriter networks may vary, and the 
different characteristics of the networks should have implications for the volume, 
                                                 
 
 
1
 See Ang and Zhang (2006), Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005), Fernando, Gatchev, and 
Spindt (2005), and Ongena and Smith (2001) for more works on underwriter-firm 
relationship. 
2
 See also Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Sherman (2000), Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky 
(2007) for more studies on underwriter-investor relationship. 
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diversity, and richness of information that travel through the networks and subsequently 
affect the IPOs.  For instance, underwriters that maintain ties to a large number of well-
connected partners can receive greater information flow, or cohesive networks may be 
more conducive for information transmission. 
Overall, underwriters with certain network capabilities should be able to produce 
more price relevant information and resolve most of the uncertainty surrounding an IPO 
earlier in the underwriting process.  However, the role of a specific network characteristic 
can depend on the nature of information that is relevant to IPO underwriting.  The impact 
of peer network on IPOs may also be contingent on certain factors such as the market 
condition and the firm-specific information asymmetry.  With the entry of commercial 
banks into underwriting, it is also possible that commercial banks and investment banks 
utilize their peer networks differently to generate information.  Finally, the networks 
formed in the equity underwriting market may be more informative than those formed in 
debt underwriting.  These networks of peer relationships represent informal information 
markets for underwriters and to some extent, their social capital.   
We explore the impact of underwriter peer networks by constructing network 
measures using the ties that underwriters form with each other when they work together 
in the syndicates of public equity and debt securities issued in the U.S. between 1970 and 
2007.  Network measures are constructed over moving four-year periods.  To explore the 
informational role of peer network, we focus on equity IPOs because information 
asymmetry is likely to be higher in equity than debt issues, especially in the first public 
equity issuance.  Specifically, we construct a set of network measures that capture the 
size (degree), position in the overall network (closeness and betweenness), 
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interconnectedness within individual underwriter networks (reciprocity and density) and 
heterogeneity (tie, industry and geographical diversity) of underwriter peer networks.  
Using these measures, we assess if the book manager’s network characteristics affect 
offer price revision, underpricing, and post-issue stock return of IPOs.   
Our results show that underwriter networks have significant effects on IPO 
pricing and placement.  IPOs underwritten by book managers that are generally close to 
all other underwriters and occupy exclusive intermediary positions, maintain large, dense 
or homogenous peer networks are more likely to experience large offer price revisions.  
The book managers with such networks may receive more information.  The results also 
show that dense and homogenous networks, rather than diverse networks, are more 
conducive to the flow of IPO relevant information.  The book managers with large, more 
central and more homogenous networks are also associated with higher short-run stock 
returns, which can be due to both the marketing and informational role of the networks.  
However, after controlling for the offer price revision, the characteristics of the book 
manager network have no impact on IPO underpricing.   
Furthermore, we find that book manager peer networks can have greater effect on 
the IPO outcomes contingent upon firm age or market condition.  Networks and 
relationships formed among underwriters in the equity underwriting market are also 
somewhat more informative and significant than those formed in debt underwriting.  
However, we find no significant difference between the effects of the peer networks of 
commercial banks and investment banks.  In general, the results indicate that the 
underwriters use their peer networks to produce information and place securities, and the 
structure of the networks has implications for these processes.     
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This study fits among the extensive literature on IPOs and the growing body of 
research on social networks in finance.  Lately, interest in social networks has grown 
dramatically.  For instance, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) focus on connections 
between fund managers and corporate board members via shared education networks.3  
Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos (2008) study the impact of CEO social networks on firm 
performance, while Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007a, 2007b) examine networks in 
venture capital industry.  Other studies focus on the impact of informal networks on 
borrower terms (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003)), mutual fund portfolio decisions 
(Gupta-Mukherjee (2007)), stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)), 
and portfolio choice (Massa and Simonov (2005)).  Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) 
also examine political connections, and Kuhnen (2005) focuses on the relations between 
fund directors and advisory firms that manage the funds.  Most of these studies use 
network measures based on geographical distance, shared educational or professional 
background.   
Our contribution lies in illustrating the role of underwriter peer networks—
another information channel—on issue outcomes.  In doing so, we use network analysis 
methodology to capture underwriter networks and introduce these as additional 
underwriter characteristics.  We also show that there are different aspects to peer 
networks and their effects differ.  For example, the complex tacit information that is 
needed to price IPOs is shared among underwriters via homogenous networks.  We also 
                                                 
 
 
3
 An interested reader can consult Barnea and Guedj (2006), Wong and Gygax (2007), 
and Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) for more corporate board related studies.   
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show the contingent effects of these networks.  To the best of our knowledge, no prior 
study in finance has examined the role of underwriter peer network as a determinant of 
issue outcomes.  The results of this study add to our knowledge of how information is 
generated in IPO underwriting and how underwriters perform their intermediary function.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 discusses the 
functions of underwriters and the role of their networks in IPOs in further detail.  After 
introducing the network analysis methodology in Section 2.3, we describe the data and 
the descriptive statistics in Section 2.4.  Section 2.5 presents the results of the impact of 
network on IPOs, and Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
 
2.2. The role of networks in IPO underwriting 
In equity underwriting, underwriters help firms raise equity capital.  Particularly, 
underwriters perform a variety of duties: conduct due diligence research, prepare 
preliminary prospectus, file registration statements with the regulatory agency, organize 
road shows, value and distribute securities to investors, and provide aftermarket liquidity.  
Information production is at the heart of this process.  Underwriters produce price 
relevant information and reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
As Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show, underwriters care about information 
production and the securities they bring to market because their reputation depends on 
their deal history.  
Previous research (e.g., Edelen and Kadlec (2005) and Lowry and Schwert 
(2004)) shows that both private and public information play a role in the underwriting 
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process.  For example, Lowry and Schwert (2004) document that almost all public 
information is included in IPO pricing and it is the private information that drives IPO 
initial returns.  According to Benveniste et al. (2002), IPO uncertainty has two main 
sources: (1) a factor common to all firms that share similar characteristics and (2) a firm 
specific factor.  Therefore, generating firm information is not only useful in the 
subsequent deals with the same firm, but also in deals that involve other firms with 
similar characteristics.   
Information, especially private information, flows via relationships.  For instance, 
Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2007) find that information sharing occurs through the 
common educational ties between fund managers and board members.  Asker and 
Ljungqvist (2008) also show that the major product market rival firms are not willing to 
share their underwriters for fear of information leakage.   
For underwriters, who are information producers, information channels, therefore, 
should be of special interest.  To produce price relevant information, underwriters rely on 
various relationships such as relationships with client firms, investors, and other 
underwriters.  Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) consider an investment bank’s information 
production capacity to be a function of investments in investor and client networks.  
Rajan and Petersen (1994) and James (1992) refer to durable bank-client relationships as 
“relationship specific capital” that can lower the cost of information production.  The 
importance of building relationships with client firms and investors for underwriters has 
been emphasized in the finance literature.  Research on peer relationships, on the other 
hand, is mostly limited to studies on underwriting syndicates.   
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Building and maintaining relationships, whether it is with firms or investors, is a 
time-consuming and costly process.  Unless nurtured, relationships decay.  Since it is 
costly to maintain relationships, Ang and Zhang (2006) document that firms maintain 
relationships with only 3-5 banks in the floating rate debt market.  Institutional investors 
also value relationships with underwriters as evidenced by the survey of institutional 
investors’ view on IPOs conducted by Jenkinson and Jones (2006).  Given that investors 
are not likely to maintain long-term relationships with all the banks, to some extent, each 
bank’s investor network is unique.  Thus, through peer networks, underwriters can 
receive indirect feedback from valuable private information obtained by their peers 
through their various activities.  Underwriters, in turn, share information with each other 
because they may need information in the future due to the repeated nature of the 
business.   
Given that ties to other underwriters represent information and resource channels, 
the various characteristics of underwriter networks may have ramifications for the 
securities they underwrite.  Networks, in general, display substantial heterogeneity in 
their structures.  For example, some personal circles are denser and more close-knit than 
others.  Similarly, underwriters’ network characteristics are likely to vary.  Different 
aspects of networks have implications for the volume, diversity, and richness of 
information that travel through these networks.  For instance, all else being equal, those 
with large networks receive greater volume of information.  Occupying a more central 
network location and maintaining ties to well-connected partners would also imply a 
greater access to a wide range of information.  Cohesive networks characterized by 
extensive interconnections may be more conducive to information transmission, as 
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underwriters may be willing to cooperate and share substantial information only with 
whom they maintain close relationships. 
As for the performance implications of network diversity and range, on one hand, 
having a diverse peer network can improve IPO performance because underwriters with 
heterogeneous peer networks can access information generated from different market 
segments, investor groups, and clienteles, which can greatly aid information production.  
On the other hand, network heterogeneity may also prove to be problematic since social 
and structural divisions may hinder effective cooperation.  The relations based on 
similarity may be stronger than the relations that exist between dissimilar organizations.  
Strong relations, in turn, may affect the quality of the information and the amount of 
cooperative effort shared between underwriters.  Despite the intuitive appeal of network 
heterogeneity, homogeneity in networks has been widely documented, especially in 
interpersonal networks.  Homophily refers to the principle that contacts between similar 
people occur at a higher rate than among dissimilar people.  Patterns of homophily are 
found to be remarkably robust across different types of relationships such as marriage, 
friendship, and acquaintance.4   
Overall, underwriters with greater peer network capability should be able to 
produce more price relevant information.  These underwriters may engage more actively 
in price discovery in the primary market and receive more information between the filing 
and offering dates resulting in a higher likelihood of price revision and a larger revision 
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 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) for a review of research on homophily. 
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when a revision occurs.  In a related study, Wang and Yung (2008) find that more 
reputable underwriters reduce return variability in the secondary market.  IPO 
underpricing, which is commonly considered to be a measure of information asymmetry 
and compensation to investors for revealing their demand information, may also be 
affected by underwriters’ network capacity.   
In addition to the function of uncovering information in security valuation, peer 
network can be used by underwriters to assist in the marketing of the securities.  
Underwriters market securities and provide price support in IPOs and SEOs.  Cook et al. 
(2006) argue that the promotion of new securities is an important feature in security 
offerings and document a significant effect of issue publicity.  An underwriter can contact 
its relationship investors to market a new equity offering.  Underwriters can also spread 
the word about a security issue via their networks, which suggests that peer networks can 
serve marketing purposes by generating greater interest in the issue.  Such indirect 
contacts are known to have significant economic consequences in many other areas, 
especially in the labor market.  Effective promotion from underwriters that result in 
greater demand for the IPOs can explain some of the variation in the post-issue stock 
return, especially short-run return.  
Furthermore, some aspects of peer network may have more impact on certain IPO 
outcomes than others.  For instance, for information production, the interconnections 
among network members may matter as much as the size of the network.  On the other 
hand, for marketing purposes, the network size may be more relevant in creating buzz 
surrounding issues.  The role of certain network aspects can also depend on the type of 
information that is being transferred.  For example, several previous studies (Hansen 
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(1999) and Reagans and McEvily (2003)) find that strong ties are more crucial in 
transferring tacit knowledge than codified knowledge. 
The impact of peer network on IPOs may also be contingent upon certain firm 
specific and exogenous factors.  For example, Pollock (2004) shows that an underwriter’s 
ties to investors benefit the seller in a low demand and the buyer in a high demand 
environment.  Gulati and Higgins (2003) document that the payoff from certain types of 
inter-organizational relationships for IPO firms depends on the market condition.    
Similarly, in our study, the role of network in IPOs may depend on the market condition.  
For instance, underwriters may need to utilize their networks more, when there is less 
information available in cold markets due to the low deal volume.  The IPOs with higher 
information asymmetry, such as the IPOs in the so-called “soft information” industries 
that are heavily dependent on intangibles or the IPOs of relatively young firms, may also 
require underwriters to utilize their peer networks to greater extent.   
The effects of peer networks of commercial banks and investment banks may 
differ as well.  With the Section 20 exemption of Glass-Steagall Act and the subsequent 
repeal of the act, commercial banks have entered securities underwriting and managed to 
acquire significant market share.  The consequences of commercial banks’ entry into 
underwriting and the differences between these two types of underwriters have garnered 
substantial attention.  Lack of established investor clientele and placement track record 
suggest that commercial banks may need to depend more heavily on peer networks for 
information production and distribution of IPOs.  On the contrary, the role of peer 
network may be smaller for commercial banks if they can enhance their underwriter 
functions by information gathering from their commercial banking activities.   
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Finally, the information content of networks formed in equity and debt 
underwriting market may vary.  For example, Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) 
document that the relationship capital is built through loyalty in equity underwriting, but 
it is not as valuable in debt underwriting.  Asker and Ljungqvist (2008) also find that the 
debt underwriting relationships are less exclusive.  Thus, it is possible that the ties that 
are forged in the equity underwriting market are more informative than those in debt 
underwriting.   
Moreover, underwriter qualities such as the valuation skill are hard to measure, 
and the finance literature describes underwriter characteristics along limited dimensions, 
mainly in terms of reputation, which is commonly measured by market share and Carter-
Manaster rank.  An extensive literature focuses on reputation in investment banking, 
specifically on the effect of hiring reputable underwriters (e.g., Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Fang (2005), Livingston and Miller (2000)).  Several previous studies suggest 
that more reputable underwriters produce more information, although how they actually 
do so remains less clear.   
Recently, attempts have been made to capture other underwriter qualities. For 
example, Hoberg (2007) captures underwriter persistence in underpricing by using 
underwriter-specific initial returns (UWpremium).  Lewellen (2006) finds that 
underwriters differ in their price support and the difference is not related to underwriter 
size or reputation, but mostly related to client base.  We introduce another quality of an 
underwriter that captures the pattern of an underwriter’s connections to its peers.  
Underwriters’ network characteristics are likely to differ, but this cross-sectional 
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variation may not be fully captured by the commonly used measures of underwriter 
reputation, although the effects of reputation and network are not mutually exclusive.    
 
 
2.3. Network measures 
Network analysis describes the structure of networks by focusing on the 
relationships among a set of actors.  The central idea is that social location and position 
matter, and some of the major themes are power, centrality, and similarity.5  Many of the 
network analysis methodologies originate from graph theory.  Network data are defined 
by actors and relations, which are represented by nodes and lines.  Two actors are 
considered adjacent if they are connected, and the distance between two actors is 
measured by the number of relations along the path that connects them.  Degree refers to 
the total number of ties an actor has, and thus, it is the size of the actor’s ego or 
individual network.  Ego network, therefore, refers to all the nodes to which a particular 
node is adjacent to.  Numerous variables are utilized in network analysis, and for the 
purpose of this study, we focus on a set of network measures that capture the size 
(degree), position in the overall network (closeness and betweenness), interconnectedness 
within individual underwriter networks (reciprocity and density) and heterogeneity (tie, 
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 For an entertaining history of network analysis, see Watts (2003).  For introductions to 
economic sociology and new economic sociology, which relies heavily on network 
analysis, see Swedberg (2003) and Dobbin (2004).   
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industry and geographical diversity) of underwriter peer networks.6  All the network 
measures are computed using undirected binary data with the exception of reciprocity, for 
which we use directed binary data.  To better illustrate how the network measures are 
constructed, we present an example of a small simplified underwriter network in Figure 
2.1.   
 
 
Panel A                                            Panel B 
 
 
Figure 2.1: An example of underwriter peer network 
For the purpose of illustrating the construction of different network measures, the 
following figures show an example of a small simplified network of underwriters.  Panel 
A shows the undirected network graph.  In the directed network graph in Panel B, an 
arrow indicates an invitation into a syndicate.   
 
 
Degree  
Degree refers to the number of relationships an underwriter has with other 
underwriters.  The higher the number of relationships an underwriter has, the more access 
                                                 
 
 
6
 Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Scott (2000) have detailed discussions of these 
measures.  Hochberg et al. (2007a) also provide discussions on how the centrality 
measures are computed. 
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it has to price relevant information and distribution channels.  In the undirected network 
in Panel A of Figure 2.1, UBS has four ties, and Morgan Stanley, Wachovia and Credit 
Suisse have two ties each while the other two underwriters have ties to only one other 
underwriter.     
Since network size varies, it is difficult to meaningfully compare the degree, or 
the number of ties, across different networks.  Instead, we use the normalized degree 
measure, which expresses degree as a percentage of the number of all actors in the 
network.  Thus, in our set up, the normalized degree is the percentage of all other 
underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Formally, 
1−
=
∑
n
x
Degree j
ij
i , 
where xij equals to one when there is a tie between underwriters i and j, and n equals to 
the number of all underwriters in the network.   
In Panel A of Figure 2.1, the normalized degree of UBS is 80 percent since it 
maintains ties with four out of five other underwriters in the network.  Similarly, Morgan 
Stanley, Wachovia and Credit Suisse have a normalized degree of 40 percent since they 
maintain ties with two out of five underwriters in the network.  Merrill Lynch and 
Goldman Sachs have ties with just one underwriter, which means they have a normalized 
degree of 20 percent.  
 
Closeness  
The measure of closeness emphasizes the proximity of an underwriter to all other 
underwriters in the network.  From a number of different closeness measures that are 
available in network analysis, we use an eigenvector centrality measure proposed by 
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Bonacich (1972) that attempts to find the most central actors in terms of the global 
network structure.  Here, the centrality of each underwriter is determined by the 
centralities of the underwriters it is connected to.  Thus, it is similar to an iterated degree 
measure.  Now, not only how many relationships an underwriter has, but also to whom it 
is connected, matters.7  If we denote the eigenvector centrality of i by evi, 
formally, ∑=
j
jiji evAev λ
1
, where λ is a constant that provides a nontrivial solution, and 
Aij is an adjacency matrix8, and we normalize this measure by dividing it by the 
maximum possible eigenvector centrality in the network.   
In Panel A of Figure 2.1, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs both have 
relationships with just one underwriter, which means they have the same degree measure.  
However, a quick look at the figure reveals that Goldman Sachs is further away from the 
center of the overall network than Merrill Lynch.  Computed eigenvector centrality 
measures confirm that as well.  Merrill Lynch has a normalized eigenvector measure of 
37.34 percent while Goldman Sachs has a normalized eigenvector centrality of 19.05.  
UBS naturally has the highest eigenvector measure of 88.85 percent followed by Credit 
Suisse and Wachovia with 64.39.  Underwriters with higher closeness centrality measures 
occupy more central positions in the network and are closer to other underwriters, which 
suggest that they are sitting in the center of the information hub and enjoy more access to 
information.  
                                                 
 
 
7
 Google’s system of ranking web pages for a particular search is similar to eigenvector 
centrality measure. 
8
 An adjacency matrix is a symmetric matrix, where Aij=1 if node i is adjacent to node j, 
and Aij=0 otherwise. 
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Betweenness  
We use betweenness measure proposed by Freeman (1979) that captures how 
often an underwriter happens to be located between pairs of other underwriters.  An 
underwriter is between two underwriters if it lies on the shortest possible path (also called 
geodesic path) between them.  For example, there is a single geodesic path between 
Goldman Sachs and UBS through Morgan Stanley in Panel A of Figure 2.1, and the 
geodesic distance is two.  Betweenness, to some extent, reflects how often an underwriter 
sits on informational linkages between others.  Specifically, ∑=
jk
jiki bsBetweennes , 
where bjik is the proportion of all paths linking distinct underwriters j and k that pass 
through underwriter i, and we divide it by the maximum possible betweenness in the 
network to obtain normalized betweenness.  
In the Panel A of Figure 2.1, since Morgan Stanley happens to be on the shortest 
possible path between Goldman Sachs and all the other four underwriters, it happens to 
be “between” four times.  The maximum possible betweenness any underwriter can have 
in an undirected network with five other underwriters is 10 (=(5x4)/2).  This gives 
Morgan Stanley a normalized betweenness measure of 40 percent.  Similarly, UBS sits 
on the shortest possible paths between eight different pairs of underwriters, which 
effectively gives it a betweenness measure of 80 percent.  Furthermore, all the four 
underwriters that are situated at the edges do not lie between any other pair of 
underwriters that are not directly connected, so their betweenness measures are zero.   
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Reciprocity 
Reciprocity refers to the proportion of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, where a tie between two underwriters is considered reciprocated if the 
underwriters invite each other into their respective syndicates.  Underwriters may be 
more likely to share information and cooperate with those with whom they maintain 
reciprocated ties.  Therefore, reciprocity may reflect the strength of relationships and 
consequently, the quality of information.  We compute reciprocity using directed ties.  
However, identifying who initiates a relationship in a syndicate is problematic, except for 
book managers.  For example, it is hard to determine the direction of relationships 
between co-managers or between co-managers and syndicate members.  Therefore, we 
establish the direction of relationships only between those who are book managers and 
those who are not, and reciprocity is measured only for underwriters that serve as book 
managers.  Formally, Reciprocityi 
∑
∑
>>
>>
=
j
jiij
j
jiij
xx
xx
)0or  0(
)0 and 0(
, where xij indicates that book 
manager i invited underwriter j into its syndicate.  In the case of Morgan Stanley in Panel 
B of Figure 2.1, when serving as a book manager, Morgan Stanley invited both Goldman 
Sachs and UBS into its syndicates.  However, in return, Morgan Stanley was invited only 
in the syndicates of Goldman Sachs when Goldman Sachs was the book manager.  
Therefore, out of two ties Morgan Stanley maintains, only one is reciprocated.  Thus, the 
reciprocity measure for Morgan Stanley is 50 percent.   
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Density 
Density of individual underwriters’ ego networks can be another way of 
measuring the interconnectedness within an underwriter’s network.  Density is measured 
by dividing the number of ties that exist among underwriter’s all partners (excluding the 
ties from the partners to the underwriter itself) by the number of all ties that can exist 
among the partners.  Specifically, )1( −=
∑
ii
jk
jk
i
nn
x
Density , where xjk equals to one when 
there is a tie between underwriters j and k with whom underwriter i maintains ties with, 
and ni equals to the number of all partners of underwriter i (i.e., degree of underwriter i).   
Dense network means that an underwriter’s partners, in turn, have many ties to 
each another, which may indicate more trust or coordination in the network.  In Panel A 
of Figure 2.1, for instance, UBS has ties to four other underwriters.  Potentially, 12 ties 
(=4x3) can exist between 4 different underwriters in the ego network of UBS, and of 
those 12 potential ties, only one tie exists between Wachovia and Credit Suisse, which 
produces network density of 8.33 percent for UBS.  Ego network density cannot be 
computed when an underwriter has no ties or only one tie.   
 
Tie diversity 
We attempt to capture the heterogeneity of individual underwriter networks first 
by the extent of non-redundant ties.  The specific measure used is called reach efficiency 
in social network analysis.  Reach efficiency measures how many non-redundant 
underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation per each partner.  
If underwriters work with similar underwriters, who, in turn, work with the same type of 
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underwriters, the network may not be highly heterogeneous and the reach efficiency 
measure will be low.  
Formally, 
∑ +−
=
j
ij
i
i
nn
kdiversityTie )1(. , where ki equals to the number of all 
distinct underwriters within two degrees of separation from underwriter i, nj the degree or 
the size of the network of each underwriter j that underwriter i is connected to, and ni is 
the degree measure of underwriter i itself.  If the tie diversity measure is high, then the 
underwriter i is essentially indirectly connected to a large number of non-redundant 
partners suggesting that the partners it works with, in turn, work with different 
underwriters.  For example, in Figure 2.1, Wachovia has two primary partners (UBS and 
Credit Suisse) and the primary partners, UBS and Credit Suisse, themselves have four 
and two ties, respectively.  Thus, the cumulative sum of their network size is 8 (=2+4+2).  
Once we ignore redundant ties, Wachovia can reach four distinct underwriters (Credit 
Suisse, UBS, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) within two degrees of separation.  
Thus, the tie diversity measure is 0.5 or 50 percent (=4/8).  
  
Industry and geographical diversity 
Here, we attempt to measure the heterogeneity of an individual underwriter’s 
network by the diversity of industry and geographical specialization of its partners, rather 
than by the identity of the partners as in tie diversity.  These diversity measures are not 
traditional social network measures, but ones that we develop to capture additional 
aspects of underwriter networks.  For each underwriter, we identify five major states and 
industries it specializes in, using the total volume of deals underwritten in different 
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industries and states over four-year periods.  Next, we compute the number of different 
industries and states an underwriter i can reach through the expertise of its partners and 
normalize it by the number of partners.  Again, if underwriter i works with underwriters 
that operate in various industries and states, this measure should be higher reflecting 
heterogeneity in the business line of the network partners.   
The network measures—degree, closeness, betweenness, reciprocity, density, tie, 
industry and geographical diversity—capture different aspects of underwriter network 
structure.  Degree measures the size of the network, while reciprocity and density 
consider the strength and interconnections of the individual underwriters’ networks.  
Closeness and betweenness describe the position of an underwriter in the overall 
network, albeit in different ways.  Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt (2006) explore the 
robustness of the centrality measures to various measurement errors and find that the 
centrality measures are quite robust and the accuracy of the centrality measures declines 
as measurement error increases, but in a monotonic fashion.  Tie, industry and 
geographical diversity measures attempt to capture the heterogeneity of the underwriter 
networks.  
 
   
2.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues 
database to create underwriter network measures.  The network measures are constructed 
using inter-organizational relationships that underwriters establish with other 
underwriters when they are involved in the same underwriting syndicates of public equity 
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and debt issues.  Initially, we obtain all 23,084 public equity and 24,818 public debt 
securities issued between 1970 and 2007 in the U.S. excluding the securities offered by 
financial firms, as shown in Table 2.1.  Of these equity and debt issues, 29,911 employ 
two or more underwriters.  Since the emphasis in network construction is the ties between 
underwriters, we do not impose sample criteria on the security issues and utilize all of 
them to compute the network measures. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Sample of security issues  
The following sample includes all public securities issued in the U.S. between 1970 and 
2007 excluding the securities of financial firms.  We use these security issues to construct 
underwriter networks.   
 
Number of issues
Number of issues that employ 
two or more underwriters 
 
Equity  
 
23,084 
 
14,344 
Initial public offerings 10,073 6,054 
Seasoned equity offerings 13,011 8,290 
Debt  24,818 15,567 
Non-convertible debt 20,899 13,030 
Convertible debt 1,575 801 
Non-convertible preferred 1,704 1,349 
Convertible preferred 640 387 
All deals 47,902 29,911 
 
 
Underwriters may interact with each other before or after the deal syndication.  
There is no reason to believe that underwriters stop communicating with each other and 
the relationships die out as soon as a deal is over.  Therefore, to capture the impact of 
relationships, we use a four-year moving period approach.  Consequently, there are 35 
rolling four-year periods from 1970 to 2007.  Three- to five-year periods are commonly 
used in other studies (i.e., Hochberg et al. (2007a)).   
  26 
We consider only the managing underwriters (book managers and co-managers) 
in syndicates and exclude syndicate members, because non-managing syndicate members 
typically only serve distributional purposes and have minimal role in the deal.  We use 
reported underwriter names, but multiple variations of the same underwriter names 
appear in the SDC data due to inconsistent abbreviation, punctuation or spelling such as 
Goldman Sachs & Co and Goldman, Sachs & Co.  We check all the underwriter names 
and manually correct the names when necessary.  Cooney et al. (2004) perform a similar 
hand correction when working with underwriter data.  In the case of bank mergers, we 
treat the post-merger bank as a new entity because a multitude of changes and 
restructuring occur around bank mergers.  After all, network, and to a greater extent, 
underwriting business itself, is mainly about tacit human capital.  In fact, Bradley, Choi, 
and Clarke (2008)) show that deal flow changes when investment bankers change 
employers.   We also identify commercial banks in the sample using Gande et al. (1999), 
Federal Reserve data on large commercial banks, and hand check.  By limiting syndicates 
only to those who serve as managing underwriters and following the above corrections, 
we obtain 1,936 underwriters in the original sample of all public issues.  However, all 
1,936 underwriters do not appear in our final sample, since we focus on the impact of 
network only on IPOs.   
Using binary network data created from syndication in the public issues, we 
compute various network measures such as degree, closeness, and betweenness by 
employing the social network analysis software UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and 
Freeman (2002)).  The network measures are constructed using all equity and debt deals 
together and also using only equity and debt deals separately.  As an illustration, the 
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network measures of top twenty equity underwriters according to market share during 
2004-07 are provided in Table 2.2.  As Table 2.2 shows, for instance, Goldman Sachs, 
who ranked first in terms of equity market, has a degree measure of 55.73, which means 
that it maintained ties with 55.73 percent of all other underwriters that served at least 
once as a co-manager or book-manager during this period.  Density measure of 28.39 
shows that of all possible ties that could exist among the partners of Goldman Sachs, 
28.39 percent exists. 
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Table 2.2:  Network measures of top twenty equity underwriters  
The table shows the network measures of the top twenty underwriters ranked by equity market share during 2004-07.  Degree is the 
percent of all other underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that 
captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest 
possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are reciprocated, 
which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can 
exist among the partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant 
underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to 
the numbers of different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners. 
Underwriter Degree Closeness Betweenness Density Reciprocity 
Tie 
diversity 
Industry 
diversity 
Geographical 
diversity 
         
Goldman Sachs 55.73 17.08 2.32 28.39 0.00 2.27 0.18 0.16 
Morgan Stanley 60.81 18.25 3.82 26.51 28.57 2.21 0.17 0.15 
Citi 69.97 19.11 6.46 21.62 0.00 2.12 0.16 0.13 
JP Morgan 66.67 18.34 6.39 22.27 0.00 2.17 0.17 0.14 
Merrill Lynch 62.85 18.44 4.50 25.32 0.00 2.18 0.17 0.14 
Lehman Brothers 58.78 17.80 2.99 27.28 0.00 2.22 0.19 0.15 
Credit Suisse 65.14 18.54 4.85 23.81 0.00 2.15 0.16 0.13 
UBS 72.52 19.31 9.49 20.50 0.00 2.11 0.15 0.13 
Deutsche Bank 62.34 18.17 3.79 25.09 0.00 2.18 0.18 0.14 
Bank of America 55.73 17.87 2.29 30.64 11.11 2.24 0.17 0.16 
Bear Stearns 47.33 16.56 1.19 37.30 6.67 2.36 0.21 0.16 
Wachovia 51.65 17.47 1.86 34.37 4.17 2.28 0.20 0.18 
RBC Capital Markets 54.71 17.57 3.00 31.05 0.00 2.26 0.20 0.15 
CIBC World Markets 38.93 12.97 1.83 36.21 18.18 2.84 0.25 0.20 
Jefferies 41.22 15.21 0.94 42.72 18.75 2.53 0.25 0.20 
Société Générale 34.35 12.35 0.84 42.96 0.00 2.97 0.26 0.21 
ABN Amro 44.02 14.76 1.62 35.18 34.78 2.55 0.17 0.14 
Piper Jaffray 45.80 16.25 1.90 38.83 20.51 2.39 0.22 0.18 
Raymond James Financial 41.73 15.48 0.95 43.03 0.00 2.52 0.24 0.20 
Thomas Weisel Partners 22.39 8.76 0.36 54.55 6.66 4.02 0.35 0.30 
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  In addition to underwriter network features, we consider underwriter reputation, 
as measured by market share and Carter-Manaster rank.  Carter-Manaster rank data is 
obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  We also compute underwriter specific average post-
issue three-month abnormal return and average residual underpricing, using all IPOs 
underwritten by an underwriter in a managing underwriter role over four-year periods.  
An  underwriter’s average three-month abnormal return is the mean of the three-month 
abnormal returns (computed by subtracting value-weighted market return) of all non-
financial, common share IPOs an underwriter is involved in as a managing underwriter.  
The average residual underpricing is the average of the regression residuals of 
underpricing of all non-financial, common share IPOs an underwriter is involved in as a 
managing underwriter.   
To investigate the effect of underwriter networks on issue performance, we focus 
on non-financial, common share IPOs with offer price above five dollars in line with 
previous research.  We match the initial sample of 12,841 IPOs from SDC to the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database by cusip.  Of those issues with matched 
cusips, we exclude investment funds, REITS and units etc., which results in 9,148 
common share IPOs.  After excluding issues of financial firms, those with offer price 
below five dollars in line with previous research, and those during 1970-73 because we 
relate the IPOs to the characteristics of their book managers in the preceding four-year 
period, our final IPO sample consists of 6,657 IPOs issued between 1974 and 2007.   
In this final sample of IPOs, 490 underwriters serve as book managers.  Of these, 
22 are commercial bank underwriters.  Of 4,808 IPOs issued since 1989 in our sample, 
about 13.7 percent employed a commercial bank as the book manager or the joint book 
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manager.  However, this number has increased dramatically over time.  For example, 
during the last four-year period, commercial banks served as the book manager or joint 
book manager in 48 percent of all the IPOs.   
In 334 out of 6,657 IPOs, the syndicates include multiple book managers, and we 
take the average of the book managers’ characteristics in these cases.  Return and price 
data is retrieved from CRSP.  Out of 6,657 issues, 2,735 issues have venture capital back-
up, and 1,067 issues are listed on NYSE, and the rest on Nasdaq.  Finally, proceeds are 
adjusted for inflation.  
 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.3 is based on underwriter-period observations and presents the 
characteristics of 490 underwriters that serve as book managers in the sample.  Mean 
degree centrality over all periods is 9.93 percent; closeness centrality is 9.31; and 
betweenness centrality is 0.95 using all public deals.  On average, 9.08 percent of 
underwriter relationships are reciprocated and the mean density of underwriter 
relationships is 44.72 percent.  As for the measures of network heterogeneity, on average, 
an underwriter can reach 0.64 and 0.60 unique industry and state per each partner.  The 
mean tie diversity of 27.19 percent or 0.2719 indicates that for each tie within two 
degrees of separation, an underwriter gets access to 0.2719 unique underwriters.    
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Table 2.3:  Descriptive statistics  
The sample consists of 6,657 non-financial, common share IPOs issued in the U.S. between 1974 and 2007 with offer price above five 
dollars and 490 underwriters that serve as book managers in underwriting of these IPOs.  Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of 
the book manager characteristics measured over moving four-year periods.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific 
underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other 
underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  
Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each 
other into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an underwriter that are 
actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of 
separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different industries and states that an 
underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners.  Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the 
equity offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the equity offerings during a period.  Average 
abnormal underpricing is the mean of the residual underpricing of all non-financial, common share IPOs that an underwriter is 
involved in as a managing underwriter during the period.  Average abnormal three-month IPO return is the mean of the market (value-
weighted) adjusted post-issue three-month returns of all non-financial, common share IPOs that an underwriter is involved in as a 
managing underwriter during the period.   
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the IPOs.  Proceeds are adjusted for inflation.  Secondary shares refers to the percentage 
of all shares offered by the insiders.  Completion speed counts the number of days between the filing date and the offer date.  
Underpricing refers to the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price of the first trading day.  Price adjustment 
measures the percentage change from the filing range mid point to the offer price.  Firm age is computed using the firm founding date 
data available from Jay Ritter’s website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/).  Number of book managers refers to the number of 
underwriters in the syndicate that serve as book managers.  Number of managing underwriters refers to the number of underwriters 
who are either book- or co-managers.  Market (industry) adjusted post-issue return is the firm stock return minus the value-weighted 
market index return (average industry return).   
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 Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev N 
Panel A: Book manager characteristics      
Network measures constructed using all public deals 
   
 
Degree 9.93 5.77 0 63.80 11.71 1,884 
Closeness 9.31 7.42 0 31.50 8.93 1,884 
Betweenness 0.95 0.33 0 12.54 1.45 1,884 
Reciprocity 9.08 0 0 100.00 16.12 1,663 
Density 44.72 44.00 0 100.00 24.88 1,604 
Tie diversity 27.19 11.58 0 99.71 29.11 1,884 
Industry diversity 0.64 0.52 0 5.00 0.56 1,884 
Geographical diversity 0.60 0.48 0 5.00 0.52 1,884 
       
Network measures constructed using all equity deals     
Degree 9.83 5.51 0 64.44 11.46 1,866 
Closeness 9.80 7.81 0 32.60 9.32 1,866 
Betweenness 0.90 0.35 0 18.00 1.40 1,866 
Reciprocity 7.32 0 0 100.00 14.41 1,621 
Density 45.53 44.96 0 100.00 24.07 1,564 
Tie diversity 27.79 13.17 0 99.54 28.71 1,866 
Industry diversity 0.69 0.59 0 5.00 0.57 1,866 
Geographical diversity 0.64 0.53 0 5.00 0.54 1,866 
       
Network measures constructed using all debt deals     
Degree 14.89 9.03 0 68.57 15.85 1,342 
Closeness 11.10 8.46 0 35.14 10.21 1,342 
Betweenness 1.29 0.23 0 14.22 2.11 1,342 
Reciprocity 11.64 0 0 76.00 18.01 1,203 
Density 57.94 56.95 0 100.00 26.45 1,118 
Tie diversity 25.03 11.93 0 99.30 27.27 1,342 
Industry diversity 0.53 0.49 0 3.00 0.35 1,342 
Geographical diversity 0.55 0.50 0 3.00 0.34 1,342 
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   Table 2.3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev N 
Market share (%) 1.62 0.08 0 28.50 4.04 1,884 
Average abnormal underpricing -1.72 -3.34 -70.721 111.79 13.90 1,594 
Average three-month IPO abnormal  2.96 1.90 -50.10 199.96 19.59 1,637 
return (%)       
       
Panel B: Issue characteristics       
Deal proceeds- adjusted ($ mil) 39.91 18.78 0.12 4,903.95 119.89 6,657 
Shares offered (mil) 4.31 2.50 0.06 600.00 11.21 6,657 
Secondary shares (%) 3.87 0 0 100.00 13.36 6,657 
Gross spread (%) 7.38 7.00 1.33 20.25 1.16 6,641 
Completion speed (days) 76.98 60.00 0 1,164.00 72.83 6,122 
Underpricing (%) 18.78 6.63 -70.45 697.50 41.37 6,435 
Price adjustment (%) 3.02 0 -98.44 344.44 28.87 6,617 
Firm age (years) 15.10 8 0 165 20.35 5,280 
No. of book managers 1.06 1 1 5 0.29 6,657 
No. of managing underwriters 2.36 2 1 28 1.50 6,657 
No. of all underwriters 5.29 2 1 69 7.23 6,657 
Market adj. three-month return (%) 2.92 -3.13 -90.60 602.78 41.59 6,541 
Market adj. one-year return (%) -22.10 -32.19 -99.11 757.90 56.82 4,853 
Market adj. two-year return (%) -29.60 -50.30 -99.94 3,266.00 100.81 4,509 
Industry adj. three-month return (%) -0.54 -4.97 -84.54 374.88 35.66 6,541 
Industry adj. one-year return (%) -27.63 -36.38 -98.96 557.53 49.22 4,853 
Industry adj. two-year return (%) -40.51 -57.59 -99.94 1,347.31 68.48 4,509 
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At maximum, an underwriter has ties to 63.80 percent of all other underwriters.  
Some underwriters have ties that are all reciprocated as evidenced by the maximum 
reciprocity of 100 percent.  Network measures constructed using either equity or debt 
deals are also presented.  The total number of debt underwriters is less than that of equity 
underwriters, which explains the lower number of debt underwriter network measures.    
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of IPOs.  IPOs in the sample have a 
mean size of $39.91 million in constant dollars.  Typically, the issues do not contain 
secondary shares, which are the shares offered by the insiders, as indicated by the median 
of zero.  Median gross spread of 7 percent is consistent with the previously documented 7 
percent solution in the IPO market.  Mean underpricing, which is measured by the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price of the first trading day, is 
18.78 percent even after the mean price adjustment of 3.02 percent.  For valid 
underpricing data, we require the first closing price to be reported within a trading day of 
the offer date.  For valid return data, we also require that missing returns constitute no 
more than 25 percent of all observations within the return horizon.  Firm age is computed 
using the founding date reported from Jay Ritter’s website, but it is not available for all 
firms.  We do not include the firm age variable in the regressions because it drastically 
reduces the sample size, and in unreported regressions, this variable is insignificant in 
most estimations.  The average syndicate size across all periods is 5.29.  The negative 
average one- and two-year returns are consistent with the previously documented post-
issue underperformance of IPOs.   
In Table 2.4, we present the correlations among the network measures.  In Panel 
A, the first three network measures – degree, closeness and betweenness – have positive 
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and significant correlations with each other as expected.  Degree or network size has 
negative correlation with network density, meaning that as the network of an individual 
underwriter grows, less embedded or close-knit the network becomes.  The degree 
measure is also negatively correlated with the network diversity measures, since the 
redundancy of network ties grows as the network becomes larger, as the additional 
members are less likely to be different from those that are already in the network.  
Network diversity measures have positive correlations with each other as expected.  
Panel B shows the correlation between the network measures constructed using equity 
and debt deals and they range from 0.075 to 0.836 reflecting the differences and the 
similarities between the ties formed in equity and debt underwriting.   
 
 
Table 2.4: Correlations of the network measures 
The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients among the network measures of 490 
underwriters that serve as book managers in 6,657 IPOs.  Network variables are 
normalized measures constructed using the ties that underwriters form with other 
underwriters when they are involved in the same underwriting syndicates of public equity 
and debt issues over moving four-year periods.  Degree is the percent of all other 
underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector 
centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters, and 
it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum eigenvector in the network.  Betweenness 
measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of 
other underwriters, and it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum betweenness in 
the network.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   
Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an 
underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-
redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for 
each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different 
industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of 
partners.  Industry is defined according to two-digit SIC codes.  Market share is 
computed as the sum of the proceeds of the equity offerings lead by a specific 
underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the equity offerings during a period.  
p-values are reported in the brackets, and 1,867 underwriter-period observations are used.       
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Panel A: Correlation among the network measures constructed using all public issues 
 Degree Closeness Betweenness Reciprocity Density Tie diversity 
Industry  
diversity 
Closeness 0.746       
 (0.00)       
Betweenness 0.669 0.535      
 (0.00) (0.00)      
Reciprocity 0.119 0.201 0.096     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Density -0.162 -0.023 -0.388 0.024    
 (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.36)    
Tie diversity -0.536 -0.626 -0.244 -0.127 -0.285   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Industry diversity -0.408 -0.418 -0.222 -0.076 -0.202 0.650  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Geographical  -0.420 -0.422 -0.238 -0.080 -0.163 0.656 0.946 
diversity (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Correlation between the network measures constructed using equity and debt issues 
 Network measures constructed from debt deals 
 Degree Closeness Betweenness Reciprocity Density 
Tie 
diversity 
Industry 
diversity 
Geographical 
diversity 
Same measure 
constructed from  0.836 0.789 0.542 0.075 
 
0.452 0.344 0.226 0.220 
equity deals (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Panel C: Correlation between the network measures constructed using all public issues and the bank reputation measures 
 Degree Closeness Betweenness Reciprocity Density 
Tie 
diversity 
Industry 
diversity 
Geographical 
diversity 
Market share 0.648 0.539 0.568 0.072 -0.216 -0.283 -0.231 -0.245 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Carter-Manaster  0.664 0.777 0.417 0.027 0.185 -0.474 -0.296 -0.302 
rank (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Panel C of Table 2.4 presents the correlation between underwriter reputation, 
which is measured by market share and Carter-Manaster rank, and the network variables.  
The correlations between the market share and the network measures range from -0.283 
to 0.648, with the highest correlation corresponding to the network size.  The correlations 
between Carter-Manaster rank and the network measures range from -0.474 to 0.777.  
However, it should be noted that Carter-Manaster rank does not display much variation, 
and thus, we use market share in the regression analysis.  Overall, the correlation 
coefficients suggest that the network measures are capturing different aspects of 
underwriter networks.  The correlation coefficients also confirm that reputation and 
network are different characteristics, although they are correlated to some extent.    
 
 
2.5. Impact of underwriter networks on IPOs 
2.5.1. Offer price revision 
We first investigate whether the characteristics of the book manager’s network 
affect the information production in the primary market.  Underwriters report a filing 
range for the offer price when they file an IPO with SEC.  The actual offer price can 
differ from the filing range midpoint, which may reflect arrival of new information that 
the underwriters compound into the price.  Therefore, we examine the likelihood of price 
revision to see if book managers with certain network capabilities engage more actively 
in price discovery in the primary market, leading to more frequent price revision.  Table 5 
presents the estimated coefficients of logistic regressions of the likelihood of price 
revision.  All the regressions include industry and year fixed effects.   
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Table 2.5:  Book manager’s network and the probability of offer price revision in IPOs  
The table presents the estimated coefficients of logistic regressions of the probability of offer price revision.  The dependent variable, 
price revision, equals to one if the offer price differs from the filing range midpoint, and zero otherwise.  Degree is the percent of all 
other underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close 
an underwriter is to all other underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths 
between pairs of other underwriters.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are reciprocated, which occurs 
when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the 
partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant underwriters an 
underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of 
different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners.  Industry is defined 
according to two-digit SIC codes.  Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the equity offerings lead by a specific 
underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the equity offerings during a period.  Integer mid point dummy equals to one if the 
mid point of the filing range is an integer, and zero otherwise.  Expected proceeds is defined as the filing range midpoint multiplied by 
the number of shares offered.  Market return>20% dummy equals to one if the absolute (value-weighted) total market return between 
the filing and the offer date exceeds 20 percent, and zero otherwise.  NYSE dummy equals to one if the firm is listed on NYSE, and 
zero otherwise.  p-values reported in the brackets are estimated using robust standard errors clustered within underwriters. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -2.599 -1.095 -2.225 -1.818 -2.208 -2.251 -2.398 -1.885 0.219 
 
(0.01) (0.25) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.83) 
Network measures        
Degree 0.035        -0.008 
 (0.00)        (0.44) 
Closeness  0.058       0.025 
  (0.00)       (0.08) 
Betweenness   0.103      0.503 
   (0.00)      (0.20) 
Reciprocity    0.007     0.002 
 
 
  (0.02)     (0.55) 
Density     0.014    0.009 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.02) 
 Tie diversity      -0.006   -0.005 
 
 
   
 (0.02)   (0.34) 
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     Table 2.5 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Industry diversity       -0.252  -0.653 
 
 
   
 
 (0.02)  (0.00) 
 Geographical diversity        -0.275  
 
 
   
 
  (0.02)  
  … x Commercial bank  -0.014 -0.005 -0.053 0.005 0.001 0.014 0.400 0.297  
    dummy (0.01) (0.62) (0.39) (0.69) (0.84) (0.30) (0.40) (0.45)  
Market share -0.050 -0.046 -0.029 -0.016 0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.33) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.43) 
Integer mid point  -0.832 -0.860 -0.786 -0.722 -0.651 -0.809 -0.782 -0.782 -0.721 
      dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Expected  0.863 0.656 1.008 0.916 0.692 0.957 0.992 0.993 0.299 
      proceeds) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Absolute market  0.678 0.649 0.697 0.489 0.579 0.686 0.688 0.691 0.463 
      return>20% dummy (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.24) 
Venture capital  0.422 0.369 0.493 0.515 0.415 0.467 0.471 0.475 0.261 
     dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
NYSE dummy -0.483 -0.461 -0.513 -0.404 -0.345 -0.485 -0.492 -0.494 -0.221 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 15.40 16.40 15.04 12.38 10.32 15.13 15.06 15.06 11.22 
N 6,091 6,091 6,091 5,450 5,438 6,091 6,091 6,091 5,142 
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Since several previous studies document an increasing tendency of the offer price 
being set at an integer or being rounded (i.e., Mola and Loughran (2004), Corwin 
(2003)), we include a dummy variable that denotes whether the filing range midpoint is 
an integer or not.  If it is not an integer, it is more likely to be revised to an integer offer 
price.  We also control for the expected deal size, the existence of venture capital back-
up, and the listing venue choice.  In addition, to reflect changes in market condition, we 
include a dummy variable that indicates whether the absolute market return between the 
filing date and the offer date is more than 20 percent.   
In all the models in Table 2.5, the estimated coefficients on the network variables 
are significant.  As the coefficients in models 1-3 show, the larger and more centrally 
located the book managers’ networks are, the higher the likelihood of price revision, 
which is consistent with more information being received by these book managers.  As 
evidenced by the results of models 4 and 5, the book managers with more reciprocated 
relationships and dense networks are also more likely to revise price implying that more 
or richer information is shared through such relationships.  Measures of network diversity 
have negative significant coefficients in models 6-8, which suggests that the more diverse 
the network is, the less likely the book manager is to revise price.  These negative effects 
of network diversity are consistent with the previous findings from interpersonal and 
inter-organizational relationships that homogenous ties tend to be stronger and more 
appropriate in transmitting complex information and knowledge.  In model 9, we estimate 
the regression of the price revision with all the network variables, except geographical 
diversity due to its high correlation of 0.946 with industry diversity.  Given the 
correlation among the network variables, some of the variables do become insignificant 
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in the estimation of this model.  However, the significant coefficients on closeness, 
density and industry diversity still show that book managers with more central, more 
interconnected and more homogenous networks are more actively engaged in price 
discovery. 
The interaction terms between the network variables and the commercial bank 
dummy are all insignificant, except in model 1.  Thus, after controlling for market share 
and allowing for clustering in the observations of the same underwriter, there is no 
difference between the effects of investment bank and commercial bank networks on the 
likelihood of price revision.  As for the control variables, the bank market share measure 
is either negative or insignificant.  The coefficients on the integer dummy variable show 
that if the filing range midpoint is already set at an integer, it is less likely to be revised.  
Larger issues are also more likely to experience price revision, and when there are 
substantial stock market movements, the offer price is revised to reflect the changing 
market condition as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the market return dummy.  
The IPOs with venture capital back up are more likely to experience price revision, while 
firms that are listed on NYSE seem to experience price revision less frequently, 
consistent with the NYSE listed firms being more established with relatively lower 
information asymmetry and the venture capital backed firms displaying greater 
information asymmetry.   
The results remain qualitatively the same when we run the regression analysis on 
the subsamples created based on the market condition and firm age.  Based on the deal 
volume, years 1983, 1986-1987, and 1992-1997 are identified as hot markets.  We also 
redefine the price revision variable using the filing range instead of the midpoint.  The 
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price revision equals to one if the offer price falls outside the filing range and zero 
otherwise.  Admittedly, underwriters may revise not only price, but also the number of 
shares, upon receiving new information.  Thus, proceeds revision variable equals to one if 
either the offer price or the number of shares is revised.  In unreported regressions, the 
results are robust to these alternative specifications of revision.  In unreported 
regressions, we also consider the direction of the price revision and estimate the 
likelihood of an upward and downward revision separately.  We find qualitatively similar 
results to those in Table 2.5, although the results from upward revision are more 
significant.  We also find that the effects of the network measures constructed using 
equity deals are somewhat greater than those constructed using debt issues.   
In Table 2.6, we focus on the absolute size of price revision.  Similar to the 
previous findings, we document positive effects of network size, closeness and 
betweenness and negative effects of network diversity in Panel A of Table 2.6.  Measures 
of reciprocity and density are insignificant in models 4 and 5.  The interaction terms with 
commercial bank dummy are also insignificant.  As for the economic significance, the 
estimated coefficient on degree in model 1 shows that when the size of the book 
manager’s network increases by one standard deviation, the IPO experiences 1.77 percent 
larger price adjustment.  Similarly, when the closeness centrality and the tie diversity in 
models 2 and 6 increase by one standard deviation, the absolute price revision is 2.31 
percent higher and 1.02 percent lower, respectively.   
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Table 2.6:  Book manager’s network and the size of offer price revision 
The table presents the estimated coefficients of linear regressions of the absolute price revision.  The dependent variable, price 
adjustment, measures the absolute percentage change from the filing range mid point to the offer price.  Panel A presents the results of 
the regressions estimated using the full sample.  Panels B and C present the results of regressions estimated using the IPOs of issuers 
in the lowest and the highest age quintile, respectively.  Firm age is computed using the firm founding date data available from Jay 
Ritter’s website.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an 
eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often 
an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of 
an underwriter that are reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   Density shows the 
percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how 
many other non-redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and 
geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the 
number of partners.  Industry is defined according to two-digit SIC codes.  Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the 
equity offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the equity offerings during a period.  Integer 
mid point dummy equals to one if the mid point of the filing range is an integer, and zero otherwise.  Expected proceeds is defined as 
the filing range midpoint multiplied by the number of shares offered.  Market return>20% dummy equals to one if the absolute (value-
weighted) total market return between the filing and the offer date exceeds 20 percent, and zero otherwise.  NYSE dummy equals to 
one if the firm is listed on NYSE, and zero otherwise.  p-values reported in the brackets are estimated using robust standard errors that 
allow for clustered within underwriters.     
       Panel A: Full sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 3.992 7.984 5.127 6.566 8.358 6.309 5.277 5.576 18.05 
 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.151        -0.103 
 (0.02)        (0.36) 
Closeness  0.259       0.082 
  (0.00)       (0.30) 
Betweenness   0.553      0.267 
   (0.07)      (0.28) 
Reciprocity    -0.001     -0.015 
 
 
  (0.99)     (0.37) 
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       Panel A (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Density     0.017    -0.003 
 
 
   
(0.29) 
   
(0.86) 
Tie diversity      -0.035   -0.065 
 
 
   
 (0.01)   (0.03) 
Industry diversity       -1.084  -2.756 
 
 
   
 
 (0.05)  (0.00) 
Geographical diversity        -1.507  
 
 
   
 
  (0.01)  
… x Commercial bank  -0.049 -0.026 -0.264 0.035 0.024 0.129 4.147 4.254  
    dummy (0.17 (0.71) (0.50) (0.60) (0.42) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27)  
Market share 0.034 0.046 0.098 0.193 0.238 0.187 0.193 0.189 0.185 
 (0.45) (0.36) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Expected  0.454 -0.353 0.935 0.714 0.071 0.695 0.885 0.845 -1.150 
      proceeds) (0.37) (0.46) (0.04) (0.15) (0.87) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Absolute market  7.102 7.006 7.108 6.121 6.769 7.066 7.030 7.034 6.847 
      return>20% dummy (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Venture capital  3.726 3.294 3.999 4.024 3.544 3.810 3.895 3.874 2.909 
     dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NYSE dummy -3.214 -2.967 -3.397 -3.048 -2.684 -3.199 -3.289 -3.286 -2.228 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 12.78 13.33 12.64 12.56 12.27 12.65 12.57 12.62 13.41 
N 6,124 6,124 6,124 5,482 5,505 6,124 6,124 6,124 5,206 
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       Panel B: IPOs of the issuers in the lowest age quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 5.667 12.682 10.938 7.835 10.573 7.878 6.271 7.252 17.684 
 
(0.40) (0.07) (0.15) (0.29) (0.06) (0.28) (0.39) (0.32) (0.10) 
Network measures         
Degree 0.334        -0.029 
 (0.00)        (0.88) 
Closeness  0.418       0.352 
  (0.00)       (0.04) 
Betweenness   1.116      0.105 
   (0.03)      (0.83) 
Reciprocity    -0.006     -0.045 
 
 
  (0.89)     (0.29) 
Density     0.002    0.010 
 
 
   
(0.95) 
   
(0.78) 
 Tie diversity      -0.037   -0.014 
 
 
   
 (0.07)   (0.80) 
 Industry diversity       -1.022  -2.125 
 
 
   
 
 (0.23)  (0.15) 
 Geographical diversity        -1.829  
 
 
   
 
  (0.02)  
  … x Commercial bank  -0.069 0.022 -0.043 -0.080 0.013 0.024 3.182 1.847  
    dummy (0.26) (0.84) (0.56) (0.53) (0.73) (0.87) (0.53) (0.69)  
Market share 0.001 0.147 0.165 0.344 0.379 0.345 0.358 0.343 0.210 
 (0.98) (0.14) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Log (Expected  0.513 -0.741 1.866 1.816 0.719 1.627 1.884 1.782 -2.101 
      proceeds) (0.53) (0.42) (0.01) (0.02) (0.38) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Absolute market  3.675 3.541 3.783 4.329 4.065 3.929 3.769 3.916 4.838 
      return>20% dummy (0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.44) (0.40) 
Venture capital  2.664 2.217 3.261 2.986 2.463 3.168 3.203 3.178 1.400 
     dummy (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25) 
NYSE dummy -3.714 -3.221 -4.038 -3.549 -3.272 -3.774 -3.853 -3.861 -2.642 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) 
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      Panel B (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 18.27 18.99 17.72 17.60 15.96 17.37 17.28 17.41 18.06 
N 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,068 1,058 1,235 1,235 1,235 987 
 
 
 
 
      Panel C: IPOs of the issuers in the highest age quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 14.954 15.734 15.186 15.828 10.245 16.117 15.362 14.985 28.264 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Network measures         
Degree 0.014        -0.229 
 (0.79)        (0.18) 
Closeness  0.101       -0.003 
  (0.03)       (0.98) 
Betweenness   -0.021      0.089 
   (0.90)      (0.81) 
Reciprocity    -0.010     -0.023 
 
 
  (0.69)     (0.48) 
Density     -0.002    -0.076 
 
 
   
(0.92) 
   
(0.19) 
 Tie diversity      -0.029   -0.104 
 
 
   
 (0.17)   (0.41) 
 Industry diversity       -0.194  -0.201 
 
 
   
 
 (0.93)  (0.96) 
 Geographical diversity        0.476  
 
 
   
 
  (0.86)  
  … x Commercial bank  0.011 -0.018 0.068 -0.011 -0.019 0.048 -0.696 -1.638  
    dummy (0.76) (0.87) (0.87) (0.92) (0.67) (0.66) (0.90) (0.74)  
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      Panel C (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Market share 0.059 0.018 0.073 0.068 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.068 0.127 
 (0.31) (0.70) (0.14) (0.19) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) 
Log (Expected  -0.365 -0.676 -0.305 -0.635 -1.029 -0.474 -0.316 -0.261 -0.993 
      proceeds) (0.79) (0.63) (0.83) (0.69) (0.55) (0.74) (0.81) (0.83) (0.53) 
Absolute market  20.226 20.110 20.259 19.744 21.371 20.300 20.253 20.286 21.321 
      return>20% dummy (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Venture capital  3.137 3.025 3.159 2.857 2.971 3.081 3.176 3.208 2.659 
     dummy (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) 
NYSE dummy -2.638 -2.574 -2.622 -2.429 -2.100 -2.555 -2.617 -2.630 -0.213 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.19) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 13.32 13.48 13.31 13.59 14.58 13.39 13.32 13.33 14.64 
N 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,136 1,148 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,110 
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Because younger firms may have higher information asymmetry and require 
greater use of underwriter networks, we focus on the firms that fall in the lowest age 
quintile in Panel B and compare the results to those of firms that fall in the highest age 
quintile in Panel C.  Indeed, we find that the network variables are more significant and 
the estimated coefficients are larger for younger firms than older ones.  In Panel C, we 
find that all the network variables, except for closeness, are insignificant.   
Overall, the price revision results suggest that the book managers with certain 
network structure engage more actively in price discovery in the primary market.  Large, 
dense and homogenous networks that are centrally located and characterized by 
reciprocated relationships enhance the information production of the book managers. 
These results indicate that underwriters do receive better information from their ties to a 
large number of partners, close connections to the rest of the network, and intermediary 
positions between other underwriters.  The results also show that the information 
generated for IPO pricing is the type that flows better through dense and homogenous 
ties.  There is some evidence that the role of network is greater for younger firms with 
greater information asymmetry and that the network measures constructed from equity 
deals have greater explanatory power, which suggests greater information content of 
these ties.     
 
2.5.2. Underpricing 
An aspect of IPO that receives a tremendous attention in the finance literature is 
underpricing (see Loughran and Ritter (2004), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)).  
Underpricing is measured by the percentage change from the offer price to the closing 
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price on the first trading day.  Some previous studies explain IPO underpricing in terms 
of information asymmetry, while others maintain that underwriters underprice issues to 
avoid being sued.   
We examine if a book manager’s peer network has an impact on underpricing 
after controlling for price revision in the primary market in Table 2.7.  In all the models, 
we control for the factors that are known to affect underpricing in the literature.  For 
instance, Hoberg (2007) documents underwriter persistence phenomenon with an 
implication that market share may not be the only measure of underwriter capability.  We 
consider the book manager’s average residual underpricing on all IPOs, in which the 
book manager participated as a managing underwriter during the previous four-year 
period.  We find that the underwriters, who underprice more, continue to do so as 
evidenced by the positive coefficients on the average abnormal underpricing of the book 
manager.  Consistent with several previous studies that document an association between 
prestigious underwriters and underpricing, we also observe significant positive 
coefficients on the market share variable.  The average underpricing of all IPOs issued 
during the previous 30 days is included to reflect the overall IPO market sentiment as in 
Bradley and Jordan (2002), and it has a positive effect on underpricing as well.  
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Table 2.7: Book manager’s network and IPO underpricing  
The table presents the estimated coefficients of regressions of issue underpricing.  The dependent variable, underpricing, is measured 
by the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price of the first trading day.  Degree is the percent of all other 
underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an 
underwriter is to all other underwriters, and it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum eigenvector in the network.  Betweenness 
measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters, and it is normalized by 
dividing it by the maximum betweenness in the network.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible 
ties that can exist among the partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-
redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical 
diversity refer to the numbers of different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of 
partners.  Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the equity offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the 
total deal volume of all the equity offerings during a period.  Book manager average abnormal underpricing refers to the average 
residual underpricing of all IPOs the book manager is involved in as a managing underwriter.   The IPO market sentiment is the 
average underpricing of all IPOs in the 30 days preceding the offer date.  Price adjustment is the percentage difference from the filing 
range mid point to the offer price.  Expected proceeds is defined as the filing range midpoint multiplied by the number of shares 
offered.  Secondary shares refer to the percentage of total shares offered by insiders.  Venture capital dummy equals to one if there is a 
venture capital back-up on the issue, and zero otherwise.  NYSE dummy equals to one if the firm is listed on NYSE, and zero 
otherwise.  Industry is defined according to two-digit SIC codes.  p-values reported in the brackets are estimated using robust standard 
errors clustered within underwriters.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -42.161 -42.118 -42.211 -46.236 -44.717 -41.947 -41.683 -41.121 -51.749 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.024        0.191 
 
(0.82)     
   
(0.36) 
Closeness  -0.033       -0.233 
 
 (0.60)    
   
(0.15) 
Betweenness   -0.134      -0.414 
 
  (0.79)   
   
(0.29) 
Reciprocity    -0.010     -0.012 
 
   (0.63)  
   
(0.59) 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Density     0.000    0.003 
 
    (0.98) 
   
(0.91) 
 Tie diversity      -0.000   -0.031 
 
     (0.99)   (0.37) 
 Industry diversity       -0.202  -1.060 
 
     
 (0.78)  (0.47) 
 Geographical         -0.768  
diversity        (0.31)  
  … x Commercial  0.007 0.049 -0.209 0.108 0.127 0.429 15.631 16.167  
    bank dummy (0.92) (0.76) (0.66) (0.58) (0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.12)  
Market share 0.478 0.527 0.519 0.517 0.570 0.539 0.563 0.564 0.524 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) 
BM average abnormal 0.111 0.108 0.110 0.116 0.120 0.117 0.117 0.120 0.078 
     underpricing (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.30) 
IPO market sentiment 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.135 0.133 0.145 0.146 0.145 0.130 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Price adjustment 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.587 0.574 0.562 0.561 0.561 0.594 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Expected  -2.227 -1.967 -2.064 -2.426 -2.749 -2.212 -2.314 -2.383 -2.787 
     proceeds) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary shares -0.070 -0.070 -0.069 -0.067 -0.068 -0.070 -0.070 -0.070 -0.068 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Venture capital dummy 3.656 3.767 3.718 3.747 3.541 3.596 3.481 3.437 3.852 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NYSE dummy -2.640 -2.677 -2.596 -2.464 -2.277 -2.661 -2.668 -2.662 -2.067 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 44.72 44.72 44.72 46.23 45.32 44.80 44.85 44.90 46.99 
N 5,865 5,865 5,865 5,247 5,289 5,865 5,865 5,865 5,004 
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The issues with revised offer price display higher underpricing in our results, 
which has been previously documented by Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Hanley 
(1993).  The positive coefficient on price adjustment is consistent with the partial 
adjustment hypothesis proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), which states that 
underwriters adjust price only partially to compensate their institutional investors.  
According to Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), insiders may care about underpricing to the 
extent that they may lose from it.  The proportion of shares sold by the insiders may be a 
proxy of the amount of insider wealth at stake, and consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), the secondary shares have significant and negative coefficients in most of our 
regression results.  We also control for venture capital back-up and NYSE listing.  
Indeed, the NYSE listed issues are underpriced less in line with their lower information 
asymmetry, while the issues with venture capital back-up are underpriced more.  After 
controlling for these variables, the characteristics of book manager network have no 
impact on IPO underpricing.   
 
2.5.3. Post-IPO stock return 
Underwriters market securities and provide price support in IPOs and SEOs.  In 
this analysis, we examine whether the characteristics of the book manager’s network 
affect post-issue performance of IPOs.  We regress the three-month post-IPO market-
adjusted return, which is computed by subtracting the value-weighted market return from 
the stock return, on the book manager’s network characteristics in Table 2.8.  The 
regression results in Panel A show that the network size, closeness and betweenness 
matter as well as the diversity.  The measures of network embeddedness, density and 
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reciprocity, are insignificant.  The interaction terms with commercial bank dummy are 
also insignificant. 
 
 
Table 2.8: Book manager’s network and post-IPO three-month return 
The table presents the estimated coefficients of regressions of post-IPO three-month 
return.  The dependent variable is three-month percentage stock return adjusted by the 
value-weighted market return.  Panel A presents the results of the regressions estimated 
using the full sample.  Panel B presents the results of regressions estimated using the 
IPOs issued during hot markets, and Panel C presents the results using all other IPOs, 
excluding those issued during hot markets.  Years 1983, 1986-1987, and 1992-1997 are 
identified as hot markets based on the issue volume.  Degree is the percent of all other 
underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector 
centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters, and 
it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum eigenvector in the network.  Betweenness 
measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of 
other underwriters, and it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum betweenness in 
the network.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   
Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an 
underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-
redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for 
each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different 
industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of 
partners.  Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the equity offerings 
lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the equity offerings 
during a period.  Book manager average three-month abnormal return refers to the 
average market-adjusted return of all IPOs the book manager is involved in as a 
managing underwriter.  Expected proceeds is defined as the filing range midpoint 
multiplied by the number of shares offered.  Secondary shares refer to the percentage of 
total shares offered by insiders.  Venture capital dummy equals to one if there is a venture 
capital back-up for the issue, and zero otherwise.  NYSE dummy equals to one if the firm 
is listed on NYSE, and zero otherwise.  Industry is defined according to two-digit SIC 
codes.  p-values reported in the brackets are estimated using robust standard errors 
clustered within underwriters.     
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      Panel A: Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 5.449 5.243 4.859 -10.335 6.342 7.877 6.563 6.657 17.029 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.461        0.371 
 (0.00)        (0.04) 
Closeness  0.374       -0.178 
  (0.00)       (0.19) 
Betweenness   1.139      -0.261 
   (0.04)      (0.76) 
Reciprocity    0.019     -0.005 
 
 
  (0.56)     (0.89) 
Density     0.009    -0.019 
 
 
   
(0.73) 
   
(0.62) 
 Tie diversity      -0.078   -0.200 
 
 
   
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
 Industry diversity       -2.305  1.950 
 
 
   
 
 (0.03)  (0.33) 
 Geographical         -2.689  
diversity        (0.03)  
  … x Commercial  -0.102 -0.059 -0.532 0.075 -0.103 -0.540 -10.106 -12.849  
    bank dummy (0.10) (0.74) (0.40) (0.76) (0.12) (0.01) (0.30) (0.08)  
Market share -0.247 -0.010 0.018 0.227 0.150 0.130 0.141 0.126 -0.034 
 (0.02) (0.90) (0.85) (0.01) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.72) 
BM average 3-month  0.041 0.040 0.037 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.039 0.045 0.024 
    abnormal return (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.52) (0.45) (0.36) (0.32) (0.25) (0.57) 
Log (Expected  -2.433 -2.589 -0.829 -1.174 -1.171 -1.164 -0.700 -0.700 -4.003 
     proceeds) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.28) (0.28) (0.00) 
Secondary shares 0.070 0.082 0.077 0.076 0.069 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.067 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
VC backup dummy 0.562 0.454 1.380 1.482 1.399 1.153 1.386 1.417 0.165 
 (0.58) (0.66) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.88) 
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      Panel A (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NYSE dummy 5.605 5.886 5.278 5.875 6.159 5.724 5.574 5.588 6.499 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 5.94 5.78 5.56 5.85 6.03 5.68 5.53 5.58 6.59 
N 6,502 6,502 6,502 5,789 5,797 6,502 6,502 6,502 5,476 
 
 
  
       
      Panel B: IPOs issued during hot markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.166 -0.619 -1.507 -1.476 -2.890 2.291 -0.844 -0.822 13.730 
 
(0.94) (0.77) (0.48) (0.50) (0.24) (0.41) (0.74) (0.75) (0.01) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.323        0.325 
 (0.00)        (0.20) 
Closeness  0.274       -0.332 
  (0.00)       (0.11) 
Betweenness   -0.067      -0.665 
   (0.85)      (0.25) 
Reciprocity    -0.003     -0.024 
 
 
  (0.94)     (0.43) 
Density     0.089    0.019 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.60) 
 Tie diversity      -0.060   -0.216 
 
 
   
 (0.04)   (0.00) 
 Industry diversity       -0.405  0.881 
 
 
   
 
 (0.71)  (0.68) 
 Geographical         -0.458  
diversity        (0.71)  
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      Panel B (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  … x Commercial  -0.301 -0.222 -3.038 -0.322 0.086 0.231 8.600 8.436  
    bank dummy (0.17) (0.33) (0.06) (0.00) (0.50) (0.78) (0.62) (0.72)  
Market share -0.428 -0.290 -0.034 -0.013 0.195 -0.062 -0.029 -0.32 0.083 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.84) (0.93) (0.21) (0.64) (0.84) (0.82) (0.66) 
BM average 3-month  -0.030 -0.028 -0.028 0.006 0.041 -0.032 -0.028 -0.028 0.047 
    abnormal return (0.43) (0.46) (0.46) (0.89) (0.38) (0.41) (0.47) (0.47) (0.38) 
Log (Expected  -0.818 -1.073 0.497 0.097 -1.394 -0.282 0.314 0.319 -3.247 
     proceeds) (0.26) (0.19) (0.42) (0.88) (0.03) (0.70) (0.64) (0.63) (0.00) 
Secondary shares 0.118 0.122 0.118 0.113 0.113 0.120 0.122 0.122 0.110 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
VC backup dummy 2.226 2.023 2.720 2.880 2.154 2.310 2.581 2.588 1.499 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) 
NYSE dummy 7.376 7.704 7.281 6.722 8.246 7.532 7.282 7.278 8.456 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 4.27 4.25 4.01 4.12 4.17 4.14 3.99 3.98 5.03 
N 3,645 3,645 3,645 3206 3,205 3,645 3,645 3,645 3006 
 
 
 
 
     Panel C: All other IPOs, excluding those issued during hot markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 8.452 7.926 7.341 9.010 16.379 12.033 12.577 12.862 10.872 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.566        0.196 
 (0.00)        (0.50) 
Closeness  0.516       0.274 
  (0.00)       (0.28) 
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     Panel C (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Betweenness   2.717      0.548 
   (0.01)      (0.76) 
Reciprocity    0.069     0.036 
 
 
  (0.23)     (0.62) 
Density     -0.112    -0.064 
 
 
   
(0.03) 
   
(0.41) 
 Tie diversity      -0.113   -0.124 
 
 
   
 (0.00)   (0.30) 
 Industry diversity       -7.349  7.117 
 
 
   
 
 (0.00)  (0.30) 
 Geographical         -8.735  
diversity        (0.00)  
  … x Commercial  -0.093 -0.018 -0.943 0.102 -0.092 -0.574 -13.283 -13.301  
    bank dummy (0.14) (0.93) (0.26) (0.72) (0.16) (0.00) (0.16) (0.04)  
Market share -0.137 0.149 0.031 0.388 0.118 0.271 0.246 0.224 -0.033 
 (0.31) (0.18) (0.82) (0.00) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.80) 
BM average 3-month  0.087 0.084 0.085 0.036 0.019 0.075 0.087 0.095 0.013 
    abnormal return (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.67) (0.73) (0.22) (0.16) (0.10) (0.81) 
Log (Expected  -3.956 -4.179 -2.331 -2.688 -1.735 -2.309 -2.039 -2.091 -4.531 
     proceeds) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.00) 
Secondary shares 0.043 0.068 0.059 0.067 0.053 0.061 0.059 0.059 0.054 
 (0.40) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.29) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.30) 
VC backup dummy -1.633 -1.724 -0.668 -0.702 -0.093 -0.721 -0.535 -0.515 -1.518 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.72) (0.72) (0.96) (0.70) (0.77) (0.78) (0.42) 
NYSE dummy 3.749 3.863 3.303 5.114 4.122 3.667 3.692 3.675 4.365 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.20) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 7.67 7.43 7.42 7.60 7.99 7.30 7.28 7.38 8.20 
N 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,583 2,592 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,470 
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These results show that when book managers have many partners (degree), are 
generally close to all other underwriters (closeness), occupy exclusive network positions 
(betweenness), they are associated with higher short-run IPO returns.  Finally, book 
managers that work with similar partners and thus, have more homogenous networks are 
also associated with higher IPO returns.  These results can be driven by the fact that the 
book managers with above network characteristics can both market the security better 
and initially produce more information leading to less negative surprises.  The median 
three-month market-adjusted IPO return is -3.13 percent.  In model 9, when we regress 
all the network variables together, the network size and tie diversity measures are still 
significant with a positive and negative coefficient, respectively.  As for the economic 
significance of these variables, when the closeness centrality of the book manager’s 
network increases by one standard deviation, for instance, the three-month stock return 
increases by 3.34 percent.  Similarly, when the tie diversity falls by one standard 
deviation, the three-month stock return increases by 2.27 percent.   
The estimated positive and significant coefficients on the market share in some of 
the models are consistent with the previously documented association of more prestigious 
underwriters and better performing IPOs.  Bao and Edmans (2007) find that the past 
return of advisors has explanatory power in M&A acquirer returns, but the past return of 
IPOs of the book managers is insignificant in our results.  The firms listed on NYSE and 
issues with a larger number of secondary shares tend to perform better within a three-
month horizon as well.   
Underwriters may need to utilize their networks more, when there is less 
information available during periods with low deal volume.  Thus, we estimate the 
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regressions using IPOs issued during hot markets and also using all IPOs, excluding those 
issued during hot markets, in Panels B and C, respectively.  We find that the results from 
the sample of IPOs issued during normal and cold market conditions in Panel C are more 
significant and the coefficients of the network variables are larger than those estimated 
using the IPOs issued during hot markets in Panel B.   
The results also remain qualitatively the same with the use of industry adjusted 
returns and one-month returns.  In unreported regressions, we repeat the analysis using 
the network measures constructed from equity and debt deals separately.  When we 
conduct similar analysis on one- and two-year post-issue returns, we find no effect of 
book manager peer network, which is consistent with the underwriter services exerting 
the most impact in the short run.   
All the previous results presented in Section 5 remain robust to alternative 
specifications.  We repeat the previous analyses using network measures constructed in a 
variety of ways.  Specifically, the network measures are computed over moving two-year 
periods.  Additionally, we focus on all the managing underwriters in an IPO instead of 
just the book managers and compute the average network measures of managing 
underwriters for each issue.  All the results remain robust to the implementations of these 
various measures.   
 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we assess the impact of underwriter peer networks on IPO pricing 
and performance, using measures from social network analysis and a sample of U.S. IPOs 
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issued between 1974 and 2007.  The network measures are constructed using underwriter 
ties that result from underwriting syndicates of public issues between 1970 and 2007.  A 
unique aspect of an underwriter’s relationships with others is that through these 
relationships, an underwriter can access information generated from other underwriters’ 
client and investor networks.  Particularly, in a knowledge- and information-based 
industry like investment banking, such networks could be pivotal.  Hence, we expect 
significant consequences from underwriter peer networks.   
Our analysis reveals that underwriter networks have a significant impact on the 
price discovery and marketing of IPOs.  When book managers have many partners, are 
generally close to all other underwriters, occupy exclusive network positions, and have 
dense and homogenous networks, the IPOs are associated with a higher likelihood of an 
offer price revision.  Beyond the impact on price revision, book manager peer network 
has no additional effect on underpricing, but it has a significant impact on the post-issue 
short-run stock returns.   Book managers with larger, more central and more homogenous 
networks are associated with higher three-month stock returns.  Moreover, the impact of 
book manager peer network is greater in the price discovery of relatively younger firms 
and in the placement of deals during certain market conditions, further highlighting the 
informational role of peer network.  We find no significant difference between the effects 
of the peer networks of commercial banks and investment banks.  In general, the results 
show that the underwriters use their peer networks to generate information and place 
securities, and the structure of the networks has implications for the volume and the 
quality of information shared between the underwriters.      
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 The main contribution of this study is to illustrate the impact of underwriter peer 
networks on IPOs and propose that the peer relationship is another information channel in 
addition to the previously discussed client and investor networks of underwriters.  The 
results indicate that the network effect is different from that of a bank’s reputation.  
Overall, our study sheds light on the role of social networks in securities issuance.    
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CHAPTER 3 
M&A ADVISOR RELATIONSHIPS:   
THE IMPACT ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are among the most critical events that firms encounter.  
In these colossal deals, financial advisors play a crucial role.  Financial advisors, in turn, 
maintain relationships with each other through their cooperation in various investment 
banking activities.  Given that an advisor serves not only as an expert in M&As, but also 
as an intermediary in deal negotiation, its relationship with the advisors on the opposite 
side of the deal may have significant implications.  This paper attempts to shed light on 
advisor peer relationships and their role in M&A deals.  More specifically, we study how 
the relative bargaining power, inherent in the business relationships between the acquirer 
and target advisors, affects the shareholder wealth of the acquirer and target firms by 
examining target premium, announcement returns, and division of shareholder wealth 
gain.   
An M&A deal involves a negotiation process, and therefore, advisors’ bargaining 
power can play a significant role in it.  Bargaining power can result from the 
interdependence in inter-organizational relationships.  In other words, one’s power stems 
from another’s dependence.  If two advisors maintain a working relationship and one 
advisor is more dependent than the other on this relationship for future business 
generation and information production, the other advisor may possess a greater 
bargaining power.  As a result, in order not to jeopardize its relationship with an 
important partner, the advisor with the less bargaining power may find its actions in an 
  63 
M&A deal constrained to certain extent, whereas the advisor with the greater bargaining 
power may be able to negotiate more favorable deal terms for its client.  Overall, power 
relations that exist among advisors in various investment banking segments may cause an 
incentive misalignment between firms and advisors and influence how the wealth gain is 
shared between target and acquirer firms.   
We examine the consequences of power in advisor peer relationships on 2,938 
domestic M&A deals of public firms between 1984 and 2007.  To measure the existence 
and the strength of advisor peer relationships, we use all public security issues and 
M&As during 1980-2007 that employ multiple underwriters or advisors, and create a 
measure of relative dependence for each pair of advisors.  Two advisors are considered to 
have a relationship if they serve together as underwriters in the same syndicate or advise 
the same firm on an M&A deal.  The importance of a relationship with a certain advisor 
is measured by the percent of all co-managed deals completed with that advisor.   
Our results show that the dynamics of the relationship between acquirer and target 
advisors exerts a significant impact on the acquirer and target shareholder wealth.  The 
regression results indicate that when the relative bargaining power of the acquirer (target) 
advisor in the relationship is greater than that of the target (acquirer) advisor, the 
announcement return and the share of the wealth gain pertaining to the acquirer (target) 
firm is higher possibly because of more favorable deal terms negotiated by the acquirer 
(target) advisor.  The results also show that when the target advisor has more power in 
the acquirer-target advisor relationship, target shareholders obtain higher premium.  
However, the results are generally weaker on the sell side compared to the ones on the 
buy side, reflecting the asymmetry in the target and acquirer advisor functions in M&As.   
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In addition, it is possible that the familiarity between acquirer and target advisors 
stemming from past working relationships fosters more effective information 
transmission and deal negotiation.  Yet, we find no significant effect of the past 
familiarity between the target and acquirer advisors on the likelihood of deal completion, 
completion speed and total wealth gain.  We also find evidence that despite the additional 
conflict of interest that may result from the relationship between the target and acquirer 
advisor, target firms are more likely to hire advisors that previously worked with the 
acquirer advisor.   
Consequently, our main contribution lies in highlighting the role and importance 
of advisor peer relationships and showing how a potential conflict of interest can arise 
from them in the context of an M&A deal.  Investment banking is considered a 
relationship-intensive industry with substantial built-in conflicts of interest that need to 
be managed, but to the best of our knowledge, the impact of relationship between the 
acquirer and target advisors has not been addressed in the prior literature.   
Our study is also relevant to several research areas in finance.  First, the study is 
related to the discussion of the broad role of financial advisors in M&As and the extent to 
which they add value.  Our findings clearly illustrate how advisor peer relationship can 
affect shareholder wealth in M&As.  Furthermore, this paper is indirectly related to the 
function of boutique investment banks.  Despite the increasing importance of financial 
capital relative to human capital in many investment banking activities, advisory service 
still remains largely dependent on tacit human capital, and the market for small and 
focused boutique banks has grown lately.  The boutique banks typically do not participate 
in security underwriting, and therefore, have no underwriting ties to the advisors on the 
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other side of the deal table.  Finally, this paper fits among the growing body of research 
on social networks.   Our work shows that the existence of relationships between acquirer 
and target advisors, especially close working relationships, can affect how the advisors 
advise on these strategically sensitive deals.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 discusses M&A 
advisors and their peer relationships in further detail.  Section 3.3 introduces the data and 
the descriptive statistics.  Section 3.4 presents the regression results, and Section 3.5 
concludes.  
 
 
3.2. The role of advisor peer relationships in M&As 
Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most prominent events in a firm’s lifecycle.  
Given their strategic significance and the large deal size, extensive research examines 
various aspects of mergers and acquisitions, including the role of the financial advisors 
that advise on these deals.  In M&As, the role of such advisors extends into a number of 
areas.  Experienced advisors provide knowledge on market dynamics, consult on 
regulatory matters, offer networks of contacts, identify potential acquirer or target firms, 
and help resolve potentially difficult situations.  Overall, the main functions of M&A 
advisors can be considered as providing expertise in various areas and serving as an 
intermediary in deal negotiation.   
Bowers and Miller (1990) were among the first to examine whether investment 
banks add value in acquisitions, and since then, substantial literature exists on the role of 
M&A advisors.  Particularly popular topics have been the choice of an advisor (e.g., Da 
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Silva Rosa et al. (2004), Forte, Iannotta, and Navone (2007), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), 
Serveas and Zenner (1996), Thomas (1995)) and the impact of advisor reputation (e.g., 
Ma (2007), Michel, Shaked, and Lee (1991), Rau and Rodgers (2002)).  For instance, 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) investigate the factors that determine whether an acquirer 
hires an advisor and how that hiring decision affects announcement returns, and Ma 
(2007) studies whether target shareholders benefit from hiring top tier banks.   
Most of the previous research, however, focuses on acquirer rather than target 
advisors.  In general, studies that focus on both acquirer and target advisors are rather 
rare.  Exceptions to this include the study by Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003), which 
examines the effect of the relative reputation of advisors on the share of wealth gain in 
corporate takeovers, and that by Allen et al. (2004), which studies commercial banks that 
serve as merger advisors and focuses on their previous lending relations with acquirer 
and target firms.  These studies, however, do not explore the role of the relationships 
among advisors.  In fact, most research on advisor relationships focuses on advisor-firm 
relationship.  For instance, Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) study the effect of prior bank-
firm relationship on advisory fees, and Allen and Peristiani (2007) explore the effect on 
the pricing of syndicated loans when the acquirer’s advisor serves as the lender.   
M&A advisors may maintain relationships with each other because of their 
previous cooperation in investment banking activities such as security underwriting and 
M&A advisory services.  With syndication becoming increasingly frequent in 
underwriting, the network of ties that exist among banks is becoming denser.  Given the 
fierce competition in the underwriting industry, having strong ties to other prominent 
underwriters is very important as underwriters can be invited as co-managers on the deals 
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that are lead by others.  Ljungqvist et al. (2007) also show that becoming a co-manager in 
a security underwriting increases the likelihood of an investment bank being selected as a 
book runner in the future deals of the firm.  In a reputation- and knowledge-intensive 
industry like investment banking, thus, peer relationships are crucial as they represent 
deal flow and information channels.   
The existence of relationships between acquirer and target advisors, especially 
close working relationships, may influence their function on these strategically sensitive 
deals, because advisors need to manage the relationships with their partners as well.  
Particularly, relationship between target and acquirer advisors can introduce an additional 
conflict of interest that may result in deal terms that are more favorable to one firm than 
the other.  An important aspect of investment banking is the built-in conflicts of interest 
that must be managed.  Some dimensions of conflict of interest in investment banking 
have already been examined.  For example, using U.K. data, Stouraitis (2003) examines 
how the announcement return and premium differ when advisors invest their own money 
and provide financing in the deal.  Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2007) examine if 
banks advising the bidders use their privileged information to their benefit by investing in 
the target firms.  The conflict of interest inherent in the provision of fairness opinions has 
also attracted academic interest lately, as evidenced by the studies of Calomiris and 
Hitscherich (2005), Kisgen, Qian, and Song (2007), and Makhija and Narayanan (2007).  
However, to the best of our knowledge, a potential conflict of interest that arises from the 
relationship between advisors has not been examined in the extant literature.  In general, 
relationships and networks can produce both positive and negative outcomes, and the ties 
that bind can easily become the ties that blind (Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005)).     
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M&A deal negotiation is a bargaining process and thus, the advisors’ bargaining 
power can play a significant role.  Such power stems from the interdependence of the 
advisors in peer relationships.  More specifically, according to the resource dependence 
theory (Emerson (1962)), one’s power essentially derives from another’s dependence.  If 
a certain relationship between two parties is more important to one party because this 
party generates a larger portion of its revenues from the relationship, and thus, it is more 
dependent on the relationship, the other party may hold greater bargaining power.  In our 
setting, if the target and acquirer advisors have a close working relationship in various 
investment banking segments, they rely on this relationship for future business generation 
and information production.  However, the extent of their dependence on the relationship 
can be different.  This difference in their relative dependence, in turn, can indicate who 
has more power.  For example, in order not to jeopardize its relationship with an 
important partner, the advisor with less bargaining power may find its actions constrained 
to some extent and not advocate for the interest of its client firm as much as it would have 
otherwise.  On the other hand, the advisor with the greater bargaining power can use this 
to its advantage and negotiate better deal terms for its client.   A number of prior studies 
in finance have established that the deal design and the terms of transactions do matter in 
M&As.  For instance, previous research has examined the role of lockup options (Burch 
(2001)), method of payment (Chang (1998)), termination fee (Officer (2003)), and 
markup pricing (Schwert (1996)).   
More specifically, for the acquirer firms, advisors can help to make sure that the 
acquirer is not overpaying.  For the target firms, advisors can assist firms to better 
estimate their values and obtain higher premium for their shareholders.  Therefore, when 
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the target (acquirer) advisor has more power in the acquirer-target advisor relationship, it 
may be able to obtain higher (lower) premium for target shareholders and negotiate more 
favorable deal terms for the target (acquirer) firm resulting in higher announcement 
returns and larger share of wealth gains for the target (acquirer) firm.  Overall, power 
dynamics in the relations between advisors may cause an incentive misalignment 
between firms and advisors and influence how the wealth gain is shared between target 
and acquirer firms.   
On the other hand, it is possible that advisors that worked together previously, 
especially in M&A deals, have better communication and information sharing skills due 
to their familiarity with each other.  According to Bruner (2004), negotiation is a learning 
process in which new information must be produced and analyzed in real time.  Effective 
communication, therefore, is critical.  Past shared experience and repeated interactions 
between advisors can improve the quantity and quality of information shared during the 
M&A process.  This informational advantage can help advisors negotiate deal terms more 
effectively and efficiently, and thus, positively affect deal outcomes.   
The impact of familiarity and trust on performance has been examined previously 
in other fields, especially in the context of team and alliance performance in strategy and 
organizational literature.  For example, Huckman, Staats, and Upton (2009) document 
that team familiarity and team performance are positively related.  Espinosa et al. (2007) 
also find that team familiarity is beneficial, especially when team coordination is more 
difficult.   
The familiarity, thus, implies that employing target and acquirer advisors that 
have previously worked together can have positive effect on the deal at hand because of 
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the improved information transmission.  Specifically, this informational advantage can 
help advisors identify deals that create higher value to shareholders.  Effective and 
efficient negotiation can also lead to a higher likelihood of deal completion or faster deal 
completion.   
 
 
3.3. Data  
To measure the existence and the strength of pairwise relationships among 
financial advisors in M&As, we obtain data on public security issues and M&A deals 
between 1980 and 2007 from Securities Data Corporation (SDC).  Specifically, we use 
all U.S. public issues that employ two or more underwriters and all M&A deals involving 
a U.S. firm and at least fifteen percent stake that also employ two or more advisors on 
either acquirer or target side.  In total, we obtain 57,617 public issues of various types 
and 6,471 M&As between 1980 and 2007 as shown in Table 3.1.  Two investment banks 
are considered to have a relationship if they serve together as underwriters in the same 
syndicate or as advisors for the same firm on a merger deal.  As we want to examine 
power in relationships, we focus on syndicate roles with potential to build significant 
relationships.  Thus, we consider managing underwriters in equity syndicates and joint 
lead underwriters in debt syndicates to construct ties among underwriters.   
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Table 3.1: Sample of security issues and M&A deals that employ multiple 
underwriters and advisors 
The following sample includes all public securities issued in the U.S. between 1980 and 
2007 that employ two or more underwriters and all M&A deals involving a U.S. firm and 
at least fifteen percent stake that employ two or more advisors on either acquirer or target 
side.  We use these deals to construct pairwise advisor relationship variables.   
 Number of deals  
 
All public issues 
                            
      57,617 
Equity                             16,613 
Initial public offerings 7,629 
Seasoned equity offerings 8,984 
Debt          41,004 
Non-convertible debt 36,825 
Convertible debt 869 
Non-convertible preferred 2,755 
Convertible preferred 555 
Mergers and acquisitions         6,471 
All deals       64,088 
 
 
 Based on these public securities and M&A deals, we identify all pairwise 
relationships between investment banks over moving four-year periods.  Relationships 
are not likely to vanish as soon as a deal is over.  Underwriters and advisors may interact 
with each other before or after the deal.  Therefore, to account for the continuous nature 
of relationships, we use four-year moving period approach.  In total, there are 25 four-
year periods between 1980 and 2007.  We use reported underwriter and advisor names, 
but multiple variations of the same name appear in the SDC data due to inconsistent 
abbreviation, punctuation or spelling such as Goldman Sachs & Co and Goldman, Sachs 
& Co.  We check all the names and manually correct the names when necessary.  In the 
case of investment bank mergers, we treat the post-merger bank as a new entity because a 
multitude of changes and restructuring occur around bank mergers.   
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For each pair of investment banks, we compute the number and dollar volume of 
deals they worked on together.  Table 3.2 describes these pairwise relationships among 
all investment banks across different investment banking segments.  As presented in 
Table 3.2, an investment bank maintains relationships with 13.86 banks on average, when 
we consider all types of deals.  The average strength of these pairwise relationships is 
7.09 deals or $3,070.31 million in deal volume.   
 
 
Table 3.2: Characteristics of the relationships among investment banks 
The table presents the characteristics of the pairwise relationships among all investment 
banks that serve as underwriters and financial advisors between 1980 and 2007.  We 
identify pairwise relationships among investment banks using the deals in Table 1.  Two 
investment banks are considered to be related if they serve together as managing 
underwriters in the same equity syndicate or as joint book managers in the same debt 
syndicate or as advisors for the same firm on a M&A deal over moving four-year periods.    
The strength of a pairwise relationship between two investment banks refers to the total 
number (dollar volume) of deals these two investment banks worked on together during a 
given four-year period.   
 Mean Median Min Max N 
Number of relationships a bank maintains in     
M&A deals 4.91 1 1 97 5,916 
Public issues 23.40 15 1 109 2,684 
Equity issues 24.16 16 1 109 2,489 
Debt issues 3.96 1 1 41 753 
All deals 13.86 2 1 167 8,501 
      
Strength of a pairwise relationship based on     
Number of deals in     
M&A deals 2.05 1 1 56 36,582 
Public issues 7.99 2 1 808 108,930 
Equity issues 6.74 2 1 238 105,716 
Debt issues 11.97 2 1 783 13,180 
All deals 7.09 2 1 808 133,358 
Dollar volume of deals ($ mil) in      
M&A deals 3,891.64 383.84 0.28 310,695 33,706 
Public issues 2,487.69 214.03 0.11 281,043 108,930 
Equity issues 1,849.26 207.73 0.11 141,506 105,716 
Debt issues 5,727.37 374.54 3.05 220,643 13,180 
All deals 3,070.31 234.93 0.11 507,929 130,982 
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A relationship between two investment banks, however, may be of differing 
importance to each bank.  Thus, to measure the importance of a specific relationship to an 
investment bank, we compute a dependence ratio by dividing the number (dollar volume) 
of deals completed with a certain bank by the number (dollar volume) of deals completed 
with all partner banks.  Specifically,    
Dependence of advisor i on advisor j =  
= (∑ deals advisor i worked w/ advisor j) /(∑ deals advisor i worked w/ others)       (1) 
Consequently, the importance of a relationship is expressed as a percent of all co-
managed deals completed with a certain bank.  For example, during the period of 2004-
07, Merrill Lynch and Lazard worked together on 28 deals of various types according to 
our criteria.  During the same period, in total, Merrill Lynch and Lazard cooperated with 
others on 1,816 and 214 deals, respectively.  Therefore, 28 deals on which they worked 
together represent 1.54 percent of all co-managed deals for Merrill Lynch, while it 
represents 13.08 percent for Lazard.  Clearly, this cooperative relationship is of much 
more significance to Lazard than Merrill Lynch.   
Furthermore, for a given pair of banks, the difference between their respective 
relationship dependence ratios may indicate to whom this relationship is more important 
and indicate relative bargaining power.  Formally,  
Relative dependence of advisor i on advisor j =    
= Dependence of advisor i on advisor j – Dependence of advisor j on advisor i        (2) 
In the above example of Merrill Lynch and Lazard, the relative dependence ratio of 
Lazard on Merrill Lynch is 11.54 (= 13.08 – 1.54).  A positive measure means Lazard is 
relatively more dependent on this relationship than Merrill Lynch.  If the difference 
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equals to zero, it indicates equal dependence and thus neither party has greater bargaining 
power over the other.   
Moreover, the importance of a relationship between advisors i and j for advisor i 
can be high or low, and at the same time, the relative importance of this relationship for 
advisor i can be greater or less than the importance of this relationship for advisor j.  
Thus, the bargaining power of advisor j that stems from the greater relative dependence 
of advisor i may be magnified if this relationship is an important relationship to advisor i 
to start with (i.e. the importance for advisor i is high).  Hence, the interaction between the 
relative and absolute dependence measures can further highlight the power dynamics in 
relationship. 
To analyze the impact of advisor relationships in M&As, next we obtain all 
domestic M&A deals between 1984 and 2007 that employ both acquirer and target 
advisors.  We require that the acquirer holds less than 50 percent of the target firm at the 
announcement with plans to acquire more than 50 percent, and the acquirer and target are 
public firms with price information available from Center for Research on Security Price 
(CRSP) database.  In line with previous research, the minimum deal value is set at $1 
million.  We also include only the first bid for the same target within two years to avoid 
double-counting target firms that receive multiple bids.   
After applying the above criteria, we obtain a final sample of 2,938 domestic 
M&As between 1984 and 2007, of which 2,659 are completed.  In total, 4,568 firms and 
423 advisors are involved in these deals.  About 869 deals involve financial acquirers in 
our sample.  When we repeat the analysis excluding these firms, we obtain qualitatively 
the same results.  There are 159 hostile and 178 challenged deals in the sample, as well as 
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1,786 deals that utilize termination fees.  Of all acquisitions, 1,113 are also considered 
horizontal acquisitions as the primary SIC codes of the acquirer and target firms are the 
same.  The takeover history of both acquirer and target firms are obtained from SDC. 
Since Bao and Edmans (2007) find performance persistence in acquirer advisors, we also 
compute the average announcement return of the previous client firms of the advisors, in 
addition to the advisors’ market shares.  
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample of 2,938 M&As. 
When presenting advisor characteristics in Table 3.3, we collapse the sample to advisor-
period observations.  Similarly, when presenting advisor pairwise relationship 
characteristics, we collapse the observations to unique acquirer-target advisor pairs across 
different periods.    For each pair of acquirer and target advisor, we compute the relative 
dependence ratio between the advisors.  When two advisors have no prior relationship, 
this ratio equals to zero to indicate that neither advisor has greater bargaining power over 
the other.  In a small number of deals with multiple advisors advising the same firm, we 
take the average of the advisor characteristics.  Table 3.3 shows that the computed 
dependence ratio of the financial advisors that advise on these 2,938 M&As range from 0 
to 100.  The average market share of the acquirer advisor is 4.28 percent while that of the 
target advisor is 3.70 percent.  The relationship measures based on the number of deals 
are used in the regression analysis, because the dollar values of some M&A deals are 
missing during the early sample periods.  The results, however, remain qualitatively the 
same when the dollar based measures are used.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of 2,938 U.S. domestic M&As involving public target and acquirer firms between 1984 
and 2007.  The advisor characteristics are measured over moving four-year periods from 1980 to 2007.  The dependence of advisor i 
on advisor j is measured by the number of all deals advisors i and j worked together divided by the number of all co-managed deals 
completed by advisor i.  An advisor’s market share refers to the percent of the total deal volume of all M&A deals advised by the 
financial advisor.  Acquirer (target) advisor’s average ACAR (TCAR) refers to the average cumulative three-day abnormal return of 
all acquirer (target) firms the acquirer (target) advisor advised during the previous four-year period.  The strategic complexity measure 
is a sum of five dummy variables that capture the difficulties of completing a deal such as two-tier structure or pending litigations.  
Target premium is measured by the percentage difference between the offer price and the target firm’s share price 21 days prior to the 
announcement. The previous M&As of the acquirer and target firms refer to the number of all previous M&A transactions completed 
by these firms.  The relative size is the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value, where market value is measured at 21 
days prior to the deal announcement.  Industry fixed effects are based on the acquirer two-digit SIC codes.   
 Mean Median Min Max Std dev N 
Acquirer advisor characteristics (%)      
Dependence of the acquirer adv on target adv in     
M&A deals 2.75 0 0 100 7.55 1,123 
Public issues 3.92 0 0 100 7.91 1,123 
Equity issues 5.39 0 0 100 10.11 1,123 
Debt issues 0.72 0 0 50 3.52 1,123 
All deals 4.21 0 0 100 7.80 1,123 
Acquirer advisor market share 4.28 0.38 0 70.76 8.48 1,123 
Acquirer advisor’s past ACAR 0.40 0.35 -39.53 57.81 5.33 848 
     
 
 
Target advisor characteristics (%)       
Dependence of the target adv on acquirer adv in      
M&A deals 3.15 0 0 100 10.16 1,280 
Public issues 3.99 0 0 100 8.17 1,280 
Equity issues 5.35 0 0 100 10.08 1,280 
Debt issues 0.81 0 0 66.67 3.99 1,280 
All deals 4.76 0 0 100 10.36 1,280 
Target advisor market share 3.70 0.20 0 70.76 8.03 1,280 
Target advisor’s past TCAR 19.49 18.33 -17.64 187.73 13.58 985 
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       Table 3.3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Min Max Std dev N 
Acquirer and target advisor characteristics (%)     
Relative dependence of the acquirer adv on target adv in      
(= -Relative dependence of the target adv on acquirer adv)    
M&A deals -0.31 0 -99.45 99.45 8.73 3,881 
Public issues -0.56 0 -99.86 99.12 9.69 3,881 
Equity issues -0.44 0 -99.64 99.72 11.66 3,881 
Debt issues -0.17 0 -66.41 49.65 4.50 3,881 
All deals -0.66 0 -99.94 97.87 9.75 3,881 
     
 
 
Deal and firm characteristics       
Deal value ($ mil) 1,724.70 317.17 1.31 164,746.9 6,346.00 2,938 
Percent cash (%) 32.01 0 0 100 42.10 3,109 
Complexity  0.84 1 0 4 0.58 3,109 
Acquirer three-day ab. return (%) -2.28 -1.87 -69.30 51.33 10.13 2,933 
Target three-day ab. return (%) 20.30 16.94 -69.38 244.51 23.70 2,934 
Combined wealth gain ($ mil) -27.72 6.12 -29,743.98 17,276.19 1,653.25 2,929 
Combined wealth gain (%) 6.95 3.88 -3,321.20 5,836.55 271.05 3,099 
Target premium (%) 40.68 33.43 -92.94 1,533.33 51.47 2,845 
Toehold ownership (%) 0.84 0 0 49 4.67 2,938 
No. of acquirer SIC codes 4.32 3 1 26 3.42 2,938 
No. of target SIC codes 2.83 2 1 25 2.15 2,938 
No. of previous M&A deals of acquirer  8.20 4 0 114 11.33 2,938 
No. of previous M&A deals of target 3.46 1 0 72 5.55 2,938 
Acquirer market value ($ mil) 8,296.21 1,204.55 1.17 567,484.2 26,368.72 2,933 
Target market value ($ mil) 1,140.20 208.50 1.67 78,204.26 4,185.11 2,934 
Relative size (%) 47.47 21.77 0.04 11,447.92 245.00 2,934 
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As for the 2,938 deals, the average deal value is $1,724.70 million, and 32.01 
percent of the deal financing comes from cash payments.  The strategic complexity 
measure is a sum of five dummy variables that capture the difficulties of completing a 
deal such as two-tier structure or pending litigations.  The average complexity measure is 
0.84 in the sample.  The average acquirer and target three-day announcement returns are  
-2.28 and 20.30 percent, respectively, which are consistent with the target firms usually 
experiencing much higher announcement returns than the acquirer firms.  The median 
target premium, which is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price 
and the target firm’s share price 21 days prior to the announcement, is 33.43 percent in 
our sample.  This is consistent with the previously reported average premium of 38 
percent between 1973 and 1998 (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)).   
As evidenced by the median toehold ownership of zero, most acquirers do not 
have previous toehold ownership in the target firms.  On average, the acquirer and target 
firm operate in 4.32 and 2.83 different industries, which suggest that acquirer firms tend 
to be more diversified than target firms.  The median acquirer firm is also about five 
times larger than the median target firm, and acquirer firms are involved in 8.20 M&A 
deals before the deal at hand.  In the next section, we investigate how the acquirer-target 
advisor relationship affects the shareholder wealth of M&A deals.    
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3.4. The effect of advisor peer relationships on shareholder wealth 
Target premium 
Substantial attention has been paid to the premium that the target shareholders 
receive over the target firm’s premerger price in M&As.  Target advisors typically work 
to negotiate favorable deal terms for the target shareholders and to obtain high premium 
for them.  We examine whether the relative dependence of the target advisor on the 
acquirer advisor affects the size of the target premium in Table 3.4.  Table 3.4 presents 
the OLS regression results, and the dependent variable, target premium, is winsorized 
below at the 10 percent and above at the 90 percent level.   
 
 
Table 3.4: Relative dependence between advisors and target premium 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions of target premium.  Target premium is 
measured by the percentage difference between the offer price and the target firm’s share 
price 21 days prior to the announcement.  The dependent variable is winsorized at 10% 
and 90% levels.  The dependence of advisor i on advisor j is measured by the number of 
all deals advisors i and j worked together divided by the number of all co-managed deals 
completed by advisor i.  An advisor’s market share refers to the percent of the total deal 
volume of all M&A deals advised by the financial advisor.  Acquirer (target) advisor’s 
average ACAR (TCAR) refers to the average cumulative three-day abnormal return of all 
acquirer (target) firms the acquirer (target) advisor advised during the previous four-year 
period.  The relative size is the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value, 
where market value is measured at 21 days prior to the deal announcement. Pure cash 
deal, hostile deal, challenged deal, termination fee, and previous toehold are dummy 
variables that equal to one if the payment method is 100% cash, deal attitude is hostile, 
deal is challenged, termination fee is used, and acquirer holds target shares prior to 
announcement, respectively.  Complexity is the sum of dummy variables that indicate 
whether the deal requires regulatory agency approval, target has defense mechanisms, 
target has significant family ownership, deal involves a pending litigation, and deal is 
two-tier.  Same industry dummy equals to one if the acquirer and target share the same 
primary two-digit SIC code.  The previous M&As of the acquirer and target firms refer to 
the number of all previous M&A transactions completed by these firms.  The relative size 
is the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value, where market value is 
measured at 21 days prior to the announcement.  Industry fixed effects are based on two-
digit SIC codes.  p-values are reported in brackets.     
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Advisor relationships from 
 
M&A 
deals 
Public 
issues 
Equity 
issues 
Debt 
issues All deals 
Intercept 44.749 44.449 44.463 44.220 44.577 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Advisors’ characteristics      
Relative dependence of  0.095 0.032 0.045 0.293 0.050 
target adv on acquirer adv (0.29) (0.65) (0.44) (0.13) (0.51) 
      
         … x Absolute dependence of  -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.016 -0.002 
             target adv on acquirer adv (0.05) (0.45) (0.14) (0.01) (0.32) 
      
Target advisor’s market share -0.063 -0.069 -0.070 -0.064 -0.065 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) 
      
Deal characteristics      
Tender offer 6.078 6.140 6.117 6.037 6.121 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pure cash deal 2.373 2.340 2.369 2.359 2.327 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Log (Deal value) -0.089 -0.042 -0.037 -0.013 -0.073 
 (0.83) (0.92) (0.93) (0.98) (0.86) 
Hostile deal  8.258 8.240 8.218 8.317 8.231 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Challenged deal  2.142 2.080 2.066 2.109 2.114 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
Termination fee  3.943 3.975 3.975 4.004 3.969 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Complexity  0.937 0.910 0.904 0.847 0.912 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) 
Firm characteristics      
Previous toehold ownership  -2.776 -2.667 -2.585 -2.802 -2.639 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) 
Log (No. of acquirer SIC codes) 1.980 1.942 1.937 1.965 1.959 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log (No. of target SIC codes) -0.664 -0.677 -0.689 -0.639 -0.682 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.46) (0.43) 
Same industry  1.366 1.364 1.370 1.318 1.363 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. acq M&As) 0.786 0.772 0.760 0.775 0.775 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. tar M&As) -1.934 -1.984 -1.985 -1.998 -1.964 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative size -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,583 2,583 2,583 2,583 2,583 
Adjusted R-square 10.47 10.36 10.42 10.62 10.37 
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The regression results in Table 3.4 show that the interaction terms between the 
relative and absolute dependence measures of target advisor are significant in models 1 
and 4.  The relative dependence ratio indicates whether the advisor relationship is 
relatively more important to target than acquirer advisor, whereas the absolute 
dependence ratio shows how important the advisor relationship is for the target advisor.  
The significant coefficients on the interaction terms in models 1 and 4 indicate that the 
relative dependence of the target advisor on the acquirer advisor, a proxy for bargaining 
power, is significant only when the relationship is important for the target advisor.  When 
the target advisor is the more dependent party in a significant relationship, the acquirer 
advisor retains greater power in the bargaining process.  A consequence of such power 
dynamics from previous cooperation is lower premium for target shareholders, given the 
negative significant coefficients.  However, this effect is documented only in the advisor 
relationships that exist in M&A advisory market and debt underwriting.  The results also 
show that the target advisor’s market share has no significant effect on the target 
premium.  Tender offers, hostile deals and those with termination fee are associated with 
higher premiums.  Diversified acquirers are also associated with higher target premium.   
   
Acquirer announcement return 
The relationship between the acquirer and target advisors may affect how the 
advisors structure the deal and negotiate the terms, which, in turn, can affect market 
reactions to deal announcements.  Table 3.5 presents the estimated coefficients from the 
OLS regressions of acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the 
announcement date on the relative bargaining power between acquirer and target 
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advisors.  Acquirer announcement return is winsorized below at the 5 percent and above 
at the 95 percent level.   
 
 
Table 3.5:  Relative dependence between advisors and acquirer three-day abnormal 
return    
The table presents the results of OLS regressions of acquirer three-day abnormal return 
around the announcement date.  The dependent variable is winsorized at 5% and 95% 
levels.  The dependence of advisor i on advisor j is measured by the number of all deals 
advisors i and j worked together divided by the number of all co-managed deals 
completed by advisor i.  The acquirer advisor’s market share is measured by all the 
completed M&A deals of the advisor over the previous four-year period as a percent of 
total M&A deal volume.  Acquirer advisor’s average ACAR refers to the average 
cumulative three-day abnormal return of all acquirers the advisor advised during the 
previous four-year period.  Pure cash deal, hostile deal, challenged deal, termination fee, 
and previous toehold are dummy variables that equal to one if the payment method is 
100% cash, deal attitude is hostile, deal is challenged, termination fee is used, and 
acquirer holds target shares prior to announcement, respectively.  Log (Deal value) refers 
to the natural logarithm of the reported deal value in inflation-adjusted dollars.  
Complexity is the sum of dummy variables that indicate whether the deal requires 
regulatory agency approval, target has defense mechanisms, target has significant family 
ownership, deal involves a pending litigation, and deal is two-tier.  Same industry dummy 
equals to one if the acquirer and target share the same primary two-digit SIC code.  The 
previous M&As of the acquirer and target firms refer to the number of all previous M&A 
transactions completed by these firms.  The relative size is the ratio of acquirer market 
value to target market value, where market value is measured at 21 days prior to the 
announcement.  Industry fixed effects are based on the acquirer two-digit SIC codes.  p-
values are reported in brackets.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Advisor relationships from 
 
M&A 
deals 
Public 
issues 
Equity 
issues 
Debt 
issues All deals 
Intercept -4.780 -4.789 -4.767 -4.726 -5.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Advisors’ characteristics      
      
Relative dependence of  -0.029 -0.036 -0.026 -0.042 -0.032 
acquirer adv on target adv (0.19) (0.04) (0.08) (0.25) (0.07) 
      
         … x Absolute dependence of  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
             acquirer adv on target adv (0.12) (0.24) (0.68) (0.85) (0.26) 
      
Acquirer advisor’s market share 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.008 
 (0.41) (0.59) (0.52) (0.34) (0.55) 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Acquirer advisor’s past ACAR 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 
 (0.97) (0.92) (0.90) (0.97) (0.93) 
      
Deal characteristics      
Pure cash deal 2.182 2.192 2.189 2.189 2.188 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Deal value) -0.315 -0.306 -0.309 -0.323 -0.308 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hostile deal  -0.759 -0.758 -0.779 -0.774 -0.763 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Challenged deal  -0.266 -0.238 -0.235 -0.254 -0.251 
 (0.64) (0.68) (0.68) (0.66) (0.66) 
Termination fee  0.405 0.411 0.422 0.393 0.409 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) 
Complexity  -0.389 -0.391 -0.399 -0.384 -0.384 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
Firm characteristics      
Previous toehold ownership  1.148 1.115 1.137 1.133 1.130 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Log (No. of acquirer SIC codes) 0.478 0.493 0.502 0.485 0.495 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log (No. of target SIC codes) 0.405 0.414 0.404 0.411 0.408 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Same industry  0.148 0.139 0.142 0.155 0.156 
 (0.59) (0.61) (0.60) (0.57) (0.57) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. acq M&As) 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.066 
 (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.66) (0.64) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. tar M&As) -0.208 -0.210 -0.213 -0.204 -0.210 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) 
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.14) (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.65) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,666 2,666 2,666 2,666 2,666 
Adjusted R-square 4.77 4.83 4.82 4.73 4.80 
 
 
 
The results in Table 3.5 show that the relative bargaining power of acquirer 
advisor stemming from the advisor relationships in equity underwriting, public security 
underwriting and all deals has statistically significant effect on the acquirer 
announcement returns, after controlling for other variables.  The estimated coefficients on 
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the relative dependence ratios in models 2, 3 and 4 are significant and negative, which 
suggests that when the acquirer advisor is more dependent on the target advisor (i.e., the 
bargaining power of the target advisor is greater), the acquirer firm’s announcement 
return is lower.  In fact, an increase of a one standard deviation in the relative dependence 
ratio is associated with a CAR that is about 1.30 percent lower, holding all else the same.  
The advisor peer relationship, therefore, has an economically significant impact on 
acquirer returns.  When an acquirer advisor is facing a target advisor with whom it 
maintains an important cooperative relationship, it may not want to jeopardize its 
valuable relationship because it affects its revenues in other areas and thus, its actions as 
an acquirer advisor may be constrained to some extent.  However, interacting the relative 
dependence ratio with the absolute dependence measure is not significant, which suggests 
that regardless of the level of the relationship importance to the acquirer advisor, the 
relative power dynamics between the advisors is significant.       
The acquirer advisor reputation, as measured by market share, and the past 
average return of acquirers advised by the same advisor do not have statistically 
significant effects on the acquirer announcement return.  The results also show that pure 
cash deals experience significantly higher market reaction, while larger deals are 
associated with less positive market reaction.  The market views acquirers with previous 
ownership in the target firms more favorably as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficients on the previous toehold ownership variable.   
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Target announcement return 
 In the previous analysis, we established a significant impact of advisor 
relationship on acquirer announcement return.  Some research studies suggest that the 
incentive alignment between advisors and firms are not symmetrical on M&A buy and 
sell sides and the roles of advisors are somewhat different as well, perhaps due to the fee 
structure on buy and sell sides.  For instance, Allen et al. (2004) document a net 
certification effect of commercial banks for target firms, but not for acquirer firms.  Thus, 
it is possible that the relationship between advisors affects target outcomes differently 
than the way it affects acquirers.  
 Next, we examine whether the advisor relationship stemming from the past 
cooperation affects target three-day CAR and present the results in Table 3.6.  As 
evidenced by the estimated coefficients, only the relative dependence between advisors in 
the advisory market is significant when interacted with the importance of the relationship 
for the target advisor.  The target advisor’s market share and the past average return of 
the target firms that it advised have no significant effect on the announcement return.  
Similar to the results of target premium in Table 3.4, tender offers are associated with 
higher announcement returns as well.  Hostile deals, pure cash deals and deals that are 
pursued by diversified acquirers are also associated with higher target announcement 
returns.  After controlling for these variables, there is evidence that the relationship 
between advisors in the advisory market affects target announcement returns.  Employing 
target advisors with greater bargaining power relative to acquirer advisors (i.e., target 
advisors with lower relative dependence measure) is associated with higher CARs for 
target firms.  However, this effect is only significant when the relative dependence 
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measure is interacted with the absolute measure, and also this effect is not observed in 
advisor relationships based on the previous cooperation in public security underwriting of 
any type.  Thus, the overall announcement effect of the power dynamics in the advisor 
relationship is smaller for target firms than acquirer firms.  In other words, the potential 
conflict of interest between the client firm and the advisor due the advisor’s peer 
relationship may be lower on the sell side.     
 
Table 3.6: Relative dependence between advisors and target three-day abnormal 
return  
The table presents the results of OLS regressions of target three-day abnormal return 
around the announcement date.  The dependent variable is winsorized at 5% and 95% 
levels.  The dependence of advisor i on advisor j is measured by the number of all deals 
advisors i and j worked together divided by the number of all co-managed deals 
completed by advisor i.  The target advisor’s market share is computed based on all the 
completed M&A deals of the advisor over the previous four-year period.  Target 
advisor’s average TCAR refers to the average cumulative three-day abnormal return of 
all acquirers the advisor advised during the previous four-year period.  Pure cash deal, 
hostile deal, challenged deal, termination fee, and previous toehold are dummy variables 
that equal to one if the payment method is 100% cash, deal attitude is hostile, deal is 
challenged, termination fee is used, and acquirer holds target shares prior to 
announcement, respectively.  Log (Deal value) refers to the natural logarithm of the 
reported deal value in inflation-adjusted dollars.  Complexity is the sum of dummy 
variables that indicate whether the deal requires regulatory agency approval, target has 
defense mechanisms, target has significant family ownership, deal involves a pending 
litigation, and deal is two-tier.  Same industry dummy equals to one if the acquirer and 
target share the same primary two-digit SIC code.  The previous M&As of the acquirer 
and target firms refer to the number of all previous M&A transactions completed by these 
firms.  The relative size is the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value, where 
market value is measured at 21 days prior to the announcement.  Industry fixed effects 
are based on the target two-digit SIC codes.  p-values are reported in brackets.     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Advisor relationships from 
 
M&A 
deals 
Public 
issues 
Equity 
issues 
Debt 
issues All deals 
Intercept 17.025 16.961 16.943 16.917 16.957 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Advisors’ characteristics      
Relative dependence of  0.021 -0.010 0.005 0.005 0.004 
target adv on acquirer adv (0.66) (0.80) (0.87) (0.96) (0.92) 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
         … x Absolute dependence of  -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
             target adv on acquirer adv (0.05) (0.62) (0.88) (0.65) (0.80) 
      
Target advisor’s market share -0.032 -0.031 -0.028 -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) 
Target advisor’s past TCAR 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) 
Deal characteristics      
Tender offer 3.845 3.893 3.894 3.888 3.887 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pure cash deal 2.501 2.466 2.464 2.473 2.474 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Deal value) -0.201 -0.187 -0.191 -0.180 -0.189 
 (0.37) (0.41) (0.39) (0.42) (0.40) 
Hostile deal  5.903 5.937 5.924 5.941 5.928 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Challenged deal  -3.301 -3.319 -3.306 -3.323 -3.313 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Termination fee  0.207 0.233 0.233 0.247 0.229 
 (0.75) (0.72) (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) 
Complexity  0.851 0.843 0.842 0.835 0.844 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Firm characteristics      
Previous toehold ownership  -2.002 -1.986 -1.969 -1.977 -1.974 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Log (No. of acquirer SIC codes) 1.397 1.385 1.381 1.382 1.379 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (No. of target SIC codes) 0.248 0.254 0.251 0.252 0.253 
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) 
Same industry  -0.071 -0.077 -0.079 -0.077 -0.068 
 (0.90) (0.89) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. acq M&As) 0.359 0.360 0.355 0.358 0.355 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. tar M&As) -0.363 -0.391 -0.392 -0.397 -0.389 
 (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) 
Relative size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 
Adjusted R-square 8.14 7.95 7.94 7.96 7.94 
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Share of announcement wealth gain 
 Another important matter in M&As is how the total wealth gain is divided 
between the target and acquirer firms.  Focusing on the share of wealth gain is also a 
good setting to examine the power dynamics between the advisors.  The share of wealth 
gain refers to the percent of total wealth effect that the acquirer or the target firm 
receives. The total wealth effect is the sum of announcement wealth effects of target and 
acquirer firms.  Announcement wealth effect of target (acquirer) firm is computed by 
multiplying the target (acquirer) firm’s three-day abnormal return by the target’s 
(acquirer) market value at 21 days prior to the announcement.  We study whether the 
advisor relationship affects the acquirer share of wealth gain in Table 3.7.  We do not 
present the results on the target share of the wealth gain as they are merely the mirror 
opposite of the acquirer share.  Since the share of wealth gain is well defined only when 
the total wealth gain is positive, we focus only on the deals that have positive wealth 
gain.   
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Table 3.7: Relative dependence between advisors and acquirer share of wealth gain 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions of acquirer share of positive combined 
wealth gain.  Combined dollar wealth is the sum of target three-day abnormal return 
times the target market value and acquirer three-day abnormal return times the acquirer 
market value.  The dependent variable is winsorized at 5% and 95% levels.  The 
dependence of advisor i on advisor j is measured by the number of all deals advisors i and 
j worked together divided by the number of all co-managed deals completed by advisor i.  
The relative market share is the acquirer advisor’s M&A market share relative to the 
target advisor’s M&A market share in the previous four-year period.  Pure cash deal, 
hostile deal, challenged deal, termination fee, and previous toehold are dummy variables 
that equal to one if the payment method is 100% cash, deal attitude is hostile, deal is 
challenged, termination fee is used, and acquirer holds target shares prior to 
announcement, respectively.  Log (Deal value) refers to the natural logarithm of the 
reported deal value in inflation-adjusted dollars.  Complexity is the sum of dummy 
variables that indicate whether the deal requires regulatory agency approval, target has 
defense mechanisms, target has significant family ownership, deal involves a pending 
litigation, and deal is two-tier.  Same industry dummy equals to one if the acquirer and 
target share the same primary two-digit SIC code.  The previous M&As of the acquirer 
and target firms refer to the number of all previous M&A transactions completed by these 
firms.  The relative size is the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value, where 
market value is measured at 21 days prior to the announcement.  Industry fixed effects 
are based on the acquirer two-digit SIC codes.  p-values are reported in brackets.     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Advisor relationships from 
 
M&A 
deals 
Public 
issues 
Equity 
issues 
Debt 
issues All deals 
Intercept 33.696 31.753 32.618 33.115 32.618 
 (0.61) (0.63 (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) 
Advisors’ characteristics      
Relative dependence of  -0.969 -1.096 -0.842 -0.351 -1.111 
acquirer adv on target adv (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.69) (0.01) 
      
         … x Absolute dependence of  0.021 0.011 0.010 -0.161 0.022 
             acquirer adv on target adv (0.08) (0.29) (0.34) (0.15) (0.47) 
      
Relative market share 0.077 0.071 0.074 0.084 0.063 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.30) (0.24) (0.39) 
Deal characteristics      
Pure cash deal 20.869 20.348 20.323 20.936 20.215 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (Deal value) -11.224 -11.226 -11.234 -11.167 -11.293 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hostile deal  -9.148 -9.448 -9.808 -9.941 -9.845 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
Challenged deal  0.602 1.128 1.463 -0.064 1.059 
 (0.96) (0.92) (0.90) (0.99) (0.93) 
Termination fee  -5.719 -5.579 -5.569 -5.522 -5.659 
 (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Complexity  -3.563 -3.734 -4.132 -3.756 -3.473 
 (0.51) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.52) 
Firm characteristics      
Previous toehold ownership  11.287 11.129 11.367 10.514 11.836 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.39) (0.33) 
Log (No. of acquirer SIC codes) 5.470 5.714 6.060 5.538 5.747 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) 
Log (No. of target SIC codes) -2.407 -1.857 -2.129 -1.799 -2.309 
 (0.64) (0.71) (0.68) (0.72) (0.65) 
Same industry  2.636 2.518 2.779 2.975 3.036 
 (0.68) (0.69) (0.66) (0.64) (0.63) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. acq M&As) 5.388 5.178 5.103 5.229 5.222 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Log (1 + No. of prev. tar M&As) -3.586 -3.981 -3.969 -3.701 -3.722 
 (0.35) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.33) 
Relative size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) (0.81) (0.86) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,443 1,443 1,443 1,443 1,443 
Adjusted R-square 4.82 5.11 4.96 4.79 5.04 
 
 
 
In the analysis of the acquirer share of wealth gain in Table 3.7, the bargaining 
power between advisors stemming from relationships in all investment banking 
segments, except debt, is significant, as evidenced by the statistically significant negative 
coefficients on all the relative dependence measures.  Hence, the negative coefficients on 
the relative dependence ratio show that the greater the bargaining power of the target 
advisor, the lower the share of the total wealth gain the acquirer firm receives and thus, 
the higher the share of the total wealth gain the target firm receives.  For instance, an 
increase of a one standard deviation in the relative dependence ratio of the acquirer 
advisor from all deals is associated with an acquirer share of total wealth gain that is 
about 8.67 percent lower, holding all else the same.  This suggests that holding all else 
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equal, when the target advisor becomes more important to the acquirer advisor, the 
acquirer advisor is more likely to accept deal terms that are more favorable for the target 
firm.  We also control for other variables including the relative market share measure in 
line with Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003).  Similar to the previous analyses that focus on 
acquirer advisor relationship, the interaction terms are insignificant here as well.    
Consequently, these results of the relative bargaining power between advisors 
highlights a potential advantage of hiring boutique investment banks as M&A advisors.  
The boutique investment banks typically do not participate in security underwriting, and 
therefore, have no underwriting ties to the advisors on the other side of the deal table.  
The market for small and focused boutique firms has grown lately, and they are starting 
to receive attention from the academic community, as Song and Wei (2008) are among 
the first to focus on the performance of M&As that are advised by boutique banks.   
 
Familiarity effect of advisor peer relationship  
Advisor peer relationships may also have a positive impact on M&A deals due to 
the familiarity between the financial advisors.  Due to their close working relationships in 
the past, advisors may be able to negotiate the deal terms more effectively, resulting in a 
higher likelihood of deal completion or faster deal completion.  We examine whether 
advisor relationships affect the likelihood of deal completion in unreported logistic 
regressions.  To study the efficiency implications of advisor relationships, we focus on 
the strength of the advisor relationship, as measured by the number of deals two advisors 
worked on together, rather than the bargaining power.  We find no significant effect of 
the relationship between the buy and sell side advisors on the likelihood of deal 
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completion, after controlling for other variables.  Therefore, the strength of the 
relationship between the advisors has no statistically significant impact on deal 
completion.  In unreported regressions, we also find that the extent of the previous 
cooperation between the advisors has no effect on the speed of deal completion.  The 
above findings are consistent with the limited impact of financial advisors’ on deal 
success suggested by several prior studies.  For instance, Song and Wei (2008) find that 
employing boutique advisors do not affect the likelihood of deal completion.  Ma (2007) 
also documents no significant association between target firms hiring top-tier investment 
banks and deal completion.   
 As a possible consequence of familiarity, we also examine whether the 
relationships between advisors, especially close cooperative relationships, help advisors 
identify deals that create higher value to shareholders, because of the improved 
information transmission between the advisors.  We examine the combined shareholder 
wealth effect in unreported regression, where the dependent variable is the total 
announcement wealth effect as a percent of the deal value.  Again, the results were 
insignificant.  Overall, we do not observe significant effects of familiarity from advisor 
peer relationships.  
 
Choice of target advisor 
In the previous tables, we see evidence that the power inherent in the advisor 
relationships affect deal outcomes.  Thus, it would be insightful to examine whether firms 
take such advisor peer relationships into account when they hire advisors.  The choice of 
an advisor has been a particularly popular topic in the extant literature (e.g., Da Silva 
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Rosa et al. (2004), Forte, Iannotta, and Navone (2007), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), 
Serveas and Zenner (1996), Thomas (1995)).  The role of firm-advisor relationship in 
advisor selection has also been examined.  In fact, some practitioners attempt to build 
positive personal relationships with the counterparties or hire advisors who already 
possess such relationships (Bruner (2004)).   
We focus on whether firms take peer relationships into account, by examining 
whether a potential advisor’s relationship with the acquirer advisor affects its likelihood 
of being selected as a target advisor.  In Table 3.8, we focus on M&A deals, where a 
target firm hires advisor(s) after the acquirer advisor(s) are selected and consequently 
model the target firm’s choice of advisor.  Since we do not have detailed and complete 
information on when the acquirer and target advisors are hired, we use the date acquirer 
and target advisors are added as reported by SDC.  However, out of 2,938 deals, only 
1,422 have reported dates for both the acquirer and target advisors and of these 496 deals 
have target advisors added after the acquirer advisors.  We assume that the target firms 
are able to observe the identities of the acquirer advisors in these 496 deals and use them 
in the regression analysis.  
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Table 3.8: Advisor peer relationships and choice of target advisor 
The table presents the estimated coefficients of logistic regressions of the probability of 
becoming a target advisor.  The sample consists of 496 U.S. domestic M&As involving 
public target and acquirer firms between 1984 and 2007, where the target advisors were 
chosen after the acquirer advisors.  The models include one observation for each eligible 
advisor for each deal, and the dependent variable equals to one if an advisor is identified 
as the target advisor in a deal, and zero otherwise.  The set of eligible advisors include 
those that serve as M&A advisors during the year.  The advisor characteristics are 
measured over the four-year period prior to the announcement year.  Intensity of the 
advisor-target firm relationship is measured by the percent of all previous deals of the 
target firm that employed the advisor.       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Advisor relationships from 
 
M&A 
deals 
Public 
issues 
Equity 
issues 
Debt 
issues All deals 
Intercept -3.006 -3.014 -3.016 -3.007 -3.012 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Advisor characteristics      
Advisor’s number of past deals with   0.094 0.008 0.011 0.015 0.008 
the acquirer advisor (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Advisor’s number of past deals with  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
the acquirer advisor2 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
      
Difference between market shares -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
of advisors (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Advisor’s market share x 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 
       No. of prev. M&As of target firm  (0.23) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
      
Intensity of advisor-target firm  0.032 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 
relationship (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 
Pseudo R-square 7.86 7.46 7.50 7.26 7.50 
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Table 3.8 presents the estimated coefficients of the logistic regressions of the 
probability of an advisor being selected as the target advisor.  The models in Table 3.8 
include one observation for each eligible advisor for each deal.  The eligible advisors 
include those who serve as either acquirer or target advisor during the year.  If an advisor 
is identified as the target advisor, the dependent variable equals to one and zero 
otherwise.  We are relating the advisor characteristics over four-year periods to the 
probability of becoming the target advisor in the next year.  To allow for deal specific 
effects, we adjust standard errors for clustering within issues.  The explanatory variable 
of interest is the extent of the past relationship between the acquirer advisor and the 
eligible advisor, as measured by the number of deals they worked on together.  Since 
extensive literature documents that firm relationships matter in advisor selection, we also 
include firm-advisor relationship measures.  We also control for the difference between 
the market share measures of the eligible advisor and the acquirer advisor.   
The logistic regression results of Table 3.8 show that target firms are more likely 
to pick advisors that had past relationship with the acquirer, although this effect is not 
linear as evidenced by the negative significant coefficient on the squared term.  We also 
find that firms are more likely to choose advisors that are close to the acquirer advisor in 
terms of market share, which means that once a reputable acquirer advisors is hired, the 
target firm is also likely to employ a reputable advisor.  The significant positive 
coefficient on the interaction term shows that the target firms with extensive prior M&A 
experience are likely to pick advisors with greater market share.  The results indicate that 
the previous relationship with the target firm matters as well.  The results show that even 
though there is no significant positive effect of familiarity between advisors and an 
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evidence of potential of conflict of interest, firms choose target advisors that have 
relationships with the acquirer advisors in the past.  In a similar strand of literature, Bao 
and Edmans (2007) also report that despite the persistence in the announcement returns 
of acquirer advisors that clients should consider when selecting M&A advisors, in 
practice, these measures are overlooked by the firms.      
 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
In M&A deals, financial advisors play a crucial role.  Financial advisors maintain 
relationships with each other from various investment banking activities.  From these 
close working relationships among advisors, a potential conflict of interest can arise.  In 
this paper, we explore how the dynamics in the relationship between acquirer and target 
advisors affect shareholder wealth.  Specifically, we study whether an advisor’s relative 
bargaining power over its peer advisor that works for the opposite side affects the target 
premium, the announcement returns, and the share of the wealth gain of the acquirer and 
target firms.   
To capture the advisor pairwise relationships, we use all public security issues and 
M&As during 1980-2007 that employ multiple underwriters or advisors and create 
measures of relative dependence for each pair of advisors.  Using these measures, we 
examine the impact of advisor relationships on 2,938 domestic M&A deals between 1984 
and 2007. 
Our results suggest that the announcement return and the share of the total wealth 
gain of the acquirer and target firms depend on the relative bargaining power between the 
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acquirer and target advisors.  When the relative bargaining power of the target advisor is 
greater than that of the acquirer advisor, the target firm’s announcement return and share 
of the total wealth gain are higher and the acquirer firm’s share is lower, and vice versa.  
The results also show that when the target advisor has more power in the acquirer-target 
advisor relationship, it is more likely to obtain higher premium for target shareholders.  
However, the results involving target advisors are generally weaker than those involving 
acquirer advisors. 
In addition, we find no significant evidence that the familiarity between acquirer 
and target advisors, stemming from past working relationships, fosters more effective 
information transmission and deal negotiation and affects the likelihood of deal 
completion, completion speed and total wealth gain.  However, we find evidence that 
despite the additional conflict of interest that may result from the relationship between 
the target and acquirer advisor, target firms are more likely to hire advisors that 
previously worked with the acquirer advisor.   
The main contribution of this research lies in the investigation of the previously 
unexplored relationship dynamics between the acquirer and target advisors.  This study is 
also relevant to a number of topics in finance, such as the role of financial advisors in 
M&As, the role of social networks, and to some extent, the effectiveness of boutique 
financial advisors, since they usually have no underwriting ties to other advisors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REACHING OUT TO YOUR PEERS: 
PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERWRITER PEER 
NETWORKS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted in a number of literature streams that the structure of a firm’s ties 
with its partners has a strong impact on the firm’s performance.  For instance, 
embeddedness, the idea that social structure shapes economic behavior and outcomes, has 
emerged as a core concept in new economic sociology.  In the security underwriting 
process, despite the critical role of the relationships among underwriters, we know very 
little about the effect of such relationships on underwriters’ performance.   
 The goal of this paper is to examine how the underwriter peer network structure 
affects market share by using measures from social network analysis.  We find that 
underwriters with certain network characteristics capture higher future market shares, as 
they are more likely to win underwriting mandates and be selected as co-managers. 
A key objective for underwriters is to maximize their market share.  With gross 
spreads usually around seven percent in IPOs (Chen and Ritter (2000)), five percent in 
seasoned equity offerings (Mola and Loughran (2004)), and less than one percent in high-
quality, long-term corporate bonds (Matthews (1994)), market share dominance leads to 
superior profits.  Building networks with others can increase an underwriter’s market 
share.  Selecting syndicate partners involves a fair amount of uncertainty, and therefore, 
banks may prefer to work with their previous partners.  Consequently, well-networked 
underwriters with extensive ties can be included in the syndicates of their partners and 
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enjoy increased deal flow.  Certain network characteristics may further improve an 
underwriter’s likelihood of winning mandates or being invited into syndicates.  
Underwriter networks differ along various dimensions, such as size and diversity, and 
these various characteristics have different implications for an underwriter’s ability to 
increase its market share.   
Moreover, the role of the peer network may be different for commercial bank and 
investment bank underwriters.  The entrance of commercial banks into security 
underwriting has attracted substantial attention in the literature and a number of studies 
examine commercial bank underwriters.  Commercial banks build relationships with 
firms early on and enjoy spillovers from the information production in their traditional 
banking activities.  Flexibility in financing is another advantage as well.  On the other 
hand, commercial banks face a conflict of interest from their dual role as a lender and 
underwriter.  In addition, commercial banks may lack strong investor clientele and 
reputation that are critical in underwriting.  Because of these inherent differences, 
commercial banks and investment banks can bring different sets of skills, and these 
differences can also affect the role of their peer networks.  
We explore the impact of underwriter peer networks by constructing network 
measures using the ties that underwriters form with each other when they are involved in 
the same underwriting syndicates.  Network measures are constructed over moving four-
year periods using equity and debt securities issued in the U.S. between 1970 and 2007.  
Specifically, we construct a set of network measures that capture the size (degree), 
position (closeness and betweenness), interconnectedness (reciprocity and density) and 
heterogeneity (tie, industry and geographical diversity) of underwriter peer networks.  
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Using these measures, we assess the impact of the network structure on the overall future 
market share, and specifically on the likelihood of winning the book manager and co-
manager positions in equity and debt underwriting. 
Our results show that underwriters with extensive ties and advantageous network 
positions capture higher market shares in equity underwriting in the following year, and 
this relationship is more pronounced for commercial banks.  For instance, a one standard 
deviation increase in the degree is associated with an increase of about 15.2 basis points 
in the equity market share in the following year for investment banks and an increase of 
46.4 basis points in the market share of commercial banks, holding all else the same.  
These are economically significant effects given that the mean equity underwriter market 
share is 0.46 percent.  We also find that investment banks are more likely to gain deal 
flow from networks with more homogenous partners, whereas commercial banks benefit 
from more diverse peer networks.  This result is consistent with the greater role of 
specialization in investment banking than commercial banking.  Commercial banks 
typically engage in a larger set of financial activities than investment banks.  In debt 
underwriting, some of the aspects of peer network remain significant, but, in general, the 
effect of network on the market share is smaller.  The regression results of the likelihood 
of winning the book manager position in equity and debt deals support these findings.      
Regarding the likelihood of being invited as a co-manager, not only the network 
size and structure, but also the proximity to the specific book manager helps underwriters 
in both equity and debt underwriting.  Underwriters that are further away from the book 
manager are less likely to be selected as a co-manager, although the effect is somewhat 
mitigated for commercial banks.  The evidence shows that underwriters prefer to work 
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with their previous partners, as eighty and ninety percent of the hired co-managers in 
equity and debt deals have previously worked with the book managers.   
This study fits among the extensive literature on underwriters and the growing 
body of research on social networks in finance.  Our contribution lies in illustrating the 
role of peer network for underwriters and documenting its impact on market share.  In 
doing so, we use network analysis methodology to characterize networks, and show how 
the different aspects of networks of peer relationships affect market share.  To the best of 
our knowledge, no prior study has explicitly examined how the various aspects of 
underwriter peer networks affect market share in the U.S.  We also focus on both equity 
and debt underwriting in this paper, and show how the overall network of equity and debt 
underwriters in the U.S. has changed over time.  Highlighting the differences between the 
effects of peer network for commercial banks and investment banks is also another 
contribution of this paper.  Our results show that, in general, commercial bank 
underwriters derive larger increases in their market shares from their networks.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 discusses the 
role of underwriter peer networks in further detail.  After introducing the network 
analysis methodology in Section 4.3, we describe the data and the summary statistics in 
Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 presents the results regarding the impact of network on bank 
performance, and Section 4.6 summarizes by presenting our conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
  102 
4.2. Underwriter peer network and market share 
For investment banks and investment banking arms of commercial banks, a key 
objective in security underwriting is to maximize market share, given that underwriting 
fees are relatively fixed.  Underwriter market share is periodically ranked and published 
in league tables, which are closely followed by the market participants.  Naturally, there 
is fierce competition among underwriters for the top ranks in league tables.  Gaining 
presence in certain market segments is even cited as a motive for bank mergers (Davis 
(2003)).   
A number of studies have examined investment bank market share.  For example, 
Dunbar (2000) studies the impact of several factors such as IPO return and abnormal 
compensation on investment bank IPO market share.  Ang and Zhang (2004) examine 
both price and non-price competition for market share in the floating rate debt market.  
Rau (2000) investigates the determinants of investment bank market share in the mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) advisory market.   
An underwriter’s strategy of building a network with other underwriters can 
improve its market share.  Relationships have always been important in investment 
banking, where non-price competition is dominant.  In the finance literature, an 
underwriter’s relationship with client firms has received the most attention.  Research on 
an underwriter’s relationship with its peers includes several works on underwriting 
syndicates.  For instance, Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine the composition of IPO 
syndicates.  Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2007) document that optimistic analyst 
research attracts co-management appointments.  Sufi (2007) studies the syndicate 
structure in the syndicated loan market.  In a theoretical analysis, Pichler and Wilhelm 
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(2001) relate the syndicate form to moral hazard problem in team production.  Syndicates 
are generally formed to facilitate a single offering and thus, short-lived, but they 
represent stable informal relationships that exist among underwriters.   
Underwriters are also competitors, and thus, these peer networks are co-opetitive 
networks.  When underwriters collaborate with competitors, they face certain risks and 
benefits.  On one hand, these peer relationships are beneficial if the underwriters have 
complementary skills, and especially since the majority of the corporate securities are 
underwritten by syndicates nowadays, relationships with other underwriters matter more 
than ever.  On the other hand, underwriters can lose their client firms to their partners as 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show that becoming a co-manager in a deal increases the 
likelihood of an investment bank becoming a book manager in the future deals.   
An extensive literature examines this delicate balance between cooperation and 
competition in various industries.  In finance, a number of studies examine competition in 
investment banking.  For instance, Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2005) study how 
investment banks compete for follow-on equity offerings using different strategies.  
Hansen (2001) examines whether the seven percent solution in the IPO market is 
consistent with competition rather than collusion.  Anand and Galetovic (2006) introduce 
a model that explains how the tension between competition and relationships can be 
resolved in investment banking.   
We expect that an underwriter’s network qualities reflect potential co-
management opportunities.  To reduce costs and the risk of opportunism, underwriters 
may cooperate with a select group of peers and create stable relationships.  In this regard, 
well networked underwriters can be included in a large number of future deals as co-
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managers or joint book managers, because they have ties to many underwriters.  In 
addition to size, underwriter networks can differ in terms of their position, reciprocity, 
interconnectedness, and diversity, and underwriters with certain network characteristics 
may be able to further increase their likelihood of being included in deals.  For example, 
underwriters with more central network positions may be more visible.  Moreover having 
ties to partners, who themselves are well-connected, can help increase deal flow.  Ties 
may also be interpreted as a signal of quality and status.  Thus, underwriters may want to 
enhance their status by partnering with other underwriters with greater network 
capabilities.   
As for the performance consequences of network diversity, having a diverse peer 
network with partners that specialize in different industry sectors and geographical 
regions can improve underwriter performance because diversity implies expanded 
opportunity set.  Diverse ties can be especially beneficial when underwriters enter new 
market sectors.  Underwriters with heterogeneous peer networks can access information 
generated from different market segments, investor groups, and clienteles, which can 
greatly aid information production.  Moreover, a bridging position that connects different 
underwriters can enhance an underwriter’s status and increase its appeal as a syndicate 
partner.  On the contrary, network heterogeneity may also prove to be problematic since 
social and structural divisions can hinder effective cooperation.  In fact, homogeneity 
within networks has been widely documented, especially in interpersonal networks.  
Homophily refers to the principle that a contact between similar people or organizations 
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occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people.9  Consequently, relations based on 
similarity may be stronger than the relations that exist between dissimilar organizations.  
Strong relations, in turn, have implications for the amount of cooperative effort the 
underwriter receives from its peers.  Thus, network homogeneity may positively 
influence an underwriter’s performance due to the strength of the relations and the 
partners’ willingness to cooperate.   
Previous findings on the subject of network heterogeneity present mixed results 
and usually focus on heterogeneity in the relationship type: arm’s-length versus 
embedded ties.  Embedded ties mean frequent and close interactions, as opposed to less-
frequent and distant arm’s-length ties.  Some studies document that firms benefit from a 
balance of strong and weak ties (Uzzi (1997) and Baum et al. (2006)).  In contrast, 
Shipilov (2005) shows that maintaining a mix of arm’s length and embedded 
relationships is a disadvantageous strategy.  Beckman and Haunschild (2002) find that 
firms, whose boards are interlocked to other firms with heterogeneous prior premium 
experience, tend to pay less for acquisitions.   
From cooperating with other underwriters and serving in their syndicates, an 
underwriter not only earns fees, but also establishes relationships with firms that can be a 
stepping stone for winning the lead position in the firm’s deals in the future.  It is also 
plausible that general network capabilities, in addition to direct relationships with firms, 
help underwriters win the book manager position.  Issuing firms might prefer 
                                                 
 
 
9
 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) for a review of research on homophily. 
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underwriters with more ties, as such underwriters can provide valuable services via their 
networks.  As a result, a peer network can be considered an underwriter’s social capital as 
it can help the underwriter win deals as either a co-manager or a book manager.  Several 
studies in strategic management focus on documenting a link between an investment 
bank’s network and market share in Canadian investment banking industry (Shipilov 
(2005, 2006), and Shipilov, Li and Baum (2007)).   
Moreover, it is possible that not all aspects of a network enhance the market share 
equally.  In addition, how underwriter peer network affects market share may be different 
in equity and debt underwriting.  Specifically, peer network may be more important in 
equity than debt underwriting due to the higher information asymmetry involved and the 
more lucrative nature of equity underwriting.  The differences between the relationships 
formed in equity and debt underwriting have been previously noted.  For example, Asker 
and Ljungqvist (2008) find that the debt underwriting relationships are less exclusive.   
Furthermore, can the effect of network be different for commercial bank and 
investment bank underwriters?  The entrance of commercial banks into underwriting has 
attracted substantial attention in the literature (e.g., Gande et al. (1997), Gande, Puri and 
Saunders (1999), Puri (1996), and Shivdasani and Song (2007)).  Because of the inherent 
differences between commercial banks and investment banks, the role of peer network 
may be different for them.  Commercial banks build relationships with firms early on.  
Commercial banks also enjoy economies of scope in information production, as 
information spills over from their lending activities.  As a result, they may possess 
superior information regarding client firms.  However, commercial banks also face a 
conflict of interest, as they can misrepresent the information they possess to the market 
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and try to issue securities of low quality firms to repay loans.  The market participants are 
aware that this potential conflict of interest can affect commercial banks’ function as 
underwriters.  In addition, commercial banks lack the established investor clientele and 
reputation of investment banks that are crucial in the underwriting process.   
Hence, on one hand, commercial banks may largely focus on their firm 
relationships and financing capacities to win deals and depend less on peer relationships.  
On the other hand, commercial banks may rely more heavily on peer networks because 
they lack established investor networks and placement track record.  For this purpose, 
commercial banks can play up their advantages such as their enhanced information 
production to increase their appeal as syndicate partners.  Commercial banks and 
investment banks may bring different sets of skills to the market and have 
complementary skills.  In fact, Song (2004) finds some evidence of such complementary 
skills in corporate bond underwriting and shows that during the period from 1991 to 
1996, pure investment bank, pure commercial bank, and mixed syndicates served 
different types of bond issuers.   
 
 
4.3. Network measures 
Network analysis describes the structure of networks by focusing on the 
relationships among a set of actors.  Network data are defined by actors and relations, 
which are represented by nodes and lines.  For the purpose of this study, we focus on a 
set of network measures that capture the size (degree), position (closeness and 
betweenness), interconnectedness (reciprocity and density) and heterogeneity (tie, 
  108 
industry and geographical diversity) of underwriter peer networks.  All the network 
measures are computed using undirected binary data with the exception of reciprocity, for 
which we use directed data.  Detailed discussions of these measures and network analysis 
are provided in Chapter 2, which uses a small simplified network of underwriters as an 
example to better illustrate the construction of these network measures.   
 
Degree 
The normalized degree measures the percentage of all other underwriters a 
specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Formally, 
1−
=
∑
n
x
Degree j
ij
i , where xij equals to 
one when there is a tie between underwriters i and j, and n equals to the number of all 
underwriters in the network.  The higher the number of relationships an underwriter has, 
the more access it has to deal flow as it can be included in the syndicates of its partners.   
 
Closeness  
The measure of closeness emphasizes the proximity of an underwriter to all other 
underwriters in the network, and we specifically use an eigenvector centrality measure 
proposed by Bonacich (1972).  Here, the centrality of each underwriter is determined by 
the centralities of the partners it is connected to.10  If we denote the eigenvector centrality 
of i by evi, formally, ∑=
j
jiji evAev λ
1
, where λ is a constant that provides a nontrivial 
                                                 
 
 
10
 Google’s system of ranking web pages for a particular search is similar to eigenvector 
centrality measure. 
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solution, and Aij is an adjacency matrix11, and we normalize this measure by dividing it 
by the maximum possible eigenvector centrality in the network. Underwriters with higher 
closeness measures occupy more central positions in the network and are closer to other 
underwriters, which suggest that they are sitting in the center of the industry network and 
enjoy more access to information and deal flows.  
 
Betweenness  
We use betweenness measure proposed by Freeman (1979) that captures how 
often an underwriter happens to be located between pairs of other underwriters.  An 
underwriter is between two underwriters if it lies on the shortest possible path (also called 
geodesic path) between them.  Betweenness, to some extent, reflects an underwriter’s 
capacity to serve as an intermediary between others.  An underwriter with higher 
betweenness can make connections between other underwriters and may have more 
power to isolate others or prevent contact.  Specifically, ∑=
jk
jiki bsBetweennes , where 
bjik is the proportion of all paths linking distinct underwriters j and k that pass through 
underwriter i, and we divide it by the maximum possible betweenness in the network to 
obtain normalized betweenness.  Closeness and betweenness are core network position 
measures, and they capture how advantageous an underwriter’s network position is.    
 
 
                                                 
 
 
11
 An adjacency matrix is a symmetric matrix, where Aij=1 if node i is adjacent to node j, 
and Aij=0 otherwise. 
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Reciprocity 
Reciprocity refers to the proportion of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, where a tie is considered reciprocated if the two underwriters invite each 
other into their respective syndicates.  Underwriters may be more likely to cooperate with 
those with whom they maintain reciprocated ties.  We compute reciprocity using directed 
ties.  We establish the direction of relationships only between those who are book 
managers and those who are not, and reciprocity is measured only for those who serve as 
book managers.  Formally, Reciprocityi 
∑
∑
>>
>>
=
j
jiij
j
jiij
xx
xx
)0or  0(
)0 and 0(
, where xij indicates that 
book manager i invited underwriter j into its syndicate.   
 
Density 
Density of an underwriter’s ego (i.e., individual) network can be another way of 
measuring the so-called embeddedness or interconnectedness within a network.  Density 
refers to the percent of all ties that can exist among an underwriter’s partners that are 
actually present.  Specifically, )1( −=
∑
ii
jk
jk
i
nn
x
Density , where xjk equals to one when there is 
a tie between underwriters j and k with whom underwriter i maintains ties with, and ni 
equals to the number of all partners of underwriter i (i.e., degree of underwriter i).   
Network density cannot be computed when an underwriter has no ties or only one tie.  
Dense network means that an underwriter’s partners, in turn, have many ties with each 
another, which may indicate more trust or coordination in the network.  Reciprocity and 
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density capture the structure of relationships around the underwriter and thus, attempt to 
indirectly measure the tendency to cooperate with each other. 
 
Tie diversity 
We first capture the heterogeneity of an individual underwriter’s network by the 
extent of non-redundant ties.  The specific measure used is called reach efficiency.  
Reach efficiency measures how many non-redundant partners an underwriter can reach 
within two degrees of separation per each partner.  If underwriters work with similar 
underwriters, who, in turn, work with the same type of underwriters, the network may not 
be highly heterogeneous and the reach efficiency measure will be low.  Formally, 
∑ +−
=
j
ij
i
i
nn
kdiversityTie )1(. , where ki equals to the number of all unique underwriters 
within two degrees of separation from underwriter i, nj the degree or the size of the 
network of each partner j of underwriter i, and ni is the degree of underwriter i itself.   
Industry and geographical diversity 
Here, we attempt to measure the heterogeneity of an individual underwriter’s 
network by the diversity of the industrial and geographical specialization of its partners.  
These measures are not traditional social network measures, but ones that we develop to 
capture additional aspects of underwriter networks.  For each underwriter, we identify 
five major states and industries it specialized in over four-year periods.  Next, we 
compute the number of different industries and states underwriter i can reach indirectly 
through the experience of its partners and normalize it by the number of partners.  If an 
underwriter maintains ties with heterogeneous partners that operate in different industries 
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and states, the diversity measures will be high.  Network diversity has implications for 
the underwriter’s access to heterogeneous information and different market segments, but 
it also reflects differentiation and segmentation and thus, may reveal information about 
the likelihood and efficiency of cooperation within a network.  
 
 
4.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues 
database to create underwriter network measures.  The network measures are constructed 
using inter-organizational relationships that underwriters establish with each other when 
they are involved in the same underwriting syndicate.  We obtain all 23,084 public equity 
and 24,818 public debt securities issued between 1970 and 2007 in the U.S. excluding the 
securities offered by financial firms as shown in Table 4.1.  Of these equity and debt 
issues, 29,911 employ two or more underwriters.   
 
Table 4.1: Sample of security issues  
The following sample includes all public securities issued in the U.S. between 1970 and 
2007 excluding the securities of financial firms.  We use these security issues to construct 
underwriter networks.   
 
 
Number of issues 
Number of issues that employ 
two or more underwriters 
 
Equity  
 
23,084 
 
14,344 
Initial public offerings 10,073 6,054 
Seasoned equity offerings 13,011 8,290 
Debt  24,818 15,567 
Non-convertible debt 20,899 13,030 
Convertible debt 1,575 801 
Non-convertible preferred 1,704 1,349 
Convertible preferred 640 387 
All deals 47,902 29,911 
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Underwriters may interact with each other before or after the deal syndication, 
and their relationships probably do not die out as soon as a deal is over.  Therefore, to 
capture the lasting nature of relationships, we use a four-year moving period approach.  
Consequently, there are 35 rolling four-year periods from 1970 to 2007.     
We consider only the managing underwriters (book managers and co-managers) 
in syndicates and exclude syndicate members, because non-managing syndicate members 
typically only serve distributional purposes and have minimal role in deals.  We use 
reported underwriter names, but multiple variations of the same underwriter names 
appear in the SDC data due to inconsistent abbreviation, punctuation or spelling such as 
Goldman Sachs & Co and Goldman, Sachs & Co.  We check all the underwriter names 
and manually correct the names when necessary.  Cooney et al. (2004) perform a similar 
hand correction when working with underwriter data.  In the case of bank mergers, we 
treat the post-merger bank as a new entity because a multitude of changes and 
restructuring occur around bank mergers.  We also identify commercial banks in the 
sample using Gande et al. (1999), Federal Reserve data on large commercial banks, and 
hand check.    
By limiting syndicates only to those who serve as managing underwriters and 
following the above corrections, we obtain total of 1,653 and 840 underwriters in the 
equity and debt samples, respectively.  Of these underwriters, 115 and 106 are 
commercial banks.  Using binary network data created from the equity and debt 
syndicates, we compute various network measures by employing the social network 
analysis software UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman (2002)).   
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We examine the impact of peer network on underwriter performance.  A major 
performance measure for an underwriter is fee income, but detailed fee information for 
individual underwriters is unavailable.  However, fee income is closely related to market 
share since underwriting fees are stable.  Market share is computed as the sum of the 
proceeds of the offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume 
of all the securities over a period, along the line of Megginson and Weiss (1991).  In 
addition to market share, we compute underwriter loyalty index to reflect an 
underwriter’s ability to retain its clients similar to Ljungqvist et al (2007).  Loyalty index 
measures how often the lead underwriter is retained in the subsequent deals of the client 
firms during a four-year period.  We also identify all firm-underwriter relationships in the 
sample and measure the strength of each firm-underwriter relationship by the percent of 
all deals of a specific firm that is underwritten by a certain underwriter during a four-year 
period.  Finally, proceeds are adjusted for inflation.  
 
4.4.1. Overall network of underwriters  
The characteristics of the overall network of underwriters in the U.S. equity and 
debt underwriting market are presented in Table 4.2.  The entire networks of underwriters 
during selected periods are also depicted in Figure 4.1.  As we can see in Panel A of 
Figure 4.1, during 1970-73 there are many equity underwriters without syndicate ties 
appearing as isolate nodes on the left.  The density measure of the overall equity 
underwriter network of this period in Panel A of Table 4.2 is 0.41 percent meaning that 
only 0.41 percent of all possible ties among 613 equity underwriters are actually present.  
However, some underwriters may have more dense individual networks than others.  The 
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average geodesic distance between reachable pairs of underwriters is 3.096, which means 
that on average the degrees of separation between any connected pair of underwriters is 
3.096.   
 
 
Table 4.2:  Characteristics of the overall underwriter networks  
The following tables present the characteristics of the overall network of underwriters 
that serve as managing underwriters of public securities over rolling four-year periods.  
Networks are created using the ties that underwriters form with each other when they are 
involved in the same underwriting syndicate of equity or debt securities during a four-
year period.  Panel A focuses on underwriters that serve in equity issues, and Panel B 
focuses on underwriters that serve in debt issues.  Density shows the percent of all 
possible ties that are actually present.  The average geodesic distance is the average of the 
geodesic distances among all reachable pairs of underwriters.  Geodesic distance refers to 
the number of relations along the shortest possible path between a pair of underwriters.       
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  Panel A:  Network of equity underwriters  
Period Years 
 Number of 
underwriters Density 
Average  
geodesic 
distance  
1 1970-73 613 0.41 3.096 
2 1971-74 519 0.57 2.768 
3 1972-75 429 0.71 2.742 
4 1973-76 187 2.73 2.551 
5 1974-77 140 5.06 2.426 
6 1975-78 147 5.58 2.361 
7 1976-79 164 4.83 2.326 
8 1977-80 178 3.98 2.373 
9 1978-81 214 2.58 2.590 
10 1979-82 230 2.35 2.863 
11 1980-83 296 1.84 3.280 
12 1981-84 315 1.79 3.368 
13 1982-85 301 1.99 3.410 
14 1983-86 345 1.80 3.596 
15 1984-87 344 1.81 4.056 
16 1985-88 330 2.08 3.732 
17 1986-89 336 2.12 4.451 
18 1987-90 289 2.63 3.684 
19 1988-91 260 3.32 2.568 
20 1989-92 300 3.43 3.164 
21 1990-93 336 4.05 3.056 
22 1991-94 360 3.87 3.196 
23 1992-95 408 3.53 3.357 
24 1993-96 440 3.41 3.464 
25 1994-97 457 3.05 3.137 
26 1995-98 442 3.38 3.505 
27 1996-99 463 3.85 2.983 
28 1997-00 427 4.66 2.905 
29 1998-01 358 5.53 2.762 
30 1999-02 342 7.18 2.489 
31 2000-03 313 9.25 2.296 
32 2001-04 293 10.94 2.158 
33 2002-05 284 11.73 2.164 
34 2003-06 276 12.13 2.104 
35 2004-07 262 14.81 2.027 
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 Panel B:  Network of debt underwriters 
Period Years 
 Number of 
underwriters Density 
Average  
geodesic 
distance  
1 1970-73 178 4.93 2.363 
2 1971-74 169 5.80 2.198 
3 1972-75 155 7.42 2.199 
4 1973-76 132 9.51 2.230 
5 1974-77 135 9.29 2.269 
6 1975-78 143 8.77 2.243 
7 1976-79 147 8.23 2.365 
8 1977-80 140 8.58 2.388 
9 1978-81 134 7.38 2.507 
10 1979-82 130 7.49 2.226 
11 1980-83 130 6.82 2.479 
12 1981-84 136 6.63 2.415 
13 1982-85 143 6.26 2.346 
14 1983-86 156 5.81 2.379 
15 1984-87 166 5.53 2.338 
16 1985-88 162 5.88 2.348 
17 1986-89 157 6.53 2.315 
18 1987-90 149 7.71 2.240 
19 1988-91 141 8.39 2.117 
20 1989-92 154 9.29 2.088 
21 1990-93 201 7.76 2.044 
22 1991-94 221 7.53 2.090 
23 1992-95 234 7.55 2.060 
24 1993-96 234 7.95 2.068 
25 1994-97 224 8.44 2.093 
26 1995-98 220 9.84 2.106 
27 1996-99 233 9.89 2.118 
28 1997-00 239 10.47 2.117 
29 1998-01 243 13.79 1.959 
30 1999-02 245 15.25 1.940 
31 2000-03 269 16.36 1.899 
32 2001-04 268 17.16 1.896 
33 2002-05 270 18.27 1.867 
34 2003-06 263 20.28 1.838 
35 2004-07 265 19.85 1.849 
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Figure 4.1:  Overall network of underwriters during selected periods  
The following figures show the overall network of underwriters that serve as managing 
underwriters in public securities during selected four-year periods.  Networks are created 
using the ties that underwriters form with each other when they are involved in the same 
underwriting syndicates of equity or debt securities during a four-year period.  Panels A-
C display the overall network of underwriters that serve in equity issues, and Panels D-F 
display the overall network of underwriters that serve in debt issues.   
 
Panel A:  Network of equity underwriters during 1970-73 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Network of equity underwriters during 1990-93 
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Panel C:  Network of equity underwriters during 2004-07 
 
 
 
Panel D:  Network of debt underwriters during 1970-73 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel E:  Network of debt underwriters during 1990-93 
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Panel F:  Network of debt underwriters during 2004-07 
 
 
 
 
In Panel B of Figure 4.1, more ties are visible among underwriters during 1990-
93.  The network density is 4.05 percent during this period.  The average geodesic 
distance between reachable pairs is 3.056, similar to the first period.  However, during the 
last period of 2004-07 in Panel C, almost all the underwriters maintain some relationships 
with other banks as evidenced by much less isolate nodes on the left.  The overall 
network density has reached 14.81 percent meaning that, of all possible relationships that 
can exist among 262 equity underwriters, 14.81 percent are actually present.  In large 
networks, density rarely reaches extremely high levels because it is impossible for every 
one to maintain ties with every one else.  The average geodesic distance between 
reachable pairs has declined to 2.027.  Therefore, on average, any equity underwriter is 
only 2.027 relationships away from any other equity underwriter that is reachable in 
2004-07.  Moreover, the underwriters seem to be globally connected to each other and do 
not display distinct cliques.  The significant drop in the number of underwriters during 
the mid and late 1970s in Panel A of Table 4.2 is mainly due to the cold market during 
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those years.  The upward trend in the overall network density from late 1990s naturally 
coincides with the increasing frequency of syndication.   
As for the underwriters of debt securities, there has been a smaller number of debt 
underwriters compared to equity underwriters as shown in Panel B of Table 4.2.  The 
same trend of increasing density is also observed here.  The density of the overall debt 
network has increased from 4.93 in 1970-73 to 19.85 in 2004-07.  In fact, the network of 
debt underwriters has consistently displayed higher density than the network of equity 
underwriters.  For example, the density measure of debt underwriters’ network during the 
first period is 4.93 percent while it is 0.41 percent for equity underwriters’ network and 
7.76 percent instead of 4.05 in 1990-93, respectively.  Panels D through F in Figure 4.1 
also display the increasing interconnectedness among debt underwriters.    
During the last period of 2004-07 in Panel F, almost all the debt underwriters 
maintain some relationships with each other as evidenced by the general lack of isolate 
nodes on the left.  The overall network density has reached 19.85 percent meaning that, 
of all possible relationships among 265 debt underwriters, 19.85 percent are actually 
present.  The average geodesic distance between reachable pairs has come down to 1.849.  
Therefore, on average, a debt underwriter is only 1.849 relationships away from any other 
debt underwriter that is reachable.  These figures and tables show that historically there 
have been a larger number of underwriters in equity than debt underwriting, although the 
numbers have become similar in recent years.  However, the network of debt 
underwriters still remains more densely connected.  
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4.2. Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we move from the overall network measures to the descriptive 
statistics of the networks of individual underwriters.  Panel A of Table 4.3 is based on 
underwriter-period observations and presents the characteristics of the underwriters of 
equity and debt securities.  For example, mean degree of equity underwriters across all 
periods is 4.15 percent; closeness is 3.79; and betweenness is 0.27.  The mean density of 
the individual networks of equity underwriters is 65.39 percent.  As for the measures of 
network diversity, the mean industry and geographical diversity are 0.72 and 0.65, which 
means that on average, equity underwriters can access 0.72 different industries and 0.65 
states through each partner.  At maximum, an equity underwriter has ties to 67.93 percent 
of all other underwriters.  Some underwriters have ties that are all reciprocated as 
evidenced by the maximum reciprocity of 100 percent.  The average market share of 
equity underwriters is smaller than that of debt underwriters, consistent with the fact that 
there are more equity underwriters.  We can observe similar statistics for debt 
underwriters as well.    
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Table 4.3:  Descriptive statistics  
The following sample includes 23,084 equity and 24,818 debt securities issued in the 
U.S. between 1970 and 2007, excluding those issued by financial firms, and all the 
underwriters that serve as managing underwriters in these securities.  There are 1,653 and 
840 underwriters involved in the underwriting of these equity and debt securities, 
respectively.  Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the underwriters’ 
characteristics measured over moving four-year periods.  Panel B presents the 
characteristics of the securities.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific 
underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that 
captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters, and it is normalized by 
dividing it by the maximum eigenvector in the network.  Betweenness measures how 
often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other 
underwriters, and it is normalized by dividing it by the maximum betweenness in the 
network.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are 
reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other into their syndicates.   
Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an 
underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-
redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for 
each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different 
industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of 
partners.  Geodesic distance is the number of relationships along the shortest possible 
path between a pair of underwriters.  Market share is computed as the sum of the 
proceeds of the offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume 
of all the offerings during a period.  Loyalty index measures how often an underwriter is 
retained as the book manager in the subsequent deals of its clients.  Firm-underwriter 
relationship strength denotes the percent of all deals of a firm that is underwritten by a 
specific underwriter over a four-year period.  We present the strength of the issuing 
firms’ relationships with their book managers in the table below.       
   
 Mean Median Min Max 
Std 
Dev 
 
N 
Panel A: Underwriter characteristics      
Equity underwriters      
Network measures 
    
 
Degree 4.15 0.83 0 67.93 7.60 12,981 
Closeness 3.79 0.69 0 32.60 6.29 12,981 
Betweenness 0.27 0 0 18.00 0.83 12,981 
Reciprocity 4.80 0 0 100.00 13.12 10,259 
Density 65.39 68.28 0 100.00 31.03 8,127 
Tie diversity 34.04 24.51 0 99.57 31.75 12,981 
Industry diversity 0.72 0.70 0 5.00 0.67 12,981 
Geographical diversity 0.65 0.63 0 5.00 0.58 12,981 
Geodesic distance 2.93 2 1 17 1.54 2702906 
Market share (%) 0.46 0.01 0 29.47 2.15 8,768 
Loyalty index (%) 44.01 50.00 0 100.00 39.66 2,772 
Firm-underwriter relationship  14.22 0 0 100.00 34.15 23,084 
strength (%)       
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Std 
Dev 
 
N 
Debt underwriters       
Network measures  
    
 
Degree 10.51 5.00 0 82.16 13.41 6,431 
Closeness 6.81 3.73 0 35.27 7.70 6,431 
Betweenness 0.42 0 0 14.37 1.28 6,431 
Reciprocity 6.09 0 0 100.00 13.90 5,929 
Density 79.54 87.43 0 100.00 23.29 5,281 
Tie diversity 26.98 14.96 0 99.55 27.31 6,586 
Industry diversity 0.61 0.56 0 16.00 0.49 6,569 
Geographical diversity 0.61 0.55 0 16.00 0.50 6,569 
Geodesic distance 2.05 2 1 8 0.64 1000406 
Market share (%) 1.53 0.02 0 40.04 4.52 3,013 
Loyalty index (%) 42.41 46.04 0 100.00 33.29 1,455 
Firm-underwriter relationship  20.05 0 0 100.00 33.43 24,818 
strength (%)       
       
Panel B: Issue characteristics       
Equity issues       
Deal proceeds ($ mil) 57.50 21.42 0.05 10674.3 224.69 23,084 
No. of book managers 1.07 1 1 6 0.31 23,084 
No. of managing underwriters 2.33 2 1 46 1.74 23,084 
No. of all underwriters 3.71 2 1 105 5.19 23,084 
       
Debt  issues       
Deal proceeds ($ mil) 193.32 92.84 0.25 8446.11 387.12 24,818 
No. of book managers 1.19 1 1 12 0.57 24,818 
No. of managing underwriters 3.26 2 1 59 3.35 24,818 
No. of all underwriters 3.47 2 1 82 4.41 24,818 
 
 
 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the securities.  The average debt 
offering is more than three times larger than the average equity offering, as evidenced by 
the mean equity offering of $57.50 million versus the mean debt offering of $193.32 
million.  Mean syndicate size across all periods is 3.71 for equity deals and 3.47 for debt 
deals.   
In Table 4.4, we present the mean network characteristics of investment banks 
and commercial banks using issues from 1989-2007, since Section 20 subsidiaries were 
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permitted to underwrite corporate securities in 1989.  From the mean network 
characteristics in Panel A of Table 4.4, it seems that the commercial banks have less 
diverse, more reciprocated and larger networks than investment banks in both equity and 
debt underwriting.  However, the commercial banks have larger market shares consistent 
with large commercial banks entering investment banking and fighting aggressively for 
market share, whereas there are a variety of investment banks that range from small 
boutique firms to large prestigious ones.  In Panel B of Table 4.4, we randomly match a 
commercial bank to an investment bank based on the market share, which results in two 
samples of equal size.  In these market share-matched samples, commercial banks and 
investment banks have similar network characteristics, but the commercial banks, on 
average, still have larger networks with more advantageous positions.     
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Table 4.4:  Characteristics of the networks of investment bank and commercial 
bank underwriters 
The following tables present the characteristics of the networks of investment banks and 
commercial banks that serve as managing underwriters of public securities between 1989 
and 2007, since Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial banks were permitted to 
underwrite corporate bond and equity securities in 1989 and 1990, respectively.  Panel A 
presents the mean network characteristics of investment banks and commercial banks.  
Panel B presents the mean network characteristics of commercial banks and those of 
investment banks that are matched by market share. Degree is the percent of all other 
underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector 
centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters.  
Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths 
between pairs of other underwriters.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an 
underwriter that are reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each other 
into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among 
the partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many 
other non-redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of 
separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of 
different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the 
number of partners.  N refers to the number of underwriter-period observations. 
Panel A:  Mean network characteristics of commercial banks and investment banks 
 Equity underwriters  Debt underwriters 
 
Investment 
banks 
(N = 9,726) 
Commercial 
banks 
(N = 1,270) 
 Investment 
banks  
(N = 3,302) 
Commercial 
banks  
(N = 927) 
Market share 0.20 0.31  0.62 0.85 
Degree 3.36 5.38  9.25 18.64 
Closeness 2.74 3.25  5.60 9.87 
Betweenness 0.22 0.25  0.32 0.47 
Reciprocity 4.83 5.53  5.67 6.02 
Density 68.93 70.55  82.24 76.48 
Tie diversity 26.29 8.65  25.24 13.51 
Industry diversity 0.55 0.25  0.58 0.47 
Geographical diversity 0.50 0.22  0.58 0.47 
Panel B:  Mean network characteristics of commercial banks and market share-
matched investment banks 
 Equity underwriters  Debt underwriters 
 
Investment 
banks 
(N = 295) 
Commercial 
banks 
(N = 295) 
 Investment 
banks  
(N = 437) 
Commercial 
banks  
(N = 437)  
Degree 13.60 18.69  22.32 28.49 
Closeness 8.46 10.83  11.49 14.15 
Betweenness 0.72 0.98  0.78 0.95 
Reciprocity 7.08 7.58  7.71 8.64 
Density 58.27 53.91  62.92 60.74 
Tie diversity 20.28 11.63  10.14 7.53 
Industry diversity 0.55 0.43  0.41 0.36 
Geographical diversity 0.49 0.36  0.42 0.36 
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4.5. Impact of underwriter network on market share 
4.5.1. Future market share 
We examine whether peer network affects future market share of equity and debt 
underwriters in Table 4.5.  The table presents the estimated coefficients of OLS 
regressions, where we regress the underwriter market share in a given year on the 
underwriter characteristics during the previous four-year period.  All the regressions 
include year fixed effects and robust standard errors that allow for clustering in the 
observations of the same underwriter.  Since lagged market share may have significant 
explanatory power due to persistence in market share, we include the market share from 
the previous four-year period in addition to our network measures.  We also include 
loyalty index that captures how often an underwriter is retained by the client firms in 
their subsequent deals during a four-year period.  This measure may indirectly proxy for 
some underwriter capability.  
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Table 4.5:  Impact of underwriter network on future market share 
The table presents the estimated coefficients of regressions of underwriter market share in equity (Panel A) and debt (Panel B) 
underwriting.  The sample includes all underwriters that serve as either a book- or co-manager in U.S. equity and debt offerings in 
1970- 2007.  The dependent variable, market share, refers to the sum of the proceeds of the offerings lead by a specific underwriter 
during a year, divided by the total annual deal volume of all the offerings.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific 
underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other 
underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  
Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are reciprocated.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that 
can exist among the partners of an underwriter that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant 
underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to 
the numbers of different industries and states that an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners.  Loyalty 
index measures how often an underwriter is retained as the book manager in the subsequent deals of its client firms.  p-values reported 
in brackets.    
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      Panel A:  The impact of network on the future market share of equity underwriters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 0.048 0.072 0.151 0.177 0.279 0.225 0.167 0.181 -0.107 
 
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) 
 
 
   
 
   
 
Degree 0.020        0.059 
 (0.01)        (0.00) 
Closeness  0.011       -0.024 
  (0.06)       (0.12) 
Betweenness   0.021      0.001 
   (0.66)      (0.98) 
Reciprocity    -0.001     -0.001 
 
 
  (0.86)     (0.75) 
 Density     -0.002    0.001 
 
 
   
(0.10) 
   
(0.31) 
Tie diversity      -0.002   0.001 
 
 
   
 (0.01)   (0.90) 
 Industry diversity       -0.055  0.053 
 
 
   
 
 (0.02)  (0.42) 
 Geographical         -0.072  
diversity        (0.02)  
   … x Commercial  0.041 0.094 0.466 0.038 0.015 0.039 2.015 2.137  
    bank dummy (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  
Market share 0.955 0.973 0.974 0.984 0.984 0.955 0.987 0.987 0.938 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loyalty index -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.19) (0.30) (0.66) (0.34) (0.50) (0.50) (0.37) (0.39) (0.10) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 75.64 75.56 75.33 76.37 74.54 75.07 75.21 75.17 76.16 
N 3,341 3,341 3,341 2,753 2,562 3,341 3,341 3,341 2,260 
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     Panel B:  The impact of network on the future market share of debt underwriters  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.094 0.070 0.227 0.286 1.597 0.444 0.358 0.330 -0.512 
 
(0.43) (0.46) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) 
 
 
   
 
   
 
Degree 0.024        0.088 
 (0.11)        (0.00) 
Closeness  0.011       -0.080 
  (0.44)       (0.03) 
Betweenness   0.197      0.134 
   (0.14)      (0.38) 
Reciprocity    0.002     0.004 
 
 
  (0.78)     (0.44) 
 Density     -0.020    0.005 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.29) 
Tie diversity      -0.006   -0.002 
 
 
   
 (0.00)   (0.80) 
 Industry diversity       -0.096  0.068 
 
 
   
 
 (0.23)  (0.61) 
 Geographical         -0.095  
diversity        (0.21)  
    … x Commercial  0.041 0.079 0.686 0.032 0.008 0.020 0.836 1.179  
           bank dummy (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)  
Market share 0.951 0.990 0.918 0.995 0.962 0.991 0.995 0.996 0.883 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loyalty index 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 (0.35) (0.08) (0.12) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.13) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 74.40 73.98 74.42 72.91 72.89 73.51 73.51 73.54 72.89 
N 1,510 1,510 1,510 1,190 1,178 1,510 1,510 1,510 1,117 
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Panel A of Table 4.5 presents the regression results of the impact of network on 
the future market share of equity underwriters.  As the estimated coefficients show, 
network degree and closeness have significant positive effects on market share, and 
network diversity measures have significant and negative coefficients.  In addition, all the 
interaction terms between the network variables and the commercial bank dummy are 
consistently significant and positive.   
The results indicate that underwriters with larger networks and closer ties to other 
underwriters experience higher market share in the following year, which is consistent 
with equity underwriters using their contacts to generate greater deal flows and increase 
their market shares.  Underwriters with well-connected partners generally display higher 
closeness, and such partners would be especially beneficial in increasing deal flow.  
These positive effects of degree and closeness are even more pronounced for commercial 
bank underwriters, as evidenced by the significant coefficients of 0.041 and 0.094 on the 
interaction terms in models 1 and 2.   
 Betweenness in model 3 is insignificant for investment banks, but it has a 
significant effect on the future market share of commercial banks.  Betweenness 
centrality for underwriter i is essentially the proportion of all geodesic paths between 
pairs that utilize underwriter i, and according to Borgatti (2005), it captures the 
exclusivity of underwriter i’s position.  Thus, it reflects an underwriter’s capacity to serve 
as an intermediary between others.  However, betweenness is insignificant for investment 
banks, but commercial banks are able to utilize their intermediary position and use it to 
control information and deal flows.   
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Measures of reciprocity and density of underwriter networks are both insignificant 
in models 4 and 5, which suggests that for investment banks, existence of more ties 
among its partners or greater reciprocity with its partners does not necessarily increase 
their market shares.  However, commercial banks benefit from such dense and 
reciprocated networks.   
Finally, measures of network diversity are negatively associated with future 
market share, but the effect is mitigated for commercial banks.  Having a diverse peer 
network can improve performance because underwriters with such networks can 
indirectly access information and deal flow in different market segments, but 
heterogeneous networks with diverse partners may also hinder effective cooperation.  The 
estimated coefficients show that investment banks generate deal flows from more 
specialized homogenous networks, whereas commercial banks benefit from 
heterogeneous networks.  This result is consistent with the fact that specialization, in 
general, has played a greater role in investment banking than commercial banking.  
Commercial banks typically engage in a larger set of financial activities than investment 
banks and tend to be more diversified than investment banks along certain dimensions.  
Therefore, commercial banks can be better equipped to work with diverse partners.  As 
for the control variables, the estimated coefficients on lagged market share shows the 
persistence in market share.  Loyalty index, on the other hand, is insignificant.  The 
adjusted R-squares that range from 74.54 to 76.37 percent support our conjecture that 
these underwriter characteristics explain variations in future market share.   
In terms of the economic significance of the equity network measures, a one 
standard deviation increase in the degree is associated with an increase of about 15.2 
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basis points in the market share in the following year for investment banks and an 
increase of 46.4 basis points in the market share of commercial banks, after controlling 
for other variables.  These are economically significant effects given that the mean equity 
underwriter market share is 0.46 percent.  Similarly, all else being equal, a one standard 
deviation increase in the closeness centrality is associated with an increase of 6.9 basis 
points in the market share of investment banks and 66 basis points in that of commercial 
banks.  When the tie diversity of a network increases by one standard deviation, the 
following year’s market share is 6.35 basis points lower for investment banks and 117.47 
basis points higher for commercial banks.  
In Panel B of Table 4.5, we repeat the analysis for debt underwriters.  Only the 
density and tie diversity measures are significant, although the interaction terms of some 
of the network variables with the commercial bank dummy are significant as well.  
Overall, the regression results show that the role of peer network in market share is less 
significant in debt underwriting than equity.  Equity networks may be more advantageous 
and of greater strategic importance than debt networks because first, the fees generated 
from equity deals tend to be higher than those from debt deals even after controlling for 
the difference in the deal size.  Second, there is higher information asymmetry 
surrounding equity deals.  These may enhance the role of networks in equity 
underwriting.   
Commercial banks that serve as debt underwriters are able to utilize the size, 
closeness and betweenness of their networks to increase deal flow of debt securities, as 
evidenced by the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms in models 1-3, but the 
benefits from other aspects of networks are not significant at five percent level.  The fact 
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that the commercial banks are more familiar with debt than equity underwriting due to 
their lending activities, may have further lowered the potential benefit of peer network for 
them in debt underwriting.  The regression results in Panel B also show persistence in 
market share.  The loyalty index, which can control for some unobserved characteristics 
of debt underwriters, is significant and positive in some of the models. 
Since many commercial banks have recently entered underwriting, we test 
whether the documented effect of network for commercial banks is simply due to 
underwriter age in unreported regressions.  We obtain the date when underwriters first 
appear in the sample and use that as an underwriter age proxy.  We find that the effect of 
commercial bank networks is not entirely driven by underwriter age, and thus, not unique 
to young underwriters.  Overall, our results show that equity underwriters—both 
investment banks and commercial banks—with extensive ties and located in the center of 
the network capture higher market shares in the following year, and this relationship is 
stronger for commercial banks.  Moreover, investment bank underwriters are more likely 
to gain equity deal flows from partners that are similar, while commercial bank 
underwriters gain from diverse peer networks.  The evidence of a greater impact of peer 
network on commercial bank market share implies that commercial banks utilize their 
peer networks more aggressively possibly playing up their complementary skills.  It, thus, 
supports the view that commercial banks and investment bank have complementary 
skills, which increases the appeal of commercial banks as partners, and as a result, 
commercial banks generate greater deal flow from networks.  Finally, there is some 
evidence that peer network matters more for equity underwriters than debt underwriters. 
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4.5.2. Probability of winning a book manager position 
In the previous section, we establish that underwriters with certain network 
capabilities tend to capture higher market shares in the next year.  Naturally, underwriters 
with such network capabilities are more likely to be invited into the future syndicates of 
their partners as a co-manager or a syndicate member.  In this section, we specifically 
examine whether peer network helps an underwriter win a book manager position in 
individual deals.  Certain network characteristics may increase an underwriter’s visibility 
and improve the likelihood of being selected by issuing firms.   
Panel A of Table 4.6 presents the estimated coefficients of the logistic regressions 
of the probability of an underwriter winning a book manager position in an equity deal.  
The models in Table 6 include one observation for each eligible underwriter for each 
deal. The eligible underwriters are those who serve as managing underwriters in equity 
deals during the year of the offering.  However, given the large sample size, for ease of 
estimation, we randomly select every fifth underwriter.  If an underwriter is identified as 
the book manager, the dependent variable equals to one and zero otherwise.  We are 
relating the underwriter characteristics over four-year periods to the probability of 
winning an equity mandate in the next year.  To allow for deal specific effects, we adjust 
standard errors for clustering within issues.  We also control for the underwriter’s ability 
to retain client firms (loyalty index), previous experience in the same industry and state 
as the issuer, and relationship with the issuer, since extensive literature documents that 
firm relationships matter in underwriter selection.   
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Table 4.6:  Underwriter network and the probability of winning a book manager position  
The table presents the estimated coefficients of logistic regressions of the probability of winning a book manager position in an 
underwriting mandate.  Panel A focuses on the probability of winning a book manager position in an equity deal, and Panel B focuses 
on debt deals.  The models include one observation for each eligible underwriter for each deal, and the dependent variable equals to 
one if an underwriter is identified as the book manager in a deal, and zero otherwise.  The set of eligible equity (debt) underwriters 
include those that serve as either a book or co-manager in an equity (debt) offering during the issue year.  However, to make the 
sample more manageable, we randomly pick every fifth underwriter.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific 
underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other 
underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  
Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of an underwriter that are reciprocated, which occurs when two underwriters invite each 
other into their syndicates.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an underwriter that are 
actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two degrees of 
separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different industries and states that an 
underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners. Market share is computed as the sum of the proceeds of the 
offerings lead by a specific underwriter, divided by the total deal volume of all the offerings.  Loyalty index measures the percent of 
the time that the underwriter is retained as a book manager in the subsequent issues of its client firms.  Previous industry and state 
experience dummies equal to one if an underwriter had underwritten an equity deal in the same industry or state as the issuer during 
the previous four-year period, and zero otherwise.  Firm-underwriter relationship strength measures the percent of the total volume of 
past equity deals of the issuer that is underwritten by the specific underwriter.  Industry is defined based on two-digit SIC code.  p-
values reported in brackets are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by deals.     
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           Panel A: Probability of winning a book manager position in an equity deal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -8.373 -8.818 -8.488 -9.054 -7.728 -8.316 -8.256 -8.250 -6.985 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.051        0.060 
 (0.00)        (0.00) 
Closeness  0.039       -0.020 
  (0.00)       (0.04) 
Betweenness   0.166      -0.119 
   (0.00)      (0.10) 
Reciprocity    0.002     -0.002 
 
 
  (0.20)     (0.26) 
 Density     -0.015    -0.020 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
Tie diversity      -0.007   -0.011 
 
 
   
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
 Industry diversity       -0.389  -0.151 
 
 
   
 
 (0.00)  (0.28) 
 Geographical         -0.448  
diversity        (0.00)  
    … x Commercial  0.010 0.043 0.087 0.027 0.013 0.032 1.673 1.995  
             bank dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
 
 
   
 
   
 
Market share 0.038 0.055 0.051 0.066 0.057 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.032 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
 
Loyalty index 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Industry experience 0.917 0.928 1.078 1.126 1.073 1.105 1.109 1.108 0.844 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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        Panel A (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
State experience 1.313 1.278 1.453 1.514 1.374 1.472 1.481 1.480 1.224 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Firm-underwriter  0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.035 
relationship strength (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Log (Expected  0.006 0.005 0.008 0.037 0.090 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.101 
proceeds) (0.62) (0.71) (0.51) (0.02) (0.00) (0.65) (0.66) (0.67) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 26.40 26.09 25.86 25.23 24.51 25.59 25.72 25.73 25.01 
N 970,894 970,894 970,894 794,516 601,809 970,894 970,894 970,894 531,138
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         Panel B: Probability of winning a book manager position in a debt deal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -5.688 -6.325 -5.607 -6.006 -3.958 -5.428 -5.301 -5.460 -6.145 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Network measures          
Degree 0.043        0.017 
 (0.00)        (0.02) 
Closeness  0.069       0.053 
  (0.00)       (0.00) 
Betweenness   0.100      -0.011 
   (0.00)      (0.56) 
Reciprocity    0.006     0.006 
 
 
  (0.00)     (0.00) 
 Density     -0.024    -0.013 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
Tie diversity      -0.017   0.007 
 
 
   
 (0.00)   (0.12) 
 Industry diversity       -0.901  0.329 
 
 
   
 
 (0.00)  (0.33) 
 Geographical         -0.565  
diversity        (0.00)  
    … x Commercial  0.016 0.043 0.158 0.031 0.015 0.063 1.944 2.161  
            bank dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
 
 
   
 
   
 
Market share 0.086 0.119 0.118 0.165 0.124 0.155 0.154 0.160 0.081 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
 
Loyalty index 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Industry experience 1.281 1.181 1.499 1.435 1.332 1.535 1.567 1.555 1.082 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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         Panel B (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
State experience 1.143 1.011 1.460 1.382 1.242 1.473 1.519 1.513 0.837 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Firm-underwriter  0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
relationship strength (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Log (Expected  -0.083 -0.083 -0.085 -0.079 -0.066 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.062 
proceeds) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 34.47 34.52 33.95 33.50 31.76 33.73 33.85 33.83 31.66 
N 419,555 419,555 419,555 337,929 314887 419,555 419,555 419,555 297,480
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The logistic regression results in Panel A of Table 4.6 suggest that large networks, 
close proximity to other underwriters and the exclusive network position of betweenness, 
help both investment banks and commercial banks win the book manager position.  
However, this relationship is even more pronounced for commercial banks.  Reciprocity 
is insignificant for investment banks, but maintaining highly reciprocated relationships 
help commercial banks win the book manager position.  The density has a negative 
coefficient, which means when an underwriter has a dense network with the partners 
working with each other, it is less likely to be selected as a book manager.  This effect is 
somewhat mitigated for commercial banks though.  It is possible that when the partners 
of an underwriter have extensive connections with each other, the likelihood of one of 
them selecting the underwriter as a joint book manager diminishes.   
Similar to the results in Table 4.5, maintaining relationships with diverse partners 
also lowers the likelihood of winning the deal for investment banks, but this is mitigated 
for commercial banks.  In unreported regressions, we repeat the analysis by limiting the 
eligible underwriters to those in the highest and lowest market share quintile and find 
qualitatively same results, although the effect of network on the likelihood of winning the 
equity book manager position is greater for large underwriters.    
As for the control variables, market share has positive and significant estimated 
coefficients as expected.  Underwriters with larger market shares are more likely to 
become book managers because they have more experience in placing deals, and thus 
may be better at pricing and distributing issues.  Having underwritten an equity deal in 
the same industry or state as the issuer during the previous four-year period significantly 
increases a bank’s chances of winning the deal as well.  However, in a related study that 
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uses debt and equity offerings, Asker and Ljungqvist (2007) document that the large 
established firms that engage in product market competition are disinclined to share 
underwriters with other firms in the same industry.     
When it comes to the likelihood of being selected as the book manager in a debt 
deal, the results in Panel B of Table 4.6 are similar to those of equity underwriting.  The 
only difference is that reciprocity is significant here.  Overall, the results in Table 4.6 
show that the underwriters with large and more homogenous networks that display higher 
closeness and betweenness are more likely to become book managers in equity and debt 
deals, and many of these results are more significant for commercial banks.  These results 
also largely confirm our findings on the overall market share from Table 4.5.     
 
4.5.3. Probability of winning a co-manager position 
 Co-managers comprise the top tier in syndicates after book managers and receive 
a substantial portion of fees.  Book managers have a significant discretion over the choice 
of co-managers, since co-managers are typically selected after the book managers.  
Therefore, we examine how not only the network characteristics, but also an 
underwriter’s tie to the book manager, affect the probability of being chosen as a co-
manager.  Unlike previous studies that use a binary variable to indicate an existence of a 
relationship between two underwriters, we use geodesic distance, which measures the 
number of relationships along the shortest possible path between an underwriter and the 
IPO book manager.  For instance, Corwin and Schultz (2004) have previously showed 
that if an underwriter served in the previous ten syndicates of the book manager, it is 
more likely to be included in the current syndicate as a member.  By contrast, we use the 
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degrees of separation—geodesic distance—in this study.  However, geodesic distance is 
only computed for connected pairs.  Thus, whenever an underwriter has no ties to the IPO 
book manager, we use the sum of one and the maximum geodesic distance of that period.   
 In Table 4.7, the sample consists of 14,344 equity and 15,567 debt deals that 
employ co-managers.  The models include one observation for each eligible underwriter 
for each deal, and the dependent variable equals to one if an underwriter is identified as 
the co-manager in a deal, and zero otherwise.  The set of eligible underwriters include 
those that serve in an equity or debt deal in a managing underwriter role during the year 
of the offering.  In order to make the sample more manageable, we further limit the 
eligible underwriters to those with previous experience in the same industry as the issuer. 
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Table 4.7:  Underwriter network and the probability of winning a co-manager position  
The table presents the estimated coefficients of logistic regressions of the probability of winning a co-manager position in an equity 
(Panel A) and debt (Panel B) deal.  The sample includes 14,344 equity and 15,567 debt deals that employ co-managers.  The models 
include one observation for each eligible underwriter for each deal, and the dependent variable equals to one if an underwriter is 
identified as the co- manager in a deal, and zero otherwise.  The set of eligible equity (debt) underwriters include those that serve as 
either a book or co-manager in an equity (debt) offering during the issue year and have previous underwriting experience in the same 
industry as the issuer.  Degree is the percent of all other underwriters a specific underwriter maintains ties with.  Closeness is an 
eigenvector centrality measure that captures how close an underwriter is to all other underwriters.  Betweenness measures how often 
an underwriter falls on the shortest possible paths between pairs of other underwriters.  Reciprocity refers to the percent of all ties of 
an underwriter that are reciprocated.   Density shows the percent of all possible ties that can exist among the partners of an underwriter 
that are actually present.  Tie diversity measures how many other non-redundant underwriters an underwriter can reach within two 
degrees of separation for each partner.  Industry and geographical diversity refer to the numbers of different industries and states that 
an underwriter’s partners specialize in, divided by the number of partners.  Geodesic distance measures the number relationships along 
the shortest path between the underwriter and the book manager of the deal.  Loyalty index measures the percent of the time that the 
underwriter is retained as a book manager in the subsequent issues of its client firms.  Previous state experience dummy equals to one 
if an underwriter had underwritten an equity (debt) deal in the same state as the issuer during the previous four-year period, and zero 
otherwise.  Firm-underwriter relationship strength measures the percent of the total volume of past equity (debt) deals of the issuer 
that is underwritten by the specific underwriter.  Industry is defined based on two-digit SIC code.  p-values reported in brackets are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered by each deal.     
Panel A: Probability of winning a co-manager position in an equity deal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -4.865 -6.056 -5.034 -5.088 -5.227 -4.183 -3.892 -3.855 -2.811 -1.048 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) 
Network measures           
Degree 0.042         0.018 
 (0.00)         (0.03) 
Closeness  0.064        -0.011 
  (0.00)        (0.30) 
Betweenness   0.038       -0.031 
   (0.00)       (0.20) 
Reciprocity    -0.001      -0.003 
 
 
  (0.20)      (0.10) 
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Panel A (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Density     0.004     -0.003 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
 (0.28) 
 Tie diversity      -0.033    -0.006 
 
 
   
 (0.00)    (0.29) 
 Industry        -1.414   -0.229 
       diversity       (0.00)   (0.42) 
Geographical        -1.577   
      diversity        (0.00)   
Geodesic          -1.193 -0.930 
         distance         (0.00) (0.00) 
      … x Commercial   -0.001 0.019 0.043 0.010 0.011 0.047 1.245 1.432 0.331  
          bank dummy (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
 
 
   
 
   
  
Market share -0.031 -0.014 -0.001 0.007 0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.96) (0.57) (0.02) (0.11) 
         
  
Loyalty index 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
  
State experience 1.215 1.081 1.369 1.361 1.335 1.227 1.264 1.261 1.131 1.212 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
  
Firm-bank  0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.017 
relationship strength (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
  
Log (Proceeds) 0.075 0.071 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.024 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 6.85 7.50 6.17 5.98 5.87 7.31 7.17 7.20 8.74 7.96 
N 1385246 1385246 1385246 1281420 1306240 1385246 1385246 1385246 1385246 1187854 
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Panel B: Probability of winning a co-manager position in a debt syndicate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -4.785 -6.013 -4.695 -5.057 -3.424 -3.753 -4.555 -4.645 -2.624 -9.965 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Network measures           
Degree 0.031         -0.018 
 (0.00)         (0.25) 
Closeness  0.080        0.089 
  (0.00)        (0.00) 
Betweenness   0.107       0.019 
   (0.61)       (0.05) 
Reciprocity    0.004      0.002 
 
 
  (0.00)      (0.01) 
Density     -0.021     -0.013 
 
 
   
(0.00) 
   
 (0.00) 
 Tie diversity      -0.058    0.013 
 
 
   
 (0.00)    (0.10) 
 Industry        -0.287   -0.051 
       diversity       (0.01)   (0.43) 
Geographical        -0.168   
      diversity        (0.00)   
Geodesic          -1.576 -1.359 
         distance         (0.00) (0.00) 
      … x Commercial   0.004 0.139 0.033 0.006 0.008 0.031 0.698 0.807 0.394  
          bank dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
 
 
   
 
   
  
Market share -0.010 0.002 -0.002 0.022 0.008 0.022 0.036 0.027 0.027 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
         
  
Loyalty index 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Panel B (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
State experience 1.040 0.877 1.208 1.265 1.099 1.104 1.282 1.291 1.154 0.839 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 (0.00) 
     
 
   
  
Firm-bank  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.010 
relationship strength (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 
   
  
Log (Proceeds) 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.003 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.95) 
     
 
   
  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 5.59 6.01 5.24 4.79 5.45 5.27 4.90 4.91 6.35 7.16 
N 1201751 1201751 1201751 1143493 1195116 1201751 1201751 1201751 1201751 1002485 
 
 148 
The estimated coefficients on all the network measures in Panel A of Table 4.7 
are significant, except for reciprocity.  These results indicate that peer network is crucial 
for underwriters for winning co-management appointments in equity deals.  The 
underwriters with larger and denser networks that have central and between positions are 
more likely to be selected as a co-manager, and the effect is usually more pronounced for 
commercial banks.  Having diverse partners lowers the likelihood of an investment bank 
being selected as a co-manager, but the effect is opposite for commercial banks.  The 
negative sign on network diversity measures are consistent with the greater specialization 
in investment banking.  It is possible that investment banks maintain close ties with other 
banks that are similar in terms of geographical or sector specialization and more likely to 
cooperate with them.    
The estimated coefficients on geodesic distance are significant and negative, 
which means that the further away an underwriter is from the book manager, the less 
likely it is to be selected as a co-manager on the deal.  As evidenced by the estimated 
coefficient of -1.193, an increase of one more relation along the geodesic path drastically 
lowers the probability of winning a co-manager position.  However, this effect is 
somewhat mitigated for commercial banks, as the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
term between geodesic distance and commercial bank dummy in model 9 in Panel A is 
0.331 and significant.  This shows that social distance is less harmful for commercial 
banks perhaps because they have other advantages that can enhance their appeal as 
partners.  Overall, not just large and central networks, but also direct ties to the book 
manager, helps an underwriter win the co-manager appointment.     
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In terms of control variables, there is mixed evidence regarding underwriter 
market share.  Having previous underwriting experience in the same state as the issuer 
and maintaining a relationship with the issuer increase the likelihood of being selected as 
a co-manager.  Since the number of co-managers increases with deal size, deal size has 
positive estimated coefficients as well.    
 Panel B of Table 4.7 presents the results of the likelihood of becoming a co-
manager in a debt issue.  All the network variables, except for betweenness, are 
significant and also all the interaction terms with commercial bank dummy are significant 
as well.  Underwriters with larger networks and more central position are more likely to 
be selected as a co-manager in debt deals similar to equity deals, and the effect is more 
pronounced for commercial banks.  Underwriters with more reciprocated ties are also 
more likely to be selected, consistent with the notion of reciprocity.  However, those with 
dense networks do not seem to necessarily gain from it, contrary to the results from 
equity underwriting in Panel A.  An underwriter is more likely to be chosen as a co-
manager in an equity deal if its partners have extensive ties to each other,  but the effect 
is opposite for debt deals.  Having diverse partners lowers the likelihood of an investment 
bank being selected as a co-manager, but the effect is opposite for commercial banks.  
The results on geodesic distance are similar to those in equity underwriting.  
Underwriters that are further away from the book manager are less likely to be selected as 
a co-manager in debt deals, but this effect is again weaker for commercial banks.    
In fact, Table 4.8 shows the geodesic distance between the book managers and the 
actual co-managers hired in all the issues that employ co-managers.  In equity 
underwriting, almost 80 percent of all the co-managers are the previous partners of the 
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book managers as they fall within one degree from the book manager.  The same ratio is 
even higher for debt underwriting.  In debt securities that employ co-managers, 90 
percent of the time the co-managers are the previous partners of the book managers.  The 
evidence shows that underwriters dominantly work with their previous partners.  As 
shown in the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3, on average, an equity underwriter 
maintains ties with 4.15 percent of all other equity underwriters and debt underwriter 
maintains ties with 10.51 percent of the entire network, but they choose their co-
managers from their networks 80 and 90 percent of the time, respectively.  This further 
highlights the importance of peer relationships.   
 
 
Table 4.8:  Social distance between book managers and co-managers 
The following table displays the social distance between the book managers and the co-
managers of all 14,344 equity and 15,567 debt offerings that employ co-managers.  
Degree of separation refers to geodesic distance, which is the number of relationships 
along the shortest possible path between a pair of underwriters.       
     
Co-managers selected within Equity Debt 
   
1 degree of separation  79.61% 90.12% 
2 degrees of separation 89.86% 92.89% 
3 degrees of separation 90.41% 92.96% 
4 degrees of separation from the book manager 90.57% 92.97% 
 
 
 
  
4.6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the impact of underwriter peer networks on the 
underwriters’ market share by using measures from social network analysis and sample 
of U.S. equity and debt securities issued between 1970 and 2007.  The network measures 
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are constructed using ties that result from underwriting syndicates.  Using these peer 
networks, an underwriter can improve its market share and consequently its revenues.   
We find that underwriters, especially commercial bank underwriters, with larger 
networks occupying central positions capture higher market shares in the following year 
in equity underwriting.  We obtain similar results when we estimate the likelihood of an 
underwriter winning the book manager position in individual equity deals.  Moreover, 
commercial banks experience higher market shares from diverse peer networks, whereas 
investment banks are more likely to benefit from networks that are more homogenous in 
terms of the partners’ industry and geographical specialization in equity underwriting.  In 
debt underwriting, some of the aspects of peer network remain significant for 
underwriters, but, in general, the effect of network on their overall market share is 
smaller. 
Having a larger network with higher closeness and betweenness also increases the 
likelihood of an underwriter being selected as a co-manager in both equity and debt 
underwriting.  Proximity to the specific book manager is also important.  Underwriters 
that are further away from the book manager are less likely to be selected as a co-
manager, but this effect is weaker for commercial banks.  The evidence shows that 
underwriters prefer to work with their previous partners as the majority of the actual co-
managers are the previous partners of the book managers.   
The main contribution of this study is to illustrate the impact of peer network on 
underwriter market share in the U.S. capital market.  Market share is a central driver of 
revenues in investment banking, an industry that has garnered increased attention 
recently.  We also highlight the differences between commercial bank and investment 
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bank underwriters.  Commercial banks utilize peer networks and generate greater deal 
flow from these networks compared to investment banks, and they also benefit from ties 
to diverse partners, while homogenous networks are more beneficial to investment banks.    
Overall, this study adds to our knowledge of the role of social networks for underwriters 
in the security issuance process.   
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